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EDITED BY: Letícia Vitral, Andrew Mark Creighton

EDITORIAL TEAM: Andrew Mark Creighton
Eleni Alexandri
Karl Kivastik
Katre Pärn
Keily Tammaru
Nelly Mäekivi

COVER ART: Kaustubh Khare

ADDRESS: Hortus Semioticus
Jakobi 2-302, 51005 Tartu, Estonia


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FOREWORD | EESSÕNA

The 8th issue of the journal *Hortus Semioticus* is a showcase of the diversity of contexts and approaches currently found in the study of semiotics. This issue's contributions reveal how intermedial and intersemiotic relations permeate our own understanding and perception of the world and its meaning-making potentials. Written in either English or Estonian, the works here present broad or specific case studies of semiotic problems in the intersections between literature, music, graphic novels, paintings, cinema, and human perception and subjectivity.


The first paper, "From lyrics to poetry and from poetry to lyrics", by **Rene Kiis**, approaches the relationship between poetry and song lyrics from the perspective of rap music. Despite poetry and singing being closely connected from a historical point of view, many of the sound-related aspects of poetic texts lost their central role in the art of poetry. The author, however, demonstrated how these aspects are still highly relevant in the poetic context and practices of rap music.

Helena Haller's paper "American Splendor: Conditionality and reality in the adaptation of a graphic novel" deals with the intermedial relations between fiction cinema, graphic novel and documentary cinema in 2003's movie *American*

Hortus Semioticuse kaheksas number ilmestab, kui erinevatel aladel viiakse läbi semiootilisi uurimusi. Mitmed selles numbris ilmuvalt artiklid käsitlevad intermeedialisi ja intersemiootilisi suhted kultuuris, nende tähendusloomelist potentsiaali ja mõju maailma mõistmisele ja tajumisele. Artiklid, mis on kirjutatud nii inglise kui ka eesti keeles, sisaldavad nii üldiseid arutlusi kui ka konkreetseid analüüse kirjanduse, muusika, koomiksi, maali, kino, inimtaju ja subjektiivsuse ristumiskohal.

Numbri esimene artikkel, **Rene Kiis** "Laulust luuleks ja luulest lauluks" uurib laulusõnade ja luule vahelisi suhteid räppmuusika näitel. Ehkki luule ja laul on ajalooliselt tihedates seostes, on paljud kõlalised aspektid aja jooksul luules oma keskse koha kaotanud. Kiis näitab, kuidas need aspektid on endiselt olulised räppmuusika sõna-seades.

Helena Haller artikkel "American Splendor: tinglikkus ja reaalsus ühe koomiksiseeria ekraniseeringus" uurib intermeedialisi suhteid mängufilmi, koomiksi ja dokumentaalfilmi vahel 2003. aasta filmis *American Splendor*, mis põhineb Harvey Pekari autobiograafilistel koomiksitel. Haller uurib



Splendor, an adaptation of Harvey Pekar's autobiographical graphic novels. Haller analyses the way different media contribute to the dynamics between fictionality and factuality in the movie.

Gabriele Teodoro's article, “Iconicity between literature and painting in Brazilian modernist portraits”, examines translation and intermediality in Brazilian modernist pictorial portraits through Peircean semiotics. Teodoro takes special interest in the transition from the notion of iconicity as similarity/resemblance, to the ability iconic signs have to reveal new information about their object.

Tiiu Tali's paper “Psychopathological subjectivity in Esther Roth's *Can Go Through Skin*” studies various cinematic devices that are used to represent psychopathological subjectivity in 2009 movie “Can Go Through Skin”. Tali uses Edward Branigan's, Jacques Aumont's, and Michel Chion's approaches to film theory in order to account for both visual and acoustic forms of subjective narration in cinema.

Tom Boyle's contribution, “Syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in Grace Paley's *Wants*”, applies Lotman's structural model of the artistic text to analyse the story *Wants*, from the Jewish-American writer Grace Paley. It proposes an understanding of the text as a primary material on itself, where explicit intertextual references, and implicit references to the author herself can be traced through the textual structure on its own terms.

Alina-Ruxandra Mircea's paper, “Being Ziggy Stardust: a semiotic problem”,


seda, kuidas erinevad meediumid panutavad fiktisionaalsuse ja faktiilise dünaamikasse filmis.

Gabriele Teodoro artikkel “Ikoonilisus kirjanduse ja maali vahel Brasiilia modernistide portreedes” uurib Brasiilia modernistlike portreede tölkimist ja intermeedialisust peirceaanliku semiootika kaudu. Teodoro analüüsib, kuidas ikoonilised märgid muutuvad lihtsalt sarnase kujutise asemel oma objekti kohta uue informatsiooni pakkujaks.

Tiiu Tali uurib oma artiklis “Psühhopatoloogiline subjektiivsus Esther Rotsi filmis *Võib minna läbi naha*” erinevaid kinematograafilisi vahendeid, mida kasutatakse psühhopatoloogilise subjektiivsuse kujutamisel 2009. aasta filmis *Võib minna läbi naha*. Tali kasutab Edward Branigani, Jacques Aumont' ja Michel Chioni filmitooreetilisi käsitleusi, andmaks ülevaate nii visuaalse kui ka akustilise subjektiivsuse vormidest filmikunstis.

Tom Boyle'i uurimus “Süntagmaatilised ja paradigmaatilised suhted Grace Paley novellis “Wants”” rakendab Juri Lotmani kuntilise teksti struktuuraset mudelit Grace Paley novelli “Wants” analüüsimsel. Artiklis vaadeldakse teksti primaarse materjalina, uurides, kuidas nii otseosed intertekstualsed viited kui ka varjatud osutused autorile enesele on teksti struktuuris iseomasel kujul tuvastatavad.

Alina-Ruxandra Mircea „Olla Ziggy Stardust: semiootiline probleem” ana-



analyses the Ziggy Stardust artistic persona of David Bowie as a converging element for all the sign systems constitutive of the impersonation as a whole. It addresses, from a semiotic point of view the ambivalence and the boundaries of the relationship performer-performance.

Andrei Bleahu's text, "The human symbolic revolution: An Uexküllian perspective", makes use of *umwelt* theory and Darwinian perspective on the symbolic revolution to examine human perception and their symbolic worlds, offering a potential synthesis between Darwinian and Uexküllian scholarship.

Despite being initially prepared for a 2011 unpublished issue of the journal, the papers by Tali, Haller, Mircea and Boyle remain extremely pertinent to the discussion of the crossing of boundaries between media – as such phenomena became more and more present and visible in contemporary years.

Readers will also find summary of an interview in which **Aleksandr Fadeev** discusses a number of questions posed to him by **Andrew Mark Creighton**, audio file is available online. Fadeev in this interview mentions his time as a PhD student at the University of Tartu, as well as his own experiences with studying and implementing Lev Vygotsky's theory and scholarship.

This issue was edited by **Letícia Vitral** and **Andrew Mark Creighton**, with the assistance of **Katre Pärn** and **Nelly Mäekivi**.


lüüsib David Bowie lavapersonat Ziggy Stardust kui kehastumist konstitueerivate märgisüsteemide koondumispunkti ning uurib semiootilisest perspektiivist esineja ja esinemise vaheliste piiride ambivalentsust.

Andrei Bleahu artikkel "Inimese sümboliline revolutsioon: uexküllilik perspektiiv" kasutab Uexkülli oma ilma teooriat ja darvinlikku vaadet sümbolisele revolutsioonile inimese tajus ja sümbolilises maailmas, pakkudes võimalikku sünteesi uexkülliliku ja darvinliku lähenemise vahel.

Ehkki Tali, Halleri, Boyle' ja Mircea artiklid olid algsest kirjutatud 2011. aastal avaldamata jäänud numbri jaoks, ei ole nad oma värskust kaotanud ning on asjakohaseks panuseks meediumitevaheliste piiriületuste ja intersemiootiliste nähtuse uurimisse, mis on uurimissuunana viimastel aastatel esiplaanile tõusnud.

Lugejad leiavad numbrist ka kokkuvõtte intervjuust, kus **Aleksandr Fadeev** arutleb küsimuste üle, mille talle esitas **Andrew Mark Creighton**. Intervjuu audiofail on kätesaadav veebiversioonis. Fadeev räägib intervjuus oma kogemustest doktorandina Tartu Ülikoolis ning oma uurimustööst, milles ta rakendab Lev Võgotski teooriaid ja uurimistulemusi.

Numbri toimetajateks olid **Letícia Vitral** ja **Andrew Mark Creighton**, abis **Katre Pärn** ja **Nelly Mäekivi**.



LAULUST LUULEKS ja luulest lauluks

Rene Kiis

Tartu Ülikool, semiootika osakond


Abstrakt: Luule ja laul on lääne kultuuris tihedalt seotud olnud ning eraldiseisev luulekunst ongi õieti laulukultuurist välja kasvanud. Aja jooksul on luulekunst iseseisvunud ning tekstile kõlalised aspektid, mis varasemalt veel üsnagi struktuuri keskmes olid, tagaplaanile vajunud. Seevastu laulusõnade vallas, mis samuti poeesia alla liigitub, pole kõlakujundid kunagi oma aktuaalsust kaotanud. Eriti ilmekalt töusevad kõlakujundid esile räppmuusika lüürikas, mille tekstit ongi enamasti üles ehitatud kindlale rõtmile ja riimitud ridadele. Artikkel arutleb Juri Lotmani kultuurisemiootikale toetudes luulekunsti muutumise dünaamika üle, kus mõned varasemalt süsteemi tuumas olnud kunstilised võtted tänases kõrgkultuuri luules tagaplaanile on vajunud, töustes samal ajal jõuliselt esiplaanile selle valdkonna popkultuurses kasutuses – räppmuusikas.

Märksõnad: luule, laulusõnad, räpp, Juri Lotman

From lyrics to poetry and from poetry to lyrics

Abstract: Poetry and singing have been closely connected in Western culture, and poetry as a separate form of art likely grew out of the song tradition. Over time, the art of poetry has become independent, and sound-related aspects of poetic texts, which used to be at the centre of the structure, have been relegated to the background. On the other hand, in the field of song lyrics, which is also part of poetics, patterns of sound have never lost their relevance. Sound patterns are especially important in the lyrics of rap music, which are strongly built around a particular rhythm and rhyming verses. On the basis of Juri Lotman's cultural semiotics, the article discusses the dynamics of change in the field of poetic texts, in which certain artistic techniques that were previously at the core of the system have fallen into the background in today's published poetry but are now intensively used in the field's pop-cultural side – in rap music.

Keywords: poetry, lyrics, rap, Juri Lotman



I.

Tartu-Moskva kultuurisemiootika pärandi järgi tuleks kultuuri käsitleda kui tekste vastu võtvat, töötlevat, säilitavat, loovat ja edasi andvat dünaamilist mehhanismi (M. Lotman, 2012: 71), mis töötab kui lakkamatu keelte ja kultuurikoodide katel. Oma olemuselt on ta seega üks heterogeenne moodustis, mis jaguneb paljudeks allsüsteemideks – osad neist kultuuris parajasti kesksemad, paiknedes selle tuumas; osa aga neist körvalisemad, paiknedes kultuuri perifeerias. Ent nagu Juri Lotmangi rõhutab, ei ole tuum ja perifeeria staatilised, vaid pidevas muutumises – tuuma ja perifeeria alaline kohtade vahetamine on kultuuridünaamika üks alusmehhanism (J. Lotman 1990: 266). Selline jaotumine ei ole aga ainult iseloomulik kultuurile tervikuna, vaid rakendub ka kõigile selle allsüsteemidele.

Järgnev on katse skemaatiliselt kirjeldada *luulekunsti* kui lääne kultuuri ühe olulise allsüsteemi dünaamilist muutuvust pikema aja jooksul. Nimelt paistab, et luulekultuuris on üks omamoodi märgiline ring täis saanud – see on aja jooksul kaotanud oma hääle, oma laulu; ning on tänaseks oma lauluhääle taas võimsalt ja laialt üles leidnud, kuid esmapilgul veidi ootamatus kontekstis – räppmuusikas.


Ajalooliselt on luule ja laul ikka seotud olnud. Ka Homerost, surematute vanakreeka eeposte „Illiase“ ja „Odüsseia“ loojat, on just pimedaks *laulikuks* nimetatud. Samuti on varasematel põhilistel luuležanritel – pastoraalidel ja oodidel (neid harrastas kirjutada ka Eesti esimene kunstluule eksperimentaator Kristjan Jaak Peterson) lauludega nii mõndagi pistmist, kuna esimene neist on karjase-*/lau/* ning teine ülistus-*/lau/*. Siinkohal võib veel meenutada, et ka esimene põhjalikum Tartu kajastus kirjanduses sai teoks just Käsu Hansu kaebe-*laulus*. Ning ehk pole kokkusattumus seegi, et Petersoni tänaseks pronksi valatud ridades küsib meie kultuuri esipoeet: „Kas siis selle maa keel / *laulutuules* ei või / taevani tõustes üles / igavikku omale otsida?“

Ometi tundub esmapilgul, et luuletusi tänapäeval kuigi tihti enam ei laulda, veel enam – tänases luulekunstis valdag vabavärsistus kohati isegi tõrgub olemast kindlarütmiliselt esitatav, teisisõnu – lauldag.

Luuletus sai alguse muusikast, laulust. Kui laul pages raamatusse, kaotas ta oma viisi, kaotas oma hääle, ja muutus luuletuseks. Seda, mida ennen kuuldi kõrvaga, nähti nüüd silmaga. Luuletus on laulu kõrval nagu tiivutu lind, nagu „haige tiivaga lind“. (Runnel, 1988: 14)

II.

Vaadeldes aga, millega luuletekst poeetilises mõttes tehtud on, võib lihtsustavalalt ühe võimaliku vastusena pakkuda, et *kujundlikust kõnest*. Ning võimalikud kujundlikkuse vormid jagunevad poeetilise keelekasutuse puhul neljaks – kõnekujundid (metafoorid,




võrdlused, epiteedid jms), lausekujundid (kordused, vastandid, sõnamängud, siirded jms), piltkujundid (kirjamärkide paigutamise teel graafiliste figuuride loomine) ning kõlakujundid (rütmid ehk värsimõõdud, erinevad riimitüübidi ja muud kõlamängud) (Merilai, 2007). Möeldes laulu ja eeltoodud kujunditüüpide omavaheliste suhete peale, tundub, et laulul on olemuslikult kõige enam pistmist kõlakujunditega, ning kõige vähem pistmist piltkujunditega.

Luule algas laulmisest. Luule on häälleta laul. Kui ka sõnad kaovad, jäääb luulest pilt. Nõnda on luuletus laulu ja pildi vahemees. Ta on see kuuldas, mis on nähtav, ning see nähtav, mis on kuuldas. Sõnana. (Runnel 1988: 15)

Proovides seda olukorda lahata veidi kultuuridünaamika perspektiivist, saab välja joonistada skemaatilise arengu laulu ja luule suhetest. Varemalt, kui luule oli veel peamiselt *kõlaoline* ning eeskätt *aulis*, olid tema süsteemi tuumas end dominantsetena kinnitanud kõla- ja lausekujundid. See oli suuresti tingitud ka asjaolust, et need tekstdid olid suuliseks deklameerimiseks, mitte lugemiseks; ning riimide ja korduste kasutamine teenis selles kontekstis ka mnemoonilist funktsiooni. Mida enam need kaunid kõlad aga raamatutesse pugesid, seda enam hakkas kõlakujundite keskne tähtsus langema, sest ruumi tuli varasemast üha enam teha ka könekujunditele. Piltkujund on selles reas kõige hilisem nähtus, algsest dominantsele kõlakujundile oma olemuselt lausa vastanduv kujundlikkuse vorm, kuna pilt võib kõla isegi välistada. Piltkujundid on aga luulemaastikul endiselt väga perifeerne nähtus ning tähistavad pigem juba piiriala, kust edasi kirjamärkidega enam mõtet minna ei ole.

Eesti luule arengu puhul paistab selline luulevalla dünaamilise arengu mudel suuresti kehtivat. Alguse saab luule ikka laulust – eesti kultuuris regilaulust, mille regivärss on väga korrastatud kõlastruktuuriga. Kirjaliku kunstluuletraditsiooni tekkimise järel oli kõlakujund veel üsna keskne organiseerimisprintsiip – kõik varased eesti luuleklassikud on kirjutanud peamiselt ikka kindla värsimõõduga ja selge riimiskeemiga tekste, hoides kõlakujundite lippu körgel. Selline ideaal kehtis suuresti veel 20. sajandi teise pooleni, mil leidsid aset isegi möningad kriitilised debatid vabavärsi teemal. Sisuks ikka see, kas nii, selge rütmi ja helikorrastuseta tohib üldse luuletusi kirjutada. Seda võib pidada ilmselt hetkeks, mil könekujundid kinnistasid enam oma koha luuleilma tuumas, tõrjudes seal aegamisi välja kõlakujundite arsenali. Vaadates tänast, 21. sajandi valdavalt vabavärsilist luulet, jäääb töesti mulje, et kõlamängudest tunduvalt kesksemateks on saanud könekujundid.

J. Lotmani struktuuridünaamika mudeli järgi on see aga loomulik asjade areng. Mingit tüüpi koodid kehtestavad ennast kultuuri tuumas, surudes samal ajal perifeeriasse seal varem domineerinud koodid. Väidan, et *laulvus* ja kõlamängud on luulekirjandusest uuemal ajal surutud enam perifeeria poole. Avaldada trükis rütmistatud riimluulet on täna justkui vanamoodne. Ja eriti halb, kui see veel lihtne ka juhtub olema, sest siis saab selle automaatselt mõttetuks vjemmalvärsiks sildistades kõrvale lükata. Ent tasub silmas pidada, et perifeeria pole mingi maha kantud koodide arhiiv, vaid hoopis intensiivsema semiootilise aktiivsusega piirkond.




III.

Ehkki laulusõnade kujul on luule oma laulval kujul tegelikult kogu aeg edasi elanud, pole neile kunstluule domineerimise ajal omistatud *kirjanduslikku* väärtust, mille all pean siinkohal silmas nende tekstile kirjastatust. Küll aga on kirjandusliku väärtusega tekste muusikute poolt viisistatud. Ruja meloodiate saatel on linni laulud nii H. Runneli, J. Viidingu, J. Liivi kui ka A. Alliksaare tekste, kui nimetada vaid mõned tänased luuleklassikud. Laulusõnade kirjandusliku staatuse küsimus on aga hakanud viimasel ajal muutuma, mille tugevaks märgiks on Bob Dylanile 2016. aastal omistatud Nobeli kirjanduspreeemia tema laulusõnade eest. Siinmail avaldas Mait Vaik 2012. aastal luulekogu pealkirjaga „Kõgil on alati õigus“, milles sisalduvad tekstit olid paljudele eestlastele suuresti juba aastakümneid tuttavad (või lausa peas) – Metro Luminali, Vennaskonna, Sõpruse Puiestee, The Tuberkuloitedi ja Kosmikute laulusõnade näol.

Luule ja muusika piirialadel tegutsejaid on üsna palju. Tänasel luulemaastikul võib nimetada mitmeid autoreid, kes lisaks luuletaja-rollile esinevad ka muusikutena. Mõne näitena võib välja tuua Aapo Ilvese, Lauri Sommeri (peamine muusikaline projekt Kago nime all), Jaan Pehki (muusikuna Orelipoiss) ning Kristiina Ehini (ansamblis Naised Köögis). Teisalt on neidki, kes on eeskätt muusikud, kuid on oma lugude tekste luuleraamatutena avaldanud – nii Villu Tamme kui ka Tõnu Trubetsky on mõlemad avaldanud kaks punkluule kogumikku, mille tekstit on viisistatud peamiselt J.M.K.E. ja Vennaskonna lugudeks.

Samal ajal on laulvus ennast luulevalla perifeerias aga kogunud ning naasnud ehk palju suurema kõlapinnaga kui seda tänane luulekirjandus ongi. Nimelt räppmuusikas. Räpptekstit pole oma olemuselt midagi muud kui kindla rütmiga lõppriimilised luuletused, mis oma pikkuses teevad tihti keskmisele trükitud luuletusele silmad ette. Räppmuusikat kuulavad täna tuhanded noored (ja eks vanadki), kes eesti keele tunnis võibolla Marie Underi sonettide peale kulmu kortsutavad, kuid vahetunnis kõige ehtsama riimluule klappidest mängima panevad, võibolla isegi mõistmata, et tegemist on sama asjaga erinevas kastmes. Räppmuusika kontekstis on kõlakujundid muidugi taas valdkonna tuumstruktuurides, sest need tekstit on sarnaselt varase luuletraditsiooniga loodud just suuliseks esituseks.

Need murtud ridadega tekstit on sisuliselt luuletused, mis on kas kirjutatud või kohandatud muusika saatel esitamiseks. Helitaust – mida räppmuusikas markeerib üldiselt sõna *beat* – on selles žanris üldiselt väga kindla rütmiga ja pigem monotoonne, dikteerides sellega ka tekstile väga kindla struktuuri. Kuna tähtsad on ridade kõlavus ja seotus – tavaliselt markeeritud sõnaga *flow* –, siis on räppteksti värsid struktureerid enamasti lõppriimide läbi (nagu tihti ka teiste žanrite laulusõnade puhul). See, kas need värsid ja riimid ka kunstiliselt heal tasemel on, on täiesti omaette teema ja varieerub esitajate (ja ka lugude) lõikes seinast seina, aga vähemalt mõne artisti puhul on tekstile kunstiliselt kõrge väärthus väljaspool kahtlust. Näiteks võib eesti plaadifirma Legendaarne Records kodulehelt 12EEK Monkey lüürika kohta



luggedat: „Kirjanik ja kirjandusteadlane Lauri Sommer nimetas Prima Vista kirjandusfestivali patroonina 12EEK Monkey lüürifikat juba kõrgpoeesiaks.“¹ Samuti on tänane eesti gängsta-räpi esinumber Beebilõust (kodanikunimega Andrus Elbing) töestanud oma sõnakunsti oskusi kahe luulekoguga („Siin Beebilõust, tere!“ 2006 ning „Resotsialiseerumine“ 2009). Veel üheks näiteks on Tommyboy (kodanikunimega Toomas Tilk), kes on avaldanud oma tekste raamatukaante vahel pealkirjaga „Aja kiri“ (2010).


Jättes siinkohal kõrvale räpptekstide kunstilise taseme küsimuse, tahan ma tähelepanu juhtida vaid sellele, et peaaegu kõik tänased eesti räpparid riimivad oma tekste ning vormistavad need murtud ridadega värsseideks, mille lugeja kõhklematult luuletusteks liigitaks, kui need trükitud kujul näiteks raamatukaante vahelt vastu vaataksid. Tegin kerge „vaatluse“ ja kuulasin fokuseeritud huviga läbi umbes 200 eesti räpilugu (lihtne korrrata – Youtube' otsing „eesti räpp“ pakub mitmeid kogukaid esitusloendeid), mille tulemusena ma pean tõdema, et vabavärsilist eesti räppi peaaegu et pole. Ainus, kes selles osas üldistest suundumustest erineb ning ka riimideta tekste räpib, on Chalice (kodanikunimega Jarek Kasar); ja on põnev märkida, et tema ehk kõige laiemalt tuntud tekst „Minu inimesed“ on suures osas vabavärsiline tekst (kuigi ka mitte päris ilma riimideta).

Vabavärssi leiab üksikutel juhtudel ka teiste artistide loomingust, kuid tavaliselt tuleneb see sellest, et lugu ongi üles ehitatud paari mõjuva rea kordamisele (milleks võib olla nt „suured köllid“ vms) ja kaasahaaravale beatile – taolisi klubihitti-laadseid üllitisi tähistatakse sel maaistikul sõnaga *banger*. Vastava näite leiab ka Beebilõusta loomingust (lugu „Imperato“), kelle teised lood ja tekstdid rajanevad peamiselt jutustaval riimis värsil ning kes on oma viimasel plaadil kasutanud muu hulgas Puškini värsse (loos „Vang“) ning kahes loos Indrek Hirve tekste. Riimideta värsi esineb tänasel räpimaaistikul umbkaudu sama palju kui seda esines 100 aastat tagasi luulemaastikul, ehk teisisõnu – seda praktiliselt pole –, samas kui luulemaastiku on see nüüdseks vallutanud ja klassikalise vormi kõrvale tõrjunud.

Rääkides aga sellest, mis eristab klassikalist riimluulet tänastest räpitestidest (mis on minu hinnangul samuti eeskätt riimluule), siis võib välja tuua järgmised punktid. Peamiselt erineb tekstile pikkus, sest üldiselt on räpplugu pikem kui 3-4 stroofine luuletus. Saavutamaks lüüriliselt „kauem mängivat“ tulemust, on räpparitel kolm peamist lahendust: 1) kirjutada tekstdid pikemaks; 2) kasutada loos palju kordust (lisatakse näiteks korratav refrään); 3) teha teiste räpparitega koostööde nii üksikute lugude kui ka grupeeringu tasandil. Viimast lahendust kohtab üsna palju – on ju näiteks Toe Tag, Hanf Kung või A-rühm eeskätt räpparite grupeeringuud, mille tulemusena saavad lood pikema ja mitmekesisema ilme (nii nagu grupeerusid varasemalt luuletajad).

Ei saa ka öelda, et luule ja räpp oma temaatika poolest eriti palju erineks, sest mõlemas esineb väga suur temaatiline varieeruvus, mis ulatub naturalistlikust

¹ <http://legendaarne.ee/artist/12-eek-monkey/>



realismist surrealistini ning vihastest protestist armastustekstini. Mihail Lotman kirjutab: „Üks Juri Lotmani meelismõtteteri piiblist oli „Kivi, mille hooneehitajad põlgasid, on saanud nurgakiviks!““ (2012: 131). Lähtudes eelöeldust võib parafraseerides märkida, et *riim, mille luuletajad põlgasid, on saanud räpi nurgakiviks!*

IV.


Nende põgusate, jäämägede tippe markeerivate tähelepanekute läbi olen ma tahtnud skematiseerida eesti luulekultuuri muutumist kõlalisuse aspektist. Siin välja toodud näited ja muutused mahuvad peamiselt viimase poole sajandi sisse, kuid kindlapiirilisest ajaraamist lähtumine pole olnud käesoleva lähenemise aluseks ega eesmärgiks. Järgnevalt paar punkti, mille ma lõpetuseks veelkord selgelt esile soovin tõsta.

1. Luule ei ole ainult raamatukaante vaheline trükitud tekst, mis raamatupoodide „Luule“ sektsionist vastu vaatab. Kui arvesse võtta ainult viimased, saab täna Eestis loodavast ja avaldatavast poesiaamaastikust vildaka pildi. Luule esineb väga suures ulatuses muusika lüürika näol, mis jõuab oma auditooriumini nähtavate trükitähede asemel hoopis kõlaritest kostuvate helilainete kujul.

2. Kuigi täna loodavas „trükiluules“ on domineerima asunud vabavärss, ei kehti sama muusika jaoks loodud (luule)tekstide kohta, mis on suuresti endiselt struktureeritud lõppriimiliste värsside läbi. Kui näiteks Eesti Kirjanike Liidul (või mõnel teisel laadsel institutsioonil) peaks millegipärast tekkima soov anda välja auhind käesoleva sajandi kõige produktiivsemale riimluuletajale, siis tuleks see tunnustus minu hinnangul küll hoopis mõnele räpparile anda, sest raamatupoodide „Luule“ sektsioonis jäaks sellise ülesandega täna kaunis jänni.

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AMERICAN SPLENDOR:

tinglikkus ja reaalsus ühe koomiksiseeria ekraniseeringus

Helena Haller


Tartu Ülikool, semiootika osakond

Abstrakt. Autobiograafilise koomiksiseeria põhjal valminud film *American Splendor* ühendab samas teoses kolm erinevat meediumit - mängufilmi, koomksi ja dokumentaali. Kuid piirid erinevate meediumide vahel on hägused ja liikuvad ning filmi erinevad osad kipuvad omavahel segunema. Näiteks tegutsevad filmis koos nii mängufilmi näitlejad kui ka joonistatud tegelased. Või väljenduvad näitleja mõtted koomiksile omase mõttemulli abil. Sinna vahele on pikitud dokumentaalkaadrid, kus töeline nimitegelane vaatajale ise oma elust jutustab. Need mitmesugused tükid, milles film koosneb, on aga erineva kodeeritusega, samuti erineva usutavuse ja reaalsuse astmega. Iga meedium proovib oma võimete piires pakkuda vaatajale vahetut ning töetriuud elamust ja luua omal moel reaalsusmuljet. Kui tegemist on ühe meediumiga korraga, siis on vahetu reaalsusmulje loomine lihtsam, kuna puudub võrdlusmoment. Kui realistik saab aga koomiks tunduda kui see on kõrvutatud mängufilmiga? Või kui usaldusväärsena on tajutav mängufilm, kui see vaheldub dokumentaalsete kaadritega? Ja millised reaalsuse ning tinglikkuse tasandid tekivad filmis, kus ühendatud on kõik kolm erineva reaalsuse astmega meediumit? Käesolev artikkel uuribki, miks Harley Pekari autobiograafiliste koomksite põhjal loodud filmi ülesehitamisel on kasutatud erineva kodeeritusega lõike ning mida sellega vaatajale öelda soovitakse.

Märksõnad: intermeedia, intermeedia refleksiivsus, ekraniseering, reaalne-tinglik opositsoon, koomiks.

American Splendor: Conditionality and reality in the adaptation of a graphic novel

Abstract. *American Splendor*, a cinematic adaptation of a series of graphic novels connects within one artwork three different forms of media: fiction film, graphic novel, and documentary. However, the boundaries between the different forms of media are ambiguous and dynamic, and the different elements of the film tend to become conflated. For example, in the film, filmed actors and drawn characters act together, or an actor's thoughts are expressed in a drawn thought bubble characteristic of the language of comics. Between filmed sequences one finds documentary shots where Harley Pekar himself talks about his life. These diverse pieces which make up the film




are coded differently and they have different degrees of conditionality and reality. Each medium tries, within its limits, to offer the viewers an immersive, believable experience, a certain impression of reality. It is easier to provide an immediate impression of reality when dealing with a single medium, since there is no comparison. But how realistic can comic elements appear when juxtaposed with photographic elements? Or how trustworthy can fictional sequences be when altered with documentary sequences? What kind of levels of reality and conditionality emerge in the combination of the three forms of media? The paper inquires why and how does the film adaptation of Harvey Pekar's autobiographical graphic novels use differently coded elements and what does it aim to convey to viewers with its media composition.

Keywords: intermediality, intermedial reflexivity, adaptation, real-conditional opposition, fiction film, graphic novel, documentary

2003. aastal valmis Harvey Pekari autobiograafilise koomiksiseeria *American Splendor* põhjal samanimeline film. Koomiksiseeria *American Splendor* on Pekar ise kirjutanud, jätkes illustreerimise seejuures erinevate kunstnike hooleks, kuna ta on ise enda kohta öelnud, et pole võimeline isegi sirget joont tömbama.

Koomiksil meediumina on ette näidata küllaltki pikk ajalugu. Tänapäeva koomiksite eelkäijateks peetakse kunstnike Rudolph Töpfferi, Wilhelm Bushi ja Angelo Agostini satiirilisi töid. Kuigi tegelikult oli mitmeid koomiksiribasid avaldatud ka varem, peetakse tihti esimeseks koomiksiribaks Richard Outcault 1895. aastal avaldatud teost *Yellow Kid*, kuna seal kasutati esimest korda tegelaste ütluste tähistamiseks jutumulli (The History of Comic Books 2011). Õige pea hakati ajalehtedes pühendama koomiksiribadele eraldi sektsioone. 1930ndatel tuli välja koomiksi raamatu ideega, esimene neist oli kollektsoon erinevatest koomiksiribadest. 1938. aastal aga ilmus esimene *Action Comics* koomiksiraamat, kus inimestele tutvustati esmakordsest Supermani. Mõnda aega olid koomksid väga populaarsed, kuid kui 1950ndatel tõstatati väide, mille kohaselt soodustavad koomksid alaeliste kuritegevust ning loodi spetsiaalne ühing vastuoluliste koomiksite keelustamiseks, kaotasid nad mõneks ajaks oma populaarsuse (The Golden Age 2011). Koomiksite tagasitulekule aitas kaasa kuulsate superkangelaste nagu Ämblikmees, Fantastiline nelik ja X-mehed sündimine (The Silver Age 2011). Tänapäevaks on koomiksitest saanud oluline kultuuri osa ning tänu Interneti levikule on koomiksitel rohkem järgijaid kui kunagi varem.

American Splendor koomksid on erilised, kuna need ei räägi superkangelastest ja uskumatutest seiklustest, vaid Harvey Pekari enda igapäevastest elust Clevelandi linnas. Koomiksites kirjutab ta oma tööst, suhetest naistega, sõpradest ja jazz-muusikast. Nagu koomksid, viib ka film *American Splendor* vaataja läbi Harvey Pekari elu, keskendudes ehk mõningatele tähtsamatele pidepunktidele. Filmi juures on tähelepanuväärne tema ülesehitus, mis koosneb erinevatest kihtidest, olles segu realsusest ja fiktsioonist. Esimene kiht, milleks on mängufilm, annab vaatajale edasi filmi sündmustikku ning tutvustab Pekari elu. Teatud hetkedel ilmuval



ekraanile koomiksi elemendid, joonistatud tegelased, mõttemullid ja iseloomuliku fondiga tekst, mis moodustavad filmi ülesehituse teise kihit. Omaette kolmanda osa moodustavad aga dokumentaalsed lõigud, kus tõeline Harvey Pekar loeb filmile jutustajana teksti peale või räägib oma elust. Nendes lõikudes näidatakse vaatajale, kuidas antud filmi luuakse. Samuti on filmis kasutatud originaalsalvestisi David Lettermani saatest, kus Pekar mitmel korral üles astus. Kuna selline filmi ülesehitus ei ole tavalline, uurib see artikkel, miks on film just nii loodud ja mida sellise ülesehitusega vaatajale öelda tahetakse.


Artikli esimene osa vaatab filmi *American Splendor* ekraniseeringuna ning seeläbi intersemiootilise tõlkena, võttes appi Linda Hutcheon ja Peeter Toropi teooriad. Sealt lähtuvalt vaatleb artikkel filmi intermeedialise ekraniseeringuna. Artikli teine osa keskendub reaalsuse ja tinglikkuse tasanditele, mis filmis tekivad. Sellist opositsiooni aitavad mõtestada Juri Lotmani tekst tekstis võte ning Jay David Bolteri ja Richard Grusini vahendamise kontseptsioon.

American Splendor kui ekraniseering ja intermeedialine ekraniseering

Oluline on, et filmi *American Splendor* puhul on tegemist samanimelise koomiksiseeria ekraniseeringuga. Võib öelda, et tegemist on isegi kahekordse adapteeringuga. Esmalt adapteeriti Pekari elu koomiksiks ning seejärel ekraniseeriti koomiks filmiks. Linda Hutcheon toob välja kolm adapteeringu defineerimise viisi. Esiteks võib adapteering olla üldtundud teose ümberasetus, mille käigus võib muutuda meedium, žanr või kontekst (Hutcheon 2006: 7). Filmi *American Splendor* ekraniseerimisel on toiminud meediumi muutus, varem koomiksi kaudu edasi antu jõuab nüüd vaatajani filmi vahendusel.

Teiseks toob Hutcheon välja, et adapteeringut võib vaadelda kui loomise protsessi, kuna adapteering koosneb alati uesti interpreteerimisest ning seda võib olenevalt seisukohast võtta kui originaali säilitavat või hävitavat (sammas, 8). Jääb iga vaataja enda otsustada, kas filmi *American Splendor* puhul on tegemist originaali säilitava või hävitava adapteeringuga, kuid kuna filmi on kaasatud ka tõeline Harvey Pekar, võib oletada, et tegemist on pigem originaali säilitava adapteeringuga, kuna vaevalt Pekar ise sooviks oma elu olulisi sündmusi edasi anda valesti.

Kolmandaks toob Hutcheon välja, et adapteering võib olla intertekstuaalsuse vorm, kuna vaatajad, kes on tuttavad originaalteosega, tajuvad adapteeringu versiooni teisiti kui need, kes originaalteosega tuttavad pole (sammas, 8). Ka analüüsitsava filmi juures on oluline, kas vaataja on juba enne filmi tuttav samanimelise koomiksiga. Kui vaataja seda on, oskab ta filmi ja koomikseid kõrvutada ning võrrelda ja leiab enda jaoks filmist vihjeid ja seoseid. Vaataja jaoks, kes on enne filmi vaatamist tuttav ka koomiksitega, muutub film tölkeks.




Roman Jakobson toob ühena kolmest tõlketüübist välja intersemiootilise tõlke ehk transmutatsiooni (Jakobson 2006: 139). Peeter Torop kirjutab artiklis "Kirjandus ja film", et intersemiootilise tõlke käigus, mis seostub ka ekraniseeringuga, interpreteeritakse verbaalsed märgisüsteemid mitteverbaalsete märgisüsteemide abil. Ka ekraniseering on intersemiootiline tõlge, ainult et ekraniseeringus säilib ka verbaalsete märkide kasutamine (Torop 1999: 143). Kui tuua sisse teksti mõiste, muutuvad film ja kirjandusteos omavahel võrreldavaks. Kuigi tekst on lahutamatult seotud oma funktsiooniga, on siiski võimalik eristada teksti väljendusplaani ja sisuplaani, mis muudab tõlkeprotsessi kahest osast koosnevaks. Väljendusplaani all võib mõista teksti kunstilise struktuuri konkreetseid aktualiseerimisvorme (samas, 144) nagu keelekasutus, sõnad, see, kuidas on teos kirjutatud või kujutatud. Sisuplaan on aga teose idee, mõtestik, sisu. Kui väljendusplaan rekodeeritakse teise keele ja kultuuri vahenditega tõlke väljendusplaani ja sisuplaan transponeeritakse tõlke sisuplaani, võib öelda, et tegemist on täieliku tõltega (samas, 146). Lähtudes sellest, et filmi ekraniseering on intersemiootiline tõlge, on ka film *American Splendor* tõlge, mille originaalteos ehk tõlke alus on samanimeline koomiksiseeria.

Ka koomksi kui teksti puhul on võimalik teha eristus tema sisu- ja väljendusplaani vahel. Koomksi või õigemini koomiksiseeria sisuplaaniks on see, mida koomiksitega edasi antakse, vaadeldava filmi puhul Harvey Pekari elu – tema sõbrad, suhted naistega, töö, koomksite kirjutamine ja muusika kuulamine. Koomiksiseeria väljendusplaaniks on aga see, kuidas on Harvey Pekari elu nendel lehekülgedel kujutatud. Põhilise osa moodustavad suured pildid, mis näitavad tegevust, jutumullides oleva iseloomuliku keelepruugi abil antakse edasi tegelaste vaheline dialoog või ühe isiku mõtted ning kastikesed lehekülje alguses viivad lugeja kurssi sündmuste toimumise koha ning ajaga.

Koomksi *American Splendor* ekraniseerimisel toimub midagi, mida võiks nimetada poolikuks või mittetäielikuks tõlkeks. Koomksi sisuplaani transponeerimisel filmi sisuplaaniks asetatakse Harvey Pekari elu kirjeldamine ümber ühest meediumist teise, seejuures sisuplaanis ei teki mingisuguseid olulisi muudatusi, säilib sarnane aegruum ja sündmustik. Koomksi väljendusplaani rekodeerimisel filmikeele vahenditega filmi väljendusplaani tekib aga erinevus selles, milline on koomksi väljendusplaan ja milline filmi oma. Osa koomksi väljendusplaanist rekodeeritakse filmikeele vahenditega filmi väljendusplaani, kuid osa jäetakse rekodeerimata ning lihtsalt tõstetakse midagi muutmata ühest meediumist teise. Suurema osa filmist domineerivad filmile omased väljendusvahendid. Teatud hetkedel ilmuvalt filmi aga joonistatud tegelased, mõttemullid, olustikku tutvustavad ja osaliselt jutustaja rolli täitvad kastikesed – need on koomksi elemendid, mida pole filmi jaoks ümber tehtud, vaid koomiksist otse filmi tõstetud.

Selliselt tekkiv kooslus, kus kõrvuti kasutatakse mitme meediumi väljendusvahendeid, pole ei koomiks ega film, vaid midagi nende kahe piirimail. Teost, mis langeb kahe või rohkema juba tuntud meediumi vahel võib nimetada intermeedialiseks (Higgins 2001: 52). Intermeedia tekib, kui kaks erinevat meediumit sulanduvad teineteise sisse, samas vaataja tajub, et tegemist on kahe erineva asjaga,




mis kokku moodustavad midagi uut (samas, 50). Filmis *American Splendor* on liskas mängufilmile ja koomiksile kasutatud ka dokumentaalseid kaadreid, seega võib öelda, et film langeb kolme tuntud meediumi – mängufilmi, koomiksi ja dokumentaalfilmi vahelisse alasse. Niimoodi muutub film millekski uueks, mis ühendab elemente kõigist kolmest meediumist.

Petr Szczepanik kirjutab, et intermeedia põhiomadus on tema refleksiivsus ehk enesekohasus või tagasisuunatus. Intermeedia refleksiivsus teeb ühes hübriidses pildivormis nähtavaks erinevate meediumide struktuursed omadused. See võte näitab, kuidas ühe meediumi struktuursete joonte peegeldused sulavad teise meediumi sisse (Szczepanik 2002: 29). Intermeedia refleksiivsus võib ilmneda nii pildi kui ka diegeesi tasandil. Pildi tasandil moodustab intermeedia refleksiivsus uusi vorme traditsioonilise meedia ning uute vormide nagu fotograafia, filmi, video ja arvuti piltide vahel. Samas intermeedia hübriidne pildivorm seob erinevate meediumide loomupärased komponendid, paljastab sidususe või mittesidususe ning toob esile nende erinevused (samas, 31). Refleksiivsus ehk tagasisuunatus aitab mõtestada, miks intermeedialisust üldse kasutatakse.

Filmis *American Splendor* moodustub intermeedia refleksiivsust kasutades uus pildivorm, kus erinevate meediumide iseloomulikud jooned põimuvad ning sulanduvad üksteise sisse. Nii põimuvad omavahel näiteks mängufilmi näitlejad ning joonistatud tegelased. Näiteks stseenis, kus Harvey seisab poes kassasabas, mis ei liigu üldse, tekivad mängufilmi Harvey kõrvale joonistatud variandid temast, kellega mängufilmi Harvey kehakeele kaudu suhtleb (Joonis 1).



Joonis 1: Koomiksi ja kinematograafia kombinatsioon filmis *American Splendor*.




Või kui Harvey tulevane abikaasa Joyce kujutab enne nende esmakohtumist ette, milline Harvey võiks välja näha, ilmuvald pilti mitu erinevat joonistatud Harveyt. Need joonistatud tegelased ei ärataks koomiksis tähelepanu, kuna koomiksi jaoks on joonistatud tegelased tavalised, neist koomiks koosnebki. Filmis aga paistavad joonistatud tegelased eredalt välja ning mõjuvad kummaliselt, neid nähes tajub vaataja, et midagi on teistmoodi kui tavalises filmis. Mängufilmi ja koomiksi elemente kõrvutades tuuakse välja meediumide erinevused, kuid samaaegselt ka nende koos eksisteerimise võimalikkus. Möttemull, mis tekib kassasabas Harvey pea kohale, pole tüüpiline element filmis, vaid koomiksis, kuid ta sulandub hästi filmi stseeni, kuna aitab Harvey mõtteid väljendada teistmoodi, kui see oleks võimalik pelgalt filmi väljendusvahendeid kasutades. Joonistatud tegelaste ning möttemullide sissetoomine selles filmis rõhutab peategelase elu tihedat seotust koomiksitega.

On huvitav, et filmistseenide vahel olevad dokumentaalkaadrid on alati valgel taustal. Seega võib dokumentaalkaadreid võtta kui filmikeele vasteid koomiksites olevatele raamidele (*gutter*), mis on samuti valged (Joonis 2).



Joonis 2: Kaader filmi *American Splendor* dokumentaalvööttest.

Väga huvitavalt on konstrueeritud filmi alguses jooksvad sissejuhatavd tiitrid. Tiitrites on filmistseenid paigutatud koomiksikastikesesse ning stseenide sarnasust koomiksiga loovad ka filmitegijate nimed, mis on pealkirjade vormis asetatud koomiksikastide servadesse (Joonis 3). Koomiksikastides on aga vaheldumisi nii filmistseenid kui pildid päris koomiksitest ning ühes koomiksikastis on ka foto tõelisest Harvey Pekarist, kusjuures lisatud on jutumull. Samuti jalutab ühes koomiksikastis tõeline Harvey Pekar, kuid järgmises juba teda kehastav näitleja. Sellist




tiitrite visuaali võib võtta kui võtit ülejää nud filmi pildi mõtestamiseks. Kogu filmi üldine visuaal on väga sarnane tiitrite omaga, mängufilmi stseenid vahelduvad koomiksi piltidega ning dokumentaalsete lõikudega, samal ajal omavahel veel ohtralt põimudes.



Joonis 3. Kaader filmi *American Splendor* algustiitritest.

Intermeedia enesekohasust on iseloomustatud ka kui protsessi, mille käigus kirjandus- või filmitekst tõstab esile enda tootmise või lavastamise. Tavaliselt näeb vaataja filmi ennast, kuid ei taju ümbritsevat võtteplatsi, prožektorite valgustust ega muud seadmestikku, mida filmimiseks kasutatakse. Kui filmis näidatakse kaamerat, tajub vaataja seda diegeetilise objektina, mitte sellesama kaamerana, millega antud filmi üles võetakse. Meediumit ennast ei ole kunagi näha, kuna ta on peidus vormi taga (Szczepanik 2002: 30). Harilikult ei näe vaataja kino seadmestikku, vaid selle manifestatsiooni, filmi. Kui tegemist on aga intermeedia enese-refleksiivsusega, võib iga meedium eeldada vormi teises meediumis ja vastupidi, iga vorm võib saada uue, tekkinud vormi meediumiks (sammas, 31). Ehk kui muidu jõuab vaatajani ainult teos, siis intermeedia refleksiivsus paljastab ka meediumi enda.

Kui harilikult ei näidata, kuidas konkreetne teos valmib, siis filmis *American Splendor* on olemas stseenid, kus näidatakse selle filmi tegemist. Filmi loomise protseduur on muudetud üheks osaks filmist. Sellistes stseenides intervjueritakse tõelist Harvey Pekarit või näidatakse, kuidas ta filmile jutustajana teksti peale loeb. Nendes lõikudes näidatakse Pekarit ümbritsetuna kaameratest ja prožektoritest. Mõndades taolistes lõikudes näidatakse, kuidas filmi loomises osalevad lisaks tõelisele Harvey Pekarile ka tema abikaasa Joyce Brabner ja Pekari sõber Toby Radloff. Leib




aset ka selline stseen, kus esiplaanil on tõelised Harvey Pekar ja Toby Radloff arutamas millegi üle ning tagapool ajavad juttu neid kehastavad näitlejad. Selliseid stseene filmis võibki nimetada refleksiivseteks ehk tagasisuunatuteks. Dokumentaalsed osad muudavad lisaks vormile, milleks on film, nähtavaks ka kino kui meediumi enda. Tänu intermeedia refleksiivsusele tajub vaataja filmi dokumentaalsetes stseenides olevaid kaameraid ja muid tehnilisi objekte just nende samade seadmetena, millega võetakse üles konkreetne film.

Reaalsuse ja tinglikkuse tasandid filmis

Juri Lotman on kirjutanud võtttest tekst tekstis, mida iseloomustab mäng opositioonil reaalne-tinglik. Opositiooni reaalne-tinglik tekitab teksti üksikosade erinev kodeeritus, mille lihtsaim juhtum on sellise lõigu teksti lülitamine, mis on kodeeritud kogu ülejäänud teksti kodeerimiseks kasutatud koodiga, ent topelt. Topeltkodeeritus viib selleni, et teksti põhiosa tajutakse reaalsena, topelt kodeeritud ehk tekst tekstis lõiku aga tinglikult. Tekst tekstis võttega röhutatakse nii teose väliseid kui ka seesmisi piire, seejuures piiride küsimus muutub röhutatuks just nende liikuvuse tõttu (Lotman 1990: 295). Piiride küsimus muutub äärmiselt oluliseks just intermeedialises teoses. Kui teos langeb mitme meediumi vaheline, kasutab ta enda loomiseks elemente neist kõigist. Kas teos kuulub sellisel juhul ühe või teise meediumi alla või moodustab hoopis midagi uut, ongi eelkõige piiride ning nende liikuvuse küsimus.

Ka filmi *American Splendor* sees on teine tekst, film filmis. Täpsemalt öeldes on filmi sees tekst sellest, kuidas filmi tehakse. Suurema osa teksti ruumist moodustab mängufilm, mis on kodeeritud ühekordselt, lõigud sellest, kuidas antud filmi tehakse, on aga kodeeritud sama koodiga, mis ülejäänud film, kuid topelt. Üldjuhul peaks vaataja tajuma ühekordset kodeeritud teksti osa reaalselt ning topeltkodeeritud osa tinglikult. Filmi *American Splendor* puhul on aga olukord vastupidine. Topeltkodeeritud lõikudes esinevad näitlejate asemel reaalsed inimesed, kes osalevad endast rääkiva filmi loomisel. Nendes lõikudes näidatakse filmi valmimise protsessi, mille käigus ka intervjueritakse päriselu inimesi. Selline olukord jätab vaatajale mitte tingliku, vaid reaalse mulje ning vaataja tajub neid lõike dokumentaalsetena. Ülejäänud mängufilm aga, mis on kodeeritud ühekordselt, muutub selle tõttu tinglikuks.

Selliste erinevalt kodeeritud lõikude tõttu muutub aktuaalseks küsimus piiridest filmi sees. Piirid peaksid üksteisest eristama mängufilmi, koomiksit ja dokumentaali, kuid piirid selles filmis on liikuvad ning võivad kergesti hajuda või omavahel põimuda. Dokumentaal tahab mõnikord lipsata mängufilmi sisse, näiteks siis, kui jutustaja rolli täitev tõeline Harvey Pekar ütleb peategelast tutvustades: "Seal olen mina, õigemini mees, kes mind mängib", viidates nii Harveyt kehastavale näitlejale ning sisenedes ise nii mängufilmi reaalsusesse. Selliseid olukordi, kus tõeline Pekar loeb jutustajana mängufilmile teksti peale on filmis veel. Mängufilm siseneb aga




dokumentaali näiteks stseenis, kus üheaegselt on kaadris nii tõelised Harvey ja Toby, kui ka neid kehastavad näitlejad. Dokumentaalsete lõikude alla saab lugeda ka filmis kasutatavad originaalsed salvestised David Lettermani saatest. Seega võib mängufilmi ja dokumentaali vaheliste piiride hägustumise näiteks tuua ka olukorra, kus Harvey läheb saatesse esinema, Joyce jäab aga teleekraanilt tema esinemist vaatama. Seejuures Joyce vaatab teleekraanilt samamoodi originaalset saate salvestust nagu filmivaatajagi. Koomiksi ja mängufilmi piirid hägustuvad aga siis, kui mängufilmi pildiga sulanduvad kokku joonistatud elemendid. Küllaltki filmi lõpus leiab aset stseen, kus Peakrit kehastav näitleja mängib joonistatud ruumis, koomiksiks (Joonis 4). Sellist erinevate meediumide kasutamist koos ühes teoses saabki iseloomustada intermeedialisena.



Joonis 4. Kaader filmist *American Splendor*, kus näitleja siseneb koomiksiruumi.

Huvitav on aga see, miks filmi on põimitud erineva kodeerituse astmega lõike, ruume. Üheks põhjuseks võib olla see, et tegemist on autobiograafilise teosega ning tõeline Harvey Pekar ja tema elu on selline, et kõike ei saaks edasi anda üheselt kodeeritult. Nii edastatakse erinevates meediumides ilmuvate Harveydega vaatajale temast erinevat informatsiooni.

Jay David Bolter ja Richard Grusin kirjutavad oma raamatus *Remediation* vahendamisest, vahetusest ja ülivahendatusest, mis on kõik tihedalt seotud intermeedialisuse mõistega. Vahetus ja ülivahendatus moodustavad vahendamise kaks vastandlikku külge. Vahetuse (*immediacy*) eesmärk on muuta meedium läbipaistvaks ning parimal juhul vaataja jaoks täiesti märkamatuks. See tähendab, et ideaalsel juhul ei taju vaataja, et ta istub televiisori ees, vaid ta tajub saadud kogemust




vahetult ning meediumist segamatult (Bolter, Grusin 2000: 5). Ülivahendatus (*hypermediacy*), vastupidiselt, muudab meediumi nähtavaks. Tänu ülivahendatusele tajub vaataja, et teadmised maailmast tulevad meediumide kaudu ning ta teadvustab meediumi kohalolu (samas, 70). Kuigi tundub, et tegemist on kahe täpselt vastupidise võttega on mõlemal sama ülesanne, reaalsusmulje loomine. Vahetus jõuab reaalsuseeni meediumi vahendamist eitades, ülivahendatus aga koondades kokku võimalikult palju meediume, korrutades nii vahendamist ning tekitades tunde täielikkusest ja seeläbi reaalsusest (samas, 53).

Vaataja viiakse Harvey maailma kolme meediumi poolt vahendatuna, igaüks neist püüdleb oma vahenditega töetruuduse, vahetusemulje ja meediumi kaotamise poole. Koomiks oli kõige esimene meedium, mille kaudu Harvey Pekar ise oma elu näitama ja jutustama hakkas. Lähtudes ainult koomiksist, loob ka see meedium oma võimalustega vahetust, küll veel mitte nii läbipaistvat kui mängufilm, kuid siiski. Koomiksis räägib Pekar oma igapäevastest elust ja ka kõige tavalisemates asjadest, mida ta teeb. Kuna koomiks ilmub pikema aja jooksul, annab see kõige detailsema ülevaate Pekari elust, pakkudes järjepidevale lugejale võimaluse elada kaasa Pekari rõõmudele ja muredele ning saada temaga justkui vahetult tuttavaks. Kui aga kõrvutada koomiksit mängufilmiga ja veel eriti dokumentaalfilmiga, muutub koomiks tinglikuks ning vaataja tajub koomiksi osi filmis kõige tinglikumatena.

Mängufilmi võib pidada järgmiseks astmeeks vahetuse loomisel. Filmi tegemisel näeb meeskond suurt vaeva, et sobiva võttepaiga, näitlejate ja tegelaste riietuse abil luua õige keskkond, mis filmi ajastu ja tegevustikuga kokku sobiks ning vaatajale reaalne tunduks. Tänu sellele võib inimene unustada, et ta istub televisori või arvutiekraani ees, mis talle seda filmi vahendab, ning elada mängufilmi täiesti sisse. Sellel hetkel on mängufilm vaataja jaoks väga reaalne. Kõige vahetum on aga dokumentaalfilm, mis loob reaalsust juba selle kaudu, et vaatajale näidatakse näitlejate asemel päriselu inimesi. Dokumetaallõigud näitavad vaatajale, kuidas film valmib ning kuidas tõeline Harvey Pekar selle valmimises osaleb.

Eraldi võttes loovad kõik kolm meediumit – koomiks, mängufilm ja dokumentaalfilm – omal moel reaalsusmuljet. Ühendades koomiksi ja mängufilmi muutub koomiks võrreldes mängufilmiga tinglikuks ja enam pole võimalik koomiksit tajuda reaalse ja vahetuna. Mängufilm lõhub koomiksi reaalsuse, kuna suudab oma esitusviisidega vaataja jaoks palju vahetuma reaalsuse luua. Kui võrreldes koomiksiga tajub vaataja mängufilmi realsena ning koomiksit tinglikuna, siis dokumentaalfilmi kaasamisega olukord muutub. Enam ei taju vaataja mängufilmi kõige reaalsemana. Nagu mängufilm lõhkus oma väljendusvahenditega koomiksi reaalsuse, lõhub dokumentaal samamoodi mängufilmi oma. Vaataja saab aru, et see, mida ta enne pidas reaalseks, on samuti tinglik. Dokumentaalsetes lõikudes näidatakse vaatajale kino seadmestikku, kõrvutatakse päriselu inimesi neid kehastavate näitlejatega ning intervjueritakse Pekarit. Selliste lõikudega võrreldes ei saa mängufilm enam kuidagi reaalne tunduda ning kõige reaalsemaks ja vahetumaks saabki dokumentaalfilm.


Kolme meediumi ühendamisest ja nende omavahelistest suhetest kasvab välja vahendamise teine pool, ülivahendatus. Ülivahendatus, see, et kolme meediumi



niimoodi kombineeritakse ja koos näidatakse, seejuures kõigile meediumidele omaseid ja iseloomulikke jooni eraldi välja tuues, põhjustab, et kogu film tundub vaatajale tinglik ning vaataja ei saa üheski kuvatud reaalsuses lõpuni kindel olla. Teisest küljest loob aga ülivahendatus omamoodi reaalsusmulje. Mulje, mis loob isemoodi täielikkust. Ülivahendatus loob reaalsuse, mis kirjeldab ja iseloomustab Harvey Pekarit mitmetest erinevatest külgedest. Mängufilm jutustab lugu Pekari elust, näidates nii olulisi kui ka vähem olulisi sündmusi selles ning andes aimu peategelase suhetest teda ümbritsevate inimestega. Seega tutvustab mängufilm Pekari seda külge, mis on näha avalikkusele ja inimestele, kellega ta kokku puutub. Siis näidatakse vaatajale Pekari teoseid, koomikseid. Koomiks on meedium, mille kaudu Pekar ise oma elu vahendama hakkas, seega edastab koomiks külje Pekarist, mis on edasi andmiseks oluline just tema meelest. Teisest küljest on koomiksid ka ise mõjutanud Pekari kujunemist. Kolmandaks näidatakse vaatajale Harveyt ennast, seekord mitte läbi kellegi teise joonistuste, vaid sellisena, nagu ta tegelikult on ning ühtlasi näidatakse, mida ta ise mõtleb endast ja oma elust. On aga oluline märkida, et kuigi ülivahendatus püüab luua peategelasest omamoodi täielikku reaalsusmuljet, jäääb mingi osa tegelikust Harveyst siiski lõpuni avamata.

Liikudes meediumide reaalsuse ja tinglikkuse eristamise juurest edasi Harvey elu juurde, võib ühendada meediumi ja reaaluse, mida see edasi annab. Koomiks, mis on loodud Harvey enda poolt, edastab tema psühholoogilist reaalsust. Seda, mis toimub tema peas, kuidas ta millesegi suhtub (kassasaba näide) ning ka seda, mida Harvey muidu välja ei näitaks. Üheks selliseks näiteks on pettumus, mis Harveyt tabab, kui ta ennast peeglist vaatab ja millest ta kellelegi niisama rääkima ei hakkaks, kuid koomiksi lehel on kõigile nähtavaks muudetud. Mängufilm aga annab edasi sündmustiku reaalsust, seda mis tegelikult toimus, mitte ei leidnud aset ainult Harvey peas (kassasaba stseenis need kaks ühenduvad). Dokumentaalfilm võtab ühest küljest kaks reaalsust kokku ja seob nad omavahel ning teisest küljest annab edasi päris reaalsust, seda mis tegelikult toimub. Dokumentaalfilm muudab realistikumaks ka teiste tasandite reaalsused. Mõnes mõttes vaatab Harvey dokumentaallöökude intervjuudes oma elule tagasi ning kommenteerib sündmuseid tagantjärele ning selle valguses muutuvad koomiks ja mängufilm meenutusteks.

Uurides erinevaid reaalsusi, mis filmis peituvald, võib teha mõningaid järeldusi. Mängufilm räägib filmis niiöelda põhilugu, andes edasi sündmustikku, mis toimus. Kuna filmi aeg on piiratud ning kuna koomiksid keskenduvad ilmselt suuremas osas siiski täiskasvanud Harveyle ja tema igapäevaelule, näitab film Harvey lapsepõlvest vaid paari kaadrit ning keskendub siis juba täiskasvanud peategelasele. Stseeni, mida vaatajale Harvey lapsepõlvest näidatakse, võib aga tema edasise elu suhtes üsna paljutähendavaks pidada. Nimelt on hulk lapsi ennast Halloweeni puhul erinevateks superkangelasteks riietanud, ainult väike Harvey ei ole ennast kostümeerinud. Kui maiustusi jagav naine küsib, missugune superkangelane tema siis on, kostab Harvey selle peale, et ta pole mingisugune superkangelane, vaid tavaline laps naabruskonnast. Selline suhtumine peegeldub ka hiljem Harvey koomiksites, ta pole superkangelane, vaid harilik mees.



Koomiks, nagu juba enne sai mainitud, annab edasi Harvey psühholoogilist reaalsust ning mitte ainult Harvey, vaid ka Joyce oma. Elementid, mis on omased vaid koomiksile (nagu mõttemullid, joonistatud tegelased või joonistatud sündmuspaik) ilmuvad filmipilti siis, kui tahetakse edasi anda kellegi sisekõne, mõtteid või tundeid. Näiteks kui Harvey on vihane või Joyce valdab teadmatus ja kahtlus. Koomiksi elementidel on filmis ka teine eesmärk ning see on uue peatüki või osa sissejuhatamine. Sarnaselt koomiksile annab ka film aja ja koha muutustest teada väikeste kastikeste abil, mis ilmuvad ekraani nurka (näiteks "1950: meie lugu algab või vahepeal Delawaris").


Dokumentaalsete lõikudega antakse edasi seda, mida töeline Harvey ise mõtleb endast, oma elust ja koomiksitest. Mida ta ise tunneb ja arvab ning seda ka tagasivaatena oma elule ja kordasaadetule (tegemist on juba üsna eaka mehega). Samuti näitavad dokumentaallõigud, mida Harvey naine Joyce arvab Harveyst ja oma elust temaga. Lisaks sellele seob dokumentaalfilm teisi teose elemente – koomiksit ja mängufilmi. Dokumentaal küll hakib nende kulgemist ja läbipõimunud reaalsust ning tuletab pidevalt meelde nende tinglikkust, kuid samal ajal ka muudab need osad realistlikuks. Just tänu dokumentaalsetele lõikudele saab vaataja aru, et tegemist on autobiograafilise teosega ning et filmis toimunu on ka tegelikult päriselus juhtunud.

Kokkuvõte

Võib öelda, et ühe väga mitmetahulise teose, nagu seda on autobiograafiline koomiks, ekraniseerimisel filmiks on tegijad leidnud omapärase ning ennast igati õigustava lahenduse, kasutades filmi loomisel intermeedialisust. Ühte teosesse mängufilmi, koomksi ja dokumentaalfilmi kaasamine võimaldab avada peategelastesest erinevaid tahke ning neid vaatajale tutvustada viisil, mis ainult mängufilmile kindlaks jäädes nii hästi esile ei tuleks. Seega on filmi tavatu ülesehituse põhjuseks just erinevad küljed, mis Harvey Pekarit iseloomustavad ning mida filmi loojad kindlasti ka vaatajale näidata tahavad. Koomiks, mis on kasutatud meediumidest kõige tinglikum, annab edasi Harvey psühholoogilist reaalsust. Koomiksist reaalsem mängufilm toob vaatajani sündmused Harvey elus ning meediumidest kõige reaalsemana tajutav dokumentaalfilm näitab töelist Harvey Pekarit ning seda, mida ta ise oma elust ja tegemistest arvab.


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Film *American Splendor* (2003). Režissöörid Shari Springer Berman ja Robert Pulcini.



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ICONICITY BETWEEN LITERATURE AND PAINTING

in Brazilian modernist portraits

Gabriele Oliveira Teodoro
Federal University of Juiz de Fora


Abstract. This article deals with an intermedial and intersemiotic phenomenon characteristic of Brazilian modernism: the pictorial portrait of writers by painters, their contemporaries. Its objective is to argue that Brazilian modernist pictorial portraits have gone from a mimetic representation (practiced in previous artistic periods) of the portrayed to a relationship in which the portrait represents the interrelationship between modernist writers and painters. In this case, the portrait, as an icon, determines its object of representation. This article is a part of a larger research project that analyses the intermedial relations between literature and painting in Brazilian modernism.

Keywords: iconicity, intermediality, portraits, Brazilian modernism

Ikoonilisus kirjanduse ja maali vahel Brasiilia modernistide portreedes

Abstrakt. Artikkel tegeleb Brasiilia modernismis iseloomulike intermeedialiste ja intersemiootiliste nähtusega – kirjanike portreedega, mille on teinud nende kaasaegsed kunstnikud. Artikli eesmärk on väita, et Brasiilia modernistide portreed on muutunud mimeetilisest representatsioonist (mida harrastati eeneval kunstiperioodil) suhteks, mis representeerib modernistliku kunstniku ja kirjaniku suhestumist. Antud juhul on portree ikoon, mis määrab oma representatsiooni objekti. Artikkelon osa laiemast uurimistööst, mis analüüsib intermediaalseid suhteid kirjanduse ja maalikunsti vahel Brasiilia modernismis.

Märksõnad: ikoonilisus, intermediaalsus, portreed, Brasiilia modernism




1. Introduction

This article discusses, in an introductory way, the iconic relationship between literature and painting in Brazilian modernist portraits. Brazilian Modernism was an artistic movement of extreme importance to the country's culture, but its origin remains undefined. About this, Simioni (2013) states that "the most widespread view considers that the spark of the modernist movement took place in 1922 in São Paulo" in the Week of Modern Art (Simioni 2013: 2). It was influenced by European artistic movements, but in Brazil several national characteristics were incorporated. The movement's aesthetic design is characterised by the replacement of a traditional language with a new modern language, which breaks with the formal rules of representation of traditional academic art (art system that remained in Brazil from the beginning of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century).

We observe, in the period of Brazilian Modernism, a great incidence of portraits of writers. In a preliminary investigation of forty-six writers, we find portraits of twenty-three of them, some with more than one work by modernist painters. Although quantitatively relevant, this phenomenon is still little explored in semiotic terms. In these portraits, it is possible to observe a relationship between literature and painting in the construction of a semiotic object, considering that, in this period, partnerships and exchanges between different arts intensified, since "what characterizes modern movements are programs and manifestos shared by artists from various fields" (Clüver 2001: 350).

The modernist movement instituted itself as an intermedial cultural phenomenon. Aesthetic and/or artistic communication is built by a complex network of media relations. Through the pictorial portrait of modernist writers, we can delve into the complexity of the intersection between painting and literature. This approach is not intended to discuss in-depth foundations of semiotics. We use the notion of iconicity parsimoniously, to overcome mimetic descriptions of artistic representation in Brazilian modernist portraits. Painters of this movement, when representing a writer, select and display aspects of his own work, mixed with the work of the artist portrayed. Together they create the object of the portrait, because the act of painting and writing demands a set of collective strategies in the choice of strokes, colours, themes, rhymes and metric patterns. Writers and painters are influenced by the guiding principles of the modernist artistic movement, so we argue that the portrait is not just the mimesis/resemblance of an existing object (the portrayed artist), but a semiotic object constructed from literary and pictorial works.

In the next section, we introduce the basic concepts of iconicity and portrait painting. Next, we relate these concepts to the collaboration established between painting and literature in the portraits of Brazilian Modernism. In the final subsection, we exemplify it with the analysis of the *Retrato de Mário de Andrade*, 1922, by Anita Malfatti.



2. Iconicity and Portrait

The basic concept of iconicity, in Peirce's semiotics, is presented in his second trichotomy of sign types, the well-known distinction between icons, indices, and symbols. This trichotomy deals with the relationship between the sign and its object, which can take three different forms. When we say that a sign is an icon of its object, we are saying that the sign shares certain properties or qualities that the object possesses and, thus, we can affirm that it is a quality of its object (CP 2.276). A sign, according to Peirce (CP 2.228)², can be described as:

[...] that, in a certain way or aspect, represents something to someone. It is addressed to someone, that is, it creates in that person's mind an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. To the sign thus created I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign represents something, its object [...] (CP 2.228).

The sign "represents something for the idea that causes or changes it. In other words, it is the vehicle that communicates something from the outside to the mind. The 'represented' is its object; the statement, the meaning, the idea that it provokes, its interpretant" (CP. 1.339). The relationship between sign and object was the first aspect observed by Peirce to classify signs. This system, the first proposed by Peirce, consists of three classes: icon, index and symbol (EP 1:225).


According to Peirce (CP 2.228), the connection of the iconic sign to the object occurs under some aspect or quality, in which the sign is linked to the object not by virtue of all aspects of the object. As Merrel (2003: 168) sums it up: "a sign that is similar to its object is an icon (for example, a portrait)". When we say that a sign is an icon of its object, we are saying that this sign shares certain properties or qualities that this object possesses and, thus, we can affirm that it is a quality of its object (CP 2.276). Introducing the concepts of sign, object and icon, we move on to the approach of iconicity, which can be defined as "the degree in which an icon is similar to its object" (Nöth 2013: 22).

In our approach, we can raise some questions: What is the role of iconicity in the joint action of different media (literature and painting)? This article is based on the assumption that iconicity is a relationship between sign and object in which the sign determines the object. The operational definition of the icon is discussed by Frederik Stjernfelt (2011), in his article: "On operational and optimal iconicity in Peirce's diagrammatology" in which the author states that the icon is defined as a

2 Peirce's works will be referenced, following academic tradition, as follows:

- CP, followed by volume number, and paragraph number: Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul & Burks, Arthur W. (eds.). (1931-1958). *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (8 volumes). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- EP 1, followed by page number: Houser, Nathan & Kloesel, Christian J. W. (eds.) 1992. *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 1 (1867-1893)*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.



type of sign that is able to reveal new information about its object. For Hookway (2000: 102), “The key to iconicity is not the perceived similarity between the sign and what it means, but rather the possibility of making new discoveries about the object of a sign through the observation of characteristics of the sign itself”. As Stjernfelt (2007) adds: similarity is not enough to define an icon. According to the author, Peirce agrees with the need for a determination of the icon beyond mere similarity (Stjernfelt 2007: 50).


Stjernfelt explains the relation of the icon to the concept of similarity:

The icon has an epistemologically crucial property: the operational specification of the concept of similarity. The icon is not only the only type of sign that presents directly some of the qualities of its object; is also the only sign by whose contemplation one can learn more than the directions for the construction of the sign [...] (Stjernfelt 2007: 398).

It is necessary to consider that the icon is a sign that has a certain autonomy to determine its object, as it determines what we can know about an object. The artistic properties shared between painter and modernist writer define the portrait, creating a notion of joint similarity between their work, an interchange between two semiotic languages (painting and literature).

In view of the conceptualisation of intersemiotic translation presented by Queiroz and Aguiar (2010: 2), in which “a translation is a type of relationship (semiotic and iconic) between multi-structured processes”, we can state that the phenomenon investigated here is characterised as intersemiotic translation. This term was initially described by Jakobson (1959) as the transmutation of signs from a verbal semiotic system to another system, of a different nature, non-verbal. According to Queiroz and Atā (2018), “the notion of intersemiotic translation (IT) is necessarily linked to the notion of semiosis (action of the sign), by C.S. Peirce, and is based on its logical and epistemological principles” (Queiroz and Atā 2018: 208). In modernism, the intersemiotic translation between literature and painting occurs with great frequency.

What interests us in this article is to explore iconicity in portraits. Pictures are typically iconic signs (Nöth 2013: 2). Through the modernist pictorial portrait, an idea of the represented writer is formed. It is as if something could be replaced by another that resembles it. But the notion of similarity is not as simple as it seems at first. The similarity in the scope of the iconic signs is not a similarity between the sign and the object, but between the sign and some characteristics of the phenomenon (of the object) that were captured and began to compose the perceptual structure, such as aspects, physiognomic traits, face, type of clothing, hair, and objects that are characteristic of the person, such as the writer Mário de Andrade and his round glasses (see fig. 1).



Iconic signs require social knowledge to be understood, and as such are not ‘pure’³ icons. Pure icons “are completely replaced by their objects as they can hardly be distinguished from them. [...] The distinction of the real and the copy disappears and is the moment of pure dream, – not any particular existence, and yet not general” (CP 3.362).

Savan states that, for Peirce, “the object is the empirical environment to which we have collateral knowledge, regardless of the action of the sign. It is the context, the circumstances, the situation that is shared by the sign and the interpreter” (Savan, 1977: 190). Peirce clarifies that “to know the object, what is needed is the prior experience of this individual object” (CP 8.181).

As Collateral Observation I do not mean intimacy (familiarity) with the sign system. What is thus inferred is not collateral, on the contrary, constitutes the prerequisite to get any meaning idea of the sign. By Collateral Observation I want to refer to the previous intimacy with what the sign denotes (CP-8.179).


The collateral experience concerns what is outside the sign, what is outside the interpretant, but which can help in its interpretation, and, consequently, in the action of the interpretant’s sign and object. This is because, despite being an effect produced by the sign, what in fact the interpretant seeks to affect is the object (Santaella: 1995).

In our approach, the sign is the portrait, and the object is a relationship between painting and literature. These concepts are fundamental to understand how the painted portraits of writers are complex signs that determine the object of the portrait.

Throughout its history in western art, the portrait had to deal with the concept of similarity, since its goal was to mimic the depicted model, following strict production rules (West: 2004). However, this definition subtracts from the portrait its most notable complexities. We must consider that several issues affect and influence the portrait, which is a complex semiotic process, heavily dependent on context.

For many theorists, the function of portraiture is to mimic individuals, often representing their social status, hierarchical position, ethnic profile, religious and political position, among others. According to Graham (2006: 89), *mimesis* (from which we get the word “mimic”) is the Greek term, variously translated as resemblance, copy and representation, which art philosophers often employ. Graham (2006) adds that, in pictorial portraiture, we are inclined to think of representation as a copy, to some extent, because the dominant convention in painting has been to portray by way of strict resemblance. According to Peirce:

³ It is known that the notion of iconicity should not be seen as pure iconicity, this subject was addressed, for example, by Umberto Eco (1998).



We say the portrait of someone we haven't seen is convincing. To the extent that, just based on what I see in him, I am led to form an idea of the person he represents, the portrait is an icon. But, in fact, it is not a pure icon, because I am greatly influenced by the fact that it is an effect, through the artist, accused by the aspect of the original, and is thus in a genuine obistent relationship with that original. Moreover, I know that portraits have only the slightest resemblance to the original, except in certain conventional aspects and according to a conventional scale of values etc. (CP 2.292)


We can associate this discussion, related to the problems of considering portrait as mimesis, with a more general discussion about the semiotic problems of the very notion of similarity that is related to mimesis. According to Queiroz (2010: 325), "There are many dangers related to the notion of similarity, especially its trivialisation as identity and its psychologisation as referring to impressions of similarity [...]" (ibid). In modernism, the pictorial portraits of writers do not represent "only" the physiognomic resemblance, but complex representational or semiotic processes, in which several aspects shared between literature and painting are observed. Similarity is not a necessary condition for significance in portraits. This role of iconicity, not based solely on similarity, finds support in the idea of iconicity as dealt with by Peirce's semiotics. Considering that iconicity can be understood as relative dependence of the sign to determine its object (Queiroz: 2012), in the pictorial portraits of modernist writers, the sign (inter-relation literature and painting) determines the object of the portrait. In the next section, we will present a table (Fig.1) with some of these pictures to illustrate the argument.

3. Iconicity between painting and literature in portraits of Brazilian Modernism

The distinction between poetry and painting is based on their material features and languages (verbal and non-verbal). In this section, we will investigate the iconic relationship in the intersections and interactions between these two arts (media).

How can we show the relationship between literature and painting? What does this mean in Brazilian Modernism? Brazilian modernist portraits are examples of how literature and painting determine an object. To illustrate, I present the work *Retrato de Mário de Andrade*, 1922, by Anita Malfatti, next to a photography (common representation technique, for being the most practiced to represent the model faithfully), to demonstrate how modernist portraits select some aspects to be represented in portraits, and how verisimilitude is not the most relevant aspect.

In modernist pictorial portraits, even if a connection through similarity is not direct, as in photography, we are dealing with a highly iconic phenomenon. "The more nebulous or ambiguous for a sign-to-object relationship, the more the sign reports to it via allusions, suggestions, the more prominent its iconic aspect" (Souza and Drigo 2012: 91).



PORTRAIT OF THE WRITER	PHOTOGRAPHY
<p><i>Retrato de Mário de Andrade</i>, by Anita Malfatti, 1922.</p>  <p>Source: Instituto IEB USP.</p>	<p>Photograph of Mário de Andrade, 1930.</p>  <p>Source: Instituto IEB USP.</p>


Fig. 1: Pictorial portrait of Mário de Andrade and his photograph.

The icon represents its object by virtue of a characteristic of itself (of the icon). In Brazilian Modernism we can consider that the “similarity” represented in the portrait is constructed and negotiated between the literary and pictorial characteristics of the writers and painters portrayed in the work.

What are these characteristics negotiated and revealed through the relationship between painter and poet in Brazilian Modernism? Literary modernism is characterised, according to Braga (2006), by the problem of the formation of structures, in the use of language, the unification of form, in the social meaning of the artist himself, in the largely symbolist aesthetics, and in the avant-garde conception of the artists (Braga 2006: 14-18). Other authors discuss methods and/or concepts related to the modernist movement (Aranha 1925, Lafetá 2000 [1930], Oliveira 2001, Simioni 2013). According to Maia (2006), the main characteristics of modernist poetry are: (i) experimentation with colloquial language in literature; (ii) exploration of everyday themes; (iii) valorisation of nationalist themes; (iv) study of national identity (Maia 2006: 108-110).

In this model of collective aesthetic organisation, experimentation with language destroyed the barriers of traditional language, adding to it the liberating and enlarging force of folklore and popular literature, as advocated by Lafetá (2004: 57).

Already in the field of painting, modernism, even if influenced by international “isms”, managed to revolutionise the aesthetic standards of the plastic arts. The art critic Meyer Schapiro (1996) points out three characteristics of modern painting: arbitrariness in the use of forms, absence of figurative images, and freedom in the use



of colours and technique (Schapiro 1996). The use of various materials allowed exploration of new effects (volumes, textures, planes).

In the *Retrato de Mário de Andrade*, we were able to observe these characteristics. In the work of Anita Malfatti, there is no concern for verisimilitude. Sharp strokes are used, with strong colours, stains and lines, mainly to disconnect us from the similarity relation with the represented object.


Savan (1977) emphasises the question of the context of the sign, to understand some information about the object that the sign alone cannot represent, it is important to observe the context in which the sign is inserted. In the example to be analysed, it is necessary to investigate what is the relationship between the aesthetic project of the writer Mário de Andrade and the work of the painter Anita Malfatti.

3.1. Analysis of the relationship between painting and literature through the *Retrato de Mário de Andrade*, 1922, by Anita Malfatti

Language and images are complementary in their semiotic potentials; both are necessary in efficient media communication (Nöth 2004). To discuss the relationship between literature and painting through the media (pictorial portrait), it is important to track the aesthetic path of Anita Malfatti and Mário de Andrade. The initial point of convergence between Mário de Andrade and Anita Malfatti was in 1917, when the writer visited the painter's exhibition. The *Anita Malfatti Modern Painting Exhibition*, held in São Paulo between December 12, 1917 and January 11, 1918, is considered a milestone in the history of modern art in Brazil and the spark for the artists who devised the 1922 Modern Art Week (Romão 2013: 22).

Anita Malfatti and Mário de Andrade were especially interested in expressionism (a cultural vanguard that emerged in Germany in the early 20th century). According to Simioni (2013: 2), Malfatti, after her studies in Germany and the United States, exhibited works that impacted the artistic environment of the period, especially expressionist paintings, which featured an unusual thematisation of human figures and a free chromaticism. Since then, Andrade and Malfatti began to meet and discuss poetry and art, later forming the Group of Five, which also included Tarsila do Amaral and the writers Oswald de Andrade and Menotti del Picchia (Batista 2012: 137). The group contributed important works regarding linguistic experimentation, collective creation and the inventive and figurative theme of national elements (Silva 2018: 88).

Mário de Andrade's relationship with expressionism, according to Avancini (1998), began from this contact with Malfatti's exhibition. This contact with the pictorial production of Anita Malfatti brought new directions to the studies of Mário de Andrade, which resulted in the renewal of his work. In 1921, he published an article in defence of Anita Malfatti, for recognising the influence that the artist and



expressionism exerted in her literary production. At the end of the same year, Malfatti made the first portrait of the writer (Romão 2013: 26).

Maurício Silva (2018) discusses Mário de Andrade's reaction to seeing the portrait: "He saw on this screen the expressionist character of Malfatti's painting". This is a feature of icons, so replaceable by their objects that they are hardly distinguishable from them. Mário de Andrade, in the misshapen strokes of Anita Malfatti, was attracted by the main characteristic that unites the aesthetic designs of both: expressionism. At that time, the writer's concern was not with the picture reliably representing his verisimilitude. We can recognise, in this situation, a property of the icon described by Peirce:

[...] when contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the awareness that it is not thing, the distinction between the real and the copy disappears, it is, for that moment, a pure dream - no particular existence, and not yet general. At this moment, what we are contemplating is an icon. (CP 3.362)

As a form of retribution, and inspired by his portrait, Andrade wrote, in 1922, the text *No Atelier*, which describes the entire process of creating the painting. In this text, the poet narrates the way in which Malfatti mixed the colours. According to Andrade (1989), Malfatti "created intoxicating, immaterial tones in a potent frenzy of creation". Mário de Andrade continues in the text:


Their colors were symbolic factories, they were synonymous! Behind my long face, divinized by the artist's trait, a Harlequin background, which was my soul. Shades of gray that were my sadness for no reason... golden tones that were my millionaire joy... Tones of fire that were my enthusiastic urges [...]. Completed the shades of gray of my soul. And smiled giving them here a blue of deluded, beyond the earthy color of restlessness... (Andrade 1989: 48).⁴

According to Tércio (2019), Mário de Andrade is represented in the portrait with the countenance of a pierrot, with his mouth half open⁵, as if perplexed with the world he tried to understand and interpret. Tércio adds that, in 1917, the writer planned to dress up as pierrot for the carnival. Andrade designed a fantasy with green satin, as he wanted to make his own version of this popular figure of Italian 16th century theatre. (Tercio 2019: 114)

We can relate the fact that Mário de Andrade was represented by Anita Malfatti as pierrot with the operational definition of icon – the sign that is able to reveal more information about its object. According to Stjernfelt:

⁴ Excerpt from the text "No atelier de Mário de Andrade", published in the book *Cartas a Anita Malfatti* (1989), organised by Marta Rossetti Batista.

⁵ Pierrot is a character of the theatrical style known as *Commedia dell'Arte* that depicting satire and social criticism. The style emerged as an alternative to the literary-inspired *Commedia Erudita*, which featured actors speaking Latin, at that time a language already inaccessible to most people. Thus, this story was an authentic popular entertainment, with a social character, influenced by carnival games. It was a spectacle staged in open spaces such as streets and squares, a point that brought him closer to the masses (Guareschi 2013: 47).



[...] it does not matter if the sign and the object for a first (or second) look seem or are experienced as similar; the decisive test for iconicity is whether it is possible to manipulate or develop the sign so that new information about its object appears. Icons are therefore signs with implicit information that can be made explicit. (Stjernfelt 2007: 398)

In the portrait, the information revealed are the characteristics synthesised by the figure of pierrot. In the work of Mário de Andrade, we find this figure of the pierrot, representative of the carnival, who has in common the boldness of invention, as opposed to mimesis (Bakhtin 1987: 30). The closest relationship of poets and painters with comedy and carnival occurs through the figure of pierrot.

Mário de Andrade presents, in *Pauliceia Desvairada* (1922), a characteristic of pierrot, the social appeal. In the work, the character is a fundamental element that represents a mask of the poetic voice that roams the streets of São Paulo and, thus, transmits its vision of reality. In the mode of representation of reality present in Mário de Andrade's aesthetic project, there is a commitment to the social character of literature. The writer was looking for a different way to represent the big city.


According to Volker Jaeckel (2009), such an attempt is a link with the expressionist poetry of Germany. According to Jaeckel (2009), we find in the works the impact of the urban on the imaginary and the new forms of collective sensitivity (Jaeckel 2009: 5). In this sense, "The environmental perception does not operate as totality", that is, the set of signs are interwoven: traces, colour, form, sounds, textures, size, smells, among others, requiring the subject to decipher the multiple texts that the space contains (Ferrara 1988: 24).

Anita portrays Mário as pierrot for being committed to the modernisation of the arts, with the escape from mimesis, with the themes of Brazilian identity (such as carnival), and for having abandoned in part the academic rules of representation. Mário de Andrade says:

[...] the first fighting spirit, the first collective consciousness, the first need for regimentation was awakened or not by what was going on in the city, with the exhibition of Anita Malfatti. It was she, it was her paintings that gave us a first consciousness of revolt and collectivity in struggle for the modernization of the Brazilian arts. At least to me. (Brito 1971: 71)

We can highlight another work that features the pierrot: *Carioca Carnival*, which was written after his participation in the carnival of Rio de Janeiro, in 1923. An extensive and complex poem, where pierrot appears reinforcing the carnavalised modernist discourse (Stam 2007: 614). The following is an excerpt: "Chaplins, sailors, gigoletes, harlequins and female pierrots in "shorts narrower than legs" are present everywhere" (Pucheu 2009: 163).

In a period close to the portrait, in 1923, Mário de Andrade corresponds with Manuel Bandeira: "My Manuel...Carnival!... [...] a curious adventure [...]" (Andrade; Bandeira, [1923] 2000, p. 85). Manuel Bandeira addresses this character of Italian theatrical comedy in several works. In *Poema de Uma Quarta-feira de Cinzas* - a sad pierrot appears, who from the Italian Commedia dell'arte represents abandoned



lovers. Chequer (2015, p. 53) discusses the presence of pierrot in modernist literary works:

[...] is produced in the language [of these] new poetics a real process of carnival-making, with the subversion of genres, with colloquial forms of language in coexistence with the traditional poetic, at the same time as introducing the manifestation of everyday art in art. (Chequer 2015: 53)

In the portrait process, Anita Malfatti invents a Mário de Andrade, and this invented writer is similar to pierrot. The emphasis of this article is on this determination of the object by the sign, rather than the imitation of an object by sign. The sign (portrait) determines the object (relation literature and painting – represented in the figure of pierrot). In the representation of Mário de Andrade, it is possible to observe a "mixture", formed by the various questions that marked poetry and painting throughout this period. The allegory character of Modernism (the pierrot), of European origin, was incorporated into the Brazilian carnival. Carnival is a great expression of nationality – a popular festival more marked and represented, both in painting and in literature.


4. Conclusions

Portraits of writers by Brazilian modernist painters are an important tool for investigating the iconic relationship between literature and painting. In Brazilian Modernism, unlike other periods, the portrait is not associated with mimetic representation, but is based on a relationship of iconicity, in which the similarity is determined and negotiated in the process of creating the work relying on the interaction of the pictorial and literary repertoire of the artists. The painter, when performing his or her work, suffers strong influence both from his own repertoire and from the literary work of the writer, and these aspects act in the construction of what is represented in the portrait.


In this article: (i) we point out the relations between poetry and painting in Brazilian literary and pictorial modernisms; (ii) we explore the concept of iconicity in these portraits; (iii) we present preliminary concepts, which are part of a larger investigation: the analysis of the intermedial relations (literature and painting) in Brazilian Modernist portraits.

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
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PSÜHHOPATOLOOGILINE SUBJEKTIIVSUS

Esther Rotsi filmis *Võib minna läbi naha*

Tiiu Tali


Tartu Ülikool, semiootika osakond

Abstrakt. Inimese psühhopatoloogilisi seisundeid ja kogemusi on filmis võimalik edasi anda mitmeti ja üheks selliseks võimaluseks on subjektiivse vaatepunkt konstrueerimine. Subjektiivse vaatepunktiprobleemi on pöhjalikult käsitlenud Edward Branigan oma raamatus *Point of View in the Cinema. A Theory of Narration and Subjectivity in Classical Film* (1984), kus on välja toodud erinevad subjektiivse jutustamise tüübid – refleksioon, pertsepsioon, projektsioon, meenutus, mentaalne protsess – ning subjektiivse plaani hälbinud vormid, mis ei ole selgelt määratletavad. Käesolevas artiklis on võimalikest subjektiivse jutustamise vormidest välja valitud kolm – pertsepsioon, projektsioon ja subjektiivne vaimuprotsess –, mida saaks kasutada tegelaskuju subjektiivsete psühhopatoloogiliste kogemuste esitamiseks filmis, ja nende tarvitamist on uuritud Esther Rotsi filmis *Võib minna läbi naha* (*Can door huid heen*, 2009). Samuti on vaadeldud nimetatud filmi mõningaid auditiiivseid aspekte, mis on seotud tegelase subjektiivse vaatepunktivälgendamisega ja mis üksiti väljendavad ka tema (hälbinud) psühholoogilist seisundit.

Märksõnad: subjektiivne vaatepunkt, visuaalne subjektiivne vaatepunkt, auditiiivne subjektiivne vaatepunkt, film, psühhopatoloogia kujutamine filmis, filmiteooria, Edward Branigan

Psychopathological subjectivity in Esther Roth's *Can Go Through Skin*

Abstract. In cinema, there are different ways of representing psychopathological states and experiences, and one of them is the construction of a subjective point of view. The problematics of a subjective point of view have been thoroughly discussed by Edward Branigan in his *Point of View in the Cinema. A Theory of Narration and Subjectivity in Classical Film* (1984), where he outlines various types of subjective narration – reflection, perception, projection, flashback, and mental process, as well as deviant forms of subjective shot which are difficult to define. The present paper studies three of the types – perception, projection and subjective mental process – as means




of representing a character's psychopathological experience in cinema. More specifically, the paper analyses the use of the devices in Esther Rots' film *Can Go Through Skin* (*Kan door huid heen*, 2009). In addition to the visual viewpoint, the paper also studies some of the acoustic aspects of representation of subjectivity, particularly deviant psychological states.

Keywords: subjective point of view, visual subjective point of view, acoustic subjective point of view, psychopathology in film, film theory, Edward Branigan

Film kui vaatepunktide kunst

Film on oma olemuselt vaatepunkt ja seda tänu filmipilti piiravale raamile. Seda fakti tunnistati klassikalise kino perioodil, mil tuli päevakorrale küsimus jutustavast 'pilgust' (*narratorial gaze*), ja see andis filmile kui visuaalsele jutustusele uued alused, mis aitasid avastada teistsuguseid võimalusi narratiivi representerimiseks (Aumont 1989: 2). Laiemas tähenduses kannab mõiste 'vaatepunkt' iseendas teatud hinnangulisust: vaatepunkt kui arvamus või hinnang, mille valguses asju vaadatakse ja mis annab sündmustele juurde mingi subjektiivsuse. Sellises tähenduses mõistetud vaatepunkt annab narratiivile üldise sidususe ja organiseerituse. Kinematograafiline vaatepunkt on eelkõige vaadete järvend, mitte aga midagi liikumatut, või nagu kirjutab Aumont: erinevatest kohtadest kadreeritud vaatepunktide omavaheline sidumine aitab luua kronoloogilist arengut ja tekib narratiivse vaatepunkt (sammas, 6). Aumont sedastab õigustatult, et "kino on hetkeline aga arvukate vaatepunktide kunst" (sammas, 3) ja seda kinnitab ka Edward Branigan, kirjutades, et kui filmi peamine eesmärk on tekitada pingeid, vastuolusid ja mitmetähenduslikkust ja pakkuda seeläbi naudingut, siis seda saab väga hästi realiseerida läbi vaatepunktide vahetumise (Branigan 1984: 92–94).

Käesolevas artiklis keskendutakse just subjektiivsele vaatepunktile ja selle konstrueerimisele, kuid eriti sellise vaatepunktvi võimalustele edasi anda tegelase psühhopatoloogilisi seisundeid tema enda vaatepunktist – nii nagu ta ise seda kogeb. Filmil on hullumeelsuse representerimiseks mitmeid vahendeid, millest subjektiivse vaatepunkt loomine on ehk raskemgi objektiivse (kõrvaltvaataja) vaatepunkt esitamisest. Objektiivselt saab edasi anda psüühilise häire väliseid avaldumisvorme (hälbiv käitumine või köne), kuid kuidas edastada vaatajale seda, mida kogeb psüühiliselt haige inimene ise, st tema subjektiivset kogemust – nagu näiteks meelepetteid? Järgnevalt tuuakse artiklis ülevaade subjektiivsuse teoriast, ehk kuidas konstrueeritakse subjektiivne vaatepunkt (nii visuaalselt kui ka auditivselt), peamiseks allikaks Edward Branigani raamat *Point of View in the Cinema. A Theory of Narration and Subjectivity in Classical Film* (1984), ning seejärel analüüsatakse, kuivõrd on kasutatud neid subjektiivsuse vorme filmis *Võib minna läbi naha* (*Kan door huid heen*, 2009).



1. Subjektiivne vaatepunkt

Branigan defineerib subjektiivsust kui spetsiifilist jutustamise tasandit, kus jutustamine on omistatud tegelasele ja filmi vaataja asetab ennast samal ajal antud tegelase positsiooni. Filmis on jutustamise akt esmajoones ruumi loomine ja subjektiivse jutustuse puhul on ruumi loojaks tegelane. Seetõttu on subjektiivsuse määramisel oluline uurida loogikat, mille läbi seostatakse filmitud ruum tegelasega nõnda, et vaataja mõistab näidatud ruumi allikana olevat tegelase (Branigan 1984: 73).


Lisaks pildile manipuleeritakse filmis ka heliga ning seetõttu on subjektiivset vaatepunktia võimalik vaadelda kaheti. Esiteks visuaalselt ehk siis uurida subjektiivse vaatepunktia puhul küsimust "mida ja kuidas tegelane näeb?" ja teiseks auditiiivselt, mille korral uuritakse küsimust "mida ja kuidas tegelane kuuleb?". Muidugi filmi teine pool – auditiiivsus – on subjektiivse vaatepunktia puhul problemaatiline, kuna heliallikat kindlaks tegemine või siis üldse heli seostamine konkreetse tegelasega ei ole niivõrd loogiliselt ja üheselt tehtav kui visuaalse pildi puhul.

1.1. Visuaalse subjektiivsuse elemendid

Branigani (1984: 75–76) järgi on subjektiivse jutustamise puhul vajalik tegelasega siduda kõik kuus jutustamise elementi. Need kuus elementi on jutustuse allikas (*origin*), nägemus (*vision*), aeg (*time*), raam (*frame*), objekt (*object*) ja vaimuseisund (*mind, mental condition*). Jutustamise elementide pinnalt on Branigan loonud subjektiivse jutustuse tüpoloogia, milles on muutujateks kolm jutustuse elementi – aeg, raam ja vaimuseisund – ja ülejäänud kolm elementi on sisuliselt invariantsed ja ei ole seega subjektiivse jutustuse määramisel olulised.

Branigan kirjeldab muutuvaid elemente ka lähemalt ja üheks muutuvaks elemendiks subjektiivse vaatepunktia määratlemiseks on aeg, mis omistatakse tegelase vaatepunktile: tema nägemuse aeg võib olla olevik, minevik, tulevik või ka teadmata aeg. Viimasel juhul ei ole võimalik tuvastada, millise ajasuhtega tegemist on, ja kui selline aeg peetakse kuuluvaks karakteri vaatepunktile, siis seda käsitletakse klassikalises filmis kui puhost mentaalset aega (nt unenägu). Branigan viitab, et tegelikult ei ole subjektiivse jutustamise tasandil tulevikul ja teadmata ajal mingit vahet, sest tegelane ei ole võimeline kogema tulevikku teisiti kui läbi unistuste, unenägude jms. Sellised tulevikunägemused võivad, kuid ei pruugi, osutuda töeks. Siinkohal jätab Branigan kõrvale ulmefilmid, kus täpsed ennustused ja ajaränded on võimalikud, ja piirdub filmidega, kus näidataava maalma üldised reeglid on analoogsed meie argireaalsuses kehtivatega. (Branigan 1984: 77)


Teine muutuv element subjektiivse vaatepunktia tüpologiseerimisel on raam (*frame*). Raam on määratud läbi ruumi allika, milleks on subjektiivse jutustamise puhul karakter: üks kindel punkt ruumis. Sellisel juhul on karakteri ja narratiivi jutustamise



seos puhtalt ruumiline, karakteri ja kaamera positsioon ühilduvad. Selle kõige tüüpilisem vorm on subjektiivne plaan (*point-of-view shot*).

Subjektiivse vaatepunktiga saab üles ehitada ka metafoorilisele seosele, kus kaamera positsioon ei pea olema samane tegelase positsiooniga. Metafooriline seos tähendab kaadri sidumist tegelasega kaudsel teel, kus loodud ekvivalentuste võrgustik asendab sümboolselt tegelase kui ruumi allika. Näiteks kui tegelaskuju on joobes, siis võidakse kasutada neutraalseid plaane – st kaader on võetud üles ükskõik millisest ruumi osast, kuid mitte tema enda punktist –, mis aga saavad subjektiivse tähenduse, kui kaadrid tegelaskujust ja teda ümbritsevast ruumist muutuvad ähmaseks vms, andes sellega edasi karakteri subjektiivset joobnut kogemust. "Ähmane nägemine" omistatakse tegelasele, kuigi ruumi ei kadreerita tema positsioonist nii, nagu tehakse subjektiivse plaani korral. Seeläbi on neutraalne ruumi esindus positsioonist saanud subjektiivseks, mida tuleks mõista kui tegelase ekspansiooni. Sääras tõtet sisaldab endas selline subjektiivse vaatepunkt konstrueerimine, mida Branigan nimetab 'tegelase projektsiooniks' (sellest lähemalt allpool). Kui kaader ja tegelaskuju ei ole omavahel seotav ei otseselt ega kaudselt (st metafoori läbi), nimetatakse seda objektiivseks või osutavaks jutustamiseks ja ta ei kuulu subjektiivse jutustamise alla. (Branigan 1984: 78)

Kolmas ja viimane element, mida Branigan peab subjektiivse vaatepunkt määramisel oluliseks, on vaimne seisund (*mental condition*). Vaimu kategooria sisaldab endas indiviidi sisemisi seisundeid ja tavapäraselt vastandatakse selliseid seisundeid välisele maailmale. Kui film viitab taolistele sisemistele süsteemidele ja nad kuuluvad ühele kindlale karakterile, võib öelda, et filmis eksisteerib mentaalne seisund. Kui aga karakter ilmub vaatajale kui läbipaistmatu pealispind ja ei ole olemas ühtegi viidet tema sisemisele seisundile, siis on tegu karakteri n-ö tavapärase või normaalse seisundiga. Siinkohal rõhutab Branigan, et sellisel juhul ei saa seda tähistada kui "seisund puudub", sest seisund on siiski olemas – n-ö normaalne seisund –, vaid kui "puudub spetsiaalne seisund", ehk siis puudub eriline või normaalsest kõrvalekalduv seisund. Sõltuvalt sellest, kuidas mingi kultuur mõistab ja defineerib inimese vaimset seisundit, konstrueeritakse kaader, mille läbi vastavat mentaalset seisundit väljendatakse. Näiteks kui subjektiivse plaaniga tahetakse edasi anda karakteri "normaalset" seisundit, siis on kaader fokusseeritud, ei ole kasutatud ebatavalisi filtreid või fookuskauguseid ja kaamera on stabiilne. Karakter on vaataja jaoks nähtamatu, st ei ole näha karakteri juukseid, nina või kõrvu, samuti ei ole mitte mingeid viiteid karakteri silmalaugude liikumisele või hingamisele. Kui karakter pöörab pead või jalutab edasi, siis kaamera liigub sujuvalt ja väga aeglaselt, mis tegelikus elus ei ole samane liikuva inimese visuaalse väljaga. Selline kaameraliikumine on vajalik, et vaataja võiks objekte selgelt näha ja süveneda sellesse, mida näeb karakter. Kuid on ka teisi viise, kuidas kujutatakse normaalse seisundi subjektiivset vaatepunktiga. Branigan sedastab, et normaalse ja ebanormaalse vaimse seisundi eristamine ja selle konstrueerimine filmis on ideoloogiline ja konventsionaalne, mistõttu ka ajas ja ruumis muutuv. (Branigan 1984: 78-79)



1.2. Visuaalse subjektiivsuse vormid


Nende narratiivi muutuvate elementide põhjal – kes on näidatud ruumi allikas (raam), millise ajasuhtega on tegu ja kas tegelase vaimne seisund on markeeritud või mitte – on Branigan määratlenud erinevad subjektiivsuse vormid: refleksioon, pertseptsioon, projektsioon, meenutus (*flashback*), mentaalne protsess ja lisaks neile subjektiivse plaani hälbinud vormid, mida ei ole võimalik konkreetsalt ühegi teise subjektiivuse vormi alla liigitada (Branigan 1984: 98).

Branigani poolt välja pakutud subjektiivsuse vormidest olen valinud välja sellised subjektiivse jutustamise tüübidi, mille kaudu saaks konstrueerida tegelase psühhopatoloogilisest seisundist tulenevaid subjektiivseid kogemusi (nt meelepetteid). Nendeks võiksid olla pertseptsioon, projektsioon ja mentaalne protsess.

Branigani järgi väljendab pertseptsioon seda, kuidas tegelane näeb objekte. Tema nägemine võib mingil põhjusel olla häiritud, objektid tegelase vaateväljas võivad näiteks moonduda, hääguseks muutuda, vahetada värvit (ruumi punaseks muutumine kui raevu märk) jms. Kõigi pertseptsiooni plaanide korral on mingil viisil tähistatud tegelase tajuseisund ning kaamera positsioneerub ruumiliselt tegelasega samas punktis (ehk siis on tegemist subjektiivse plaaniga). Siinkohal toob Branigan eraldi välja dünaamilise pertseptsiooni plaani, kus kaamera ei ole ruumiliselt tegelasega samas punktis, kuid liigub või vahetab asukohta mööda tegelase nägemisjoont. Sellisel juhul muutub distants tegelase poolt vaadataava objektiga, näiteks kaamera liigub objektile lähemale, kuid näitab objekti siiski tegelasega samast suunast, mis võib aidata vaatajal paremini objekti näha või rõhutada näidataava objekti tähtsust. (Branigan 1984: 80–81)

Projektsiooni korral on aga tegelase ja kaamera ruumiline seos katkenud: vaadeldavat objekti näidatakse erinevatest rakuksidest, kuid sealjuures on säilinud viited tegelase vaimuseisundile. Sellisel juhul on näidatav ruum seotud tegelasega läbi metafoori. Projektsiooni puhul on oluline kindlaksmääratav ajasuhe – olevik –, sest kui aega ei ole võimalik kindlaks teha, siis on tegemist tegelase subjektiivse vaimuprotsessiga. Nii projektsionis kui ka vaimuprotsessis (nt unenäos) võib tegelane kaadris olla koos objektiga, kus (a) projektsiooni korral me ei näe mitte sama pilti, mida tegelane, vaid meile on edastatud metafooriliselt tema võimalik tajukogemus (mis on projitseeritud näidatavale "siin ja praegu" toimuvale – ülalpool näide "joobes olemisest") ja (b) vaimuprotsessi puhul näeme sama pilti, mida näeb tegelane, kuid tegemist on viimase fantaasiaga ja selle ajasuhted on seega määratlemata. (Branigan 1984: 82–83) Viimast, subjektiivset vaimuprotsessi, on kasutatud ka filmis *Võib minna läbi nahă* meelepete representeerimiseks, mida elab läbi selle peategelane.

Kolmas ja viimane subjektiivse jutustamise vorm, mida filmis võiks kasutada patoloogiliste vaimsete häirete edasi andmiseks, on subjektiivne vaimuprotsess (*mental process narration*). Subjektiivse vaimuprotsessi edasi andmisel on olulised




markeerimata ajasuhted ja näidatava ruumi sidumine tegelase vaimuseisundiga. Tegelase fantaasiate edasiandmisel võib tegelase ja näidatava pildi vaheline seos olla nii ruumiline kui metafooriline. Vaimuprotsessi edasi andmisel on kõige olulisem tegelase ja objekti lõhestumine, mis toimub kahe jutustamisvormi ilmnemise tõttu. Neutraalne jutustus, mis leiab aset filmis kujutatud realsuses (diegeetiline maailm), raamib teist jutustust – vaimuprotsessi poolt toodetud illusoorsel realsust (mitte-diegeetilist maailma) – ja nendes kahes maailmas võivad elemendid korduda (nt tegelane näeb unenäos iseennast lendavat). Korduvad elemendid kahel jutustamistasandil aga ei ole identsed, kuna nende funktsioon on neil tasanditel erinev ja seetõttu toimubki elementide n-ö lõhestumine. (Branigan 1984: 85–94)

1.3. Auditiiivne subjektiivsus

Filmi puhul ei saa aga rääkida vaid pildilistest aspektidest, vaid ka helilistest, antud teema kontekstis subjektiivsetest helidest, mis võksid olla tingitud tegelase psühhopatoloogilisest seisundist (nt luululised või obsessiivsed mõtted, kuulmismeelepetted jms). Auditiiivne subjektiivsus on iseenesest vähe käsitlust leidnud teema, mistõttu ei ole selle kohta selgeid teooriaid. Põgusalt kirjutab subjektiivsest helist Michel Chion raamatus *Audio-Vision. Sound on Screen* (1994), mõningaid märkusi selle kohta on teinud ka Branigan (1984: 94).

Subjektiivse kuuldepunkti (*point of audition*) kontsept põhineb vaatepunktiaanaloogial, mis Chioni järgi tekitab aga probleeme. Võttes aluseks subjektiivse vaatepunktia, on ka kuuldepunktil kaks tähendust: ruumiline tähendus ja subjektiivne tähendus. Vaatepunkt ise on otsestelt seotud ruumiga, st me näeme midagi ühest konkreetsest ruumipunktist ja seda ruumipunkti on võimalik ka kindlaks määrama (nähtav distants, nägemisvälja ühesuunalisus), samas kui kuuldepunkti puhul ei ole võimalik sellist ruumilist punkti üheselt kindlaks teha, sest heli on mitmesuunaline ning kuulmistaju on vörreldes nägemistajuga erinev. Samas on kuuldepunkti subjektiivsus (vaataja kuuleb sama, mida tegelane) edasi antud samamoodi nagu vaatepunktia subjektiivsus: heli seotakse tegelase kuuldepunktiga läbi montaaži, näidates kuuldava heliga samaaegselt tegelase nägu, kui subjektiivse vaatepunktia puhul näidatakse tegelast lähiplaanis (tema pilku) ja siis objekti, mida ta vaatab. (Chion 1994: 89–91)

Chioni mõistele 'subjektiivne kuuldepunkt' vastab Branigani poolt välja toodud 'auditiiivne vaatepunkt' (*aural point-of-view*), kus mõlema subjektiivse heli puhul kuuleb vaataja heli tegelase vaatepunktist ja sealjuures on sama heli kuulda ka teistele filmitegelastele. Psühhopatoloogilisest seisundist tulenevate helide määramisel võib olla abi Branigani helitüübist, mida ta nimetab auditiiivseks pertseptsiooniks (*aural perception*), mille puhul on tegemist heliga, mida kuuleb vaid tegelane ise (ja ka vaataja). (Branigan 1984: 94) Chioni mõistetesüsteemis vastab sellele 'sisemine heli' (*internal sound*). Chion aga läheb siit edasi ja jagab sisemised helid omakorda objektiivseteks sisemisteks helideks (objective-internal sound) ja subjektiivseteks sisemisteks helideks (subjective-internal sound). Objektiivne sisemine heli viitab



tegelaskuju füüsilinele seisundile, andeks vaatajale edasi selliseid helisid nagu näiteks hingamine, oiged, südamelöögid jms, samal ajal kui subjektiivseks sisemiseks heliks võivad olla tegelase peas kuuldavad helid, nagu näiteks sisemonoloog või kuulmismeelepetted, viidates seega otsestelt tema vaimsele seisundile. (Chion 1994: 76) Objektiivne sisemine heli võib aga samuti viidata vaimsele seisundile, kuigi kaudselt – näiteks ärritunud inimese kiirenenud südamelöökide edasiandmine.

Käesolevas artiklis olen analüüsitas filmis peategelase subjektiivse kuuldepunkti määramisel kasutanud Chioni mõistestikku, kus ta teeb jaotuse sisemiste helide osas.

2. Psühhopatoloogiline subjektiivsus filmis *Võib minna läbi naha*


Erinevate subjektiivsete vaatepunktide kasutamist võib näha Esther Rotsi filmis *Võib minna läbi naha* (*Kan door huid heen*), kus sellistel vaatepunktidel on oluline osa peategelase psühholoogilise seisundi edasiandmisel.

Filmis tuuakse vaatajani psühholoogiline draama täiskasvanud naise (Marieke) elust ühe aasta jooksul. Marieke elab Amsterdamis kiiret elu ja on äsja läinud lahku oma elukaaslastest. Kuid siis tabab teda järgmine psühholoogiline trauma: pitsapoiss tungib tema korterisse ja ründab teda. Pärast seda juhtumit hakkavad Marieke siseelus toimuma muutused, mis võtavad haigusliku ilme: paranoilisuse kasv, ärevus ja hirm kuni paanikahooguden, usaldamatus teiste inimeste vastu, kättemaksuhimilus (mida kohati rahuldatakse nägemismeelepetete kaudu), turvatunde täielik puudumine.

2.1. Üldine psühholoogilise ebastiabiilsuse markeeritus

Alates esimestest filmikaadritest on Marieke psühholoogiline ebastiabiilsus selgelt aimatav: kaamera liikumine on kergelt kaootiline – võimalik, et on filmitud käsikaameraga –, kaadrid vahetuvad suhteliselt kiiresti ja distants kaamera ja peategelase vahel on muutuv. Ka heli ja pildi vastavus ei ole püsiv ja korrapärane: me näeme Marieket telefoniga rääkimas, kui juba näidatakse teda telefoni lihtsalt käes hoidmas ja samal ajal kuuleme jätkuvalt Marieke könet, mis on pärit hoopis eelmisest kaadrist. Selline kaamera liikumine ja pildi-heli montaaž viitavad Marieke psühholoogilisele seisundile, mis on häiritud hiljutisest lahkuminekust elukaaslastest ja mida omakorda võimendab alkoholi tarvitamine: ta on segaduses, hinges valitseb süvenev kaootilus.

Avastseeni võib pidada peategelase projektsiooniks, sest kaamera liikumine ja montaaž ei ole objektiivsed, vaid rõhutavad Marieke sisemaailma segasust ja samal ajal ka tema pertseptsiooni. Avatseenis kasutatud ebastiabiilne kaamera on kogu filmi



vältel pigem küll reegliks kui erandiks, mistõttu on filmis raske selgelt piiritleda objektiivseid ja subjektiivseid vaatepunktide. Samas just tänu sellisele filmimisviisile on peaaegu alati markeeritud tegelase enda ebastabiilsus, olgu selleks üldine segaduses olek (avastseen), rahutu ja veidi sihitu tegutsemine (nt stseenid, kus Marieke koristab ja remondib tube või valib poeriulitelt kaupa) või ärevuse ja pinge kasvamine kuni paanikani (stseenid kohtusaalis).

2.2. Projektsioon


Järgmine stseen, kus on selgelt edasi antud Marieke sisemine häiritus, toimub kohtusaalis. Alguses näidatakse kohtuistungit objektiivsest vaatepunktist, mis hakkab jätkjärgult aga kajastama Marieke sisemise pingi ja rõhutuse kasvu, muutudes seeläbi subjektiivseks.

Näeme lähiplaanis ja erinevatest rakurssidest süüalust – tema põlv, trummeldavaid sõrmi ja nägu sel hetkel, kui ta vaatab Marieke pool –, samuti Marieke enda nägu; poolüldplaanides teisi kohalviibivaid inimesi, kes juba vaatavad Marieket või alles pööravad pilgu tema pool; kaamera liikumine muutub ebastabiiliseks; diegeetiline heli muutub mitte-diegeetiliseks ja häirivaks heliks, mis hakkab valjenema kuni stseeni lõpuni. Subjektiivseid plaane on kasutatud siin väga vähe, st kaamera ei positsioneeru tegelasega samas punktis ja näidatav pilt on tegelasega seotud metafooriliselt – me seostame nähtut Marieke sisemiste muutustega, mis leiavad aset paralleelselt kohtusaalis toimuvaga. Selliselt edasiantult on tegemist stseeniga, kus tegelase sisemaailm projitseeritakse välismaailmale ja seda võib seetõttu määratleda kui peategelase projektsiooni.

2.3. Subjektiivne kuuldepunkt

Ka hiljem esitatakse sarnaseid kaadreid kohtusaalist, mis samal moel edastavad Marieke sisemist seisundit. Pärast ühte järgmist kohtuistungit, kui Marieke läheneb oma majale, jätkub kuuldaava heli kaudu tegelase subjektiivne projektsioon: me kuuleme vere pulseerimist, mis lisab objektiivsele visuaalsele poolele subjektiivsust, osutades peategelase sisemisele rahutusele ja kasvavale pingele. Vastavalt Chioni määratlustele sisemistest helidest saab stseenis kuulduud heli nimetada objektiivseks sisemiseks heliks, kuna vere kuuldaav tuiklemine körvus on iseenesest füüsiline nähtus ja ta on tingitud psühholoogilisest seisundist – raevust.

Viidatud objektiivne sisemine heli jätkub veel mõnda aega ja seob ühtseks tervikuks selle kestel näidatud erineva sisuga kaadrid: Marieke mälupildid kohtusaalis toimunust ja pildid Marieke näöst lähiplaanis, kus ta lamab voodis ja vaatab hirmunud ilmel ringi. Neid pilte saatev vere pulseerimist imiteeriv heli annab lõppkokkuvõttes mulje peategelase vihast, hirmust ja kasvavast paranoiaast. Peale objektiivsete sisemiste helide kasutatakse filmis suhteliselt sageli ka subjektiivseid sisemisi helisi,



milleks on vaatajale kuulavad Marieke mõtted ning kõnelused nii iseenda kui ka nägemismeelepetetega.

2.4. Subjektiivne vaimuprotsess


Subjektiivseid vaatepunkte, kus on olemas selgelt äratuntavad psühhopatoloogilised kogemused, oli filmis neli ja neis stseenides ähvardab Marieke relvaga kujutletavat pitsapoissi. Sealjuures Marieke räägib oma meeletepetega, nimetet tegevus toimub nii vahetu kõne kui ka mõtete vormis. Kuigi neis stseenides Marieke suhtleb pitsapoisisiga, siis reaalset dialoogi ometigi ei toimu, sest viimane ei tee kordagi häält. Omal moel kinnitab see vaataja jaoks pitsapoisi ebareaalsust ja me saame aru, et teda ei ole töesti olemas. Samas kui pitsapoiss on Marieke nägemismeelepete, siis miks mitte esitada pitsapoisi kõne ja siis see tõlgendada peategelase kuulmismeelepettena. Selline lisandus tekitaks vaatajas hoopis teisi kahtlusi: kas ekraanil näidatud pitsapoiss on ikka Marieke subjektiivne fantaasia? Pigem muutub visuaalselt esitatud hallutsinatsioon läbi heliliste aspektide lisamise realsemaks kui ta on.

Nimetatud psühhopatoloogilist seisundit väljendavad stseenid võib määratleda peategelase subjektiivse vaimuprotsessi representeerimisenä, kuna projektsionist eristab antud stseeni neis sisalduv võimatu objekt, st me näeme midagi, mida ei ole olemas: hallutsinatsiooni, mis on toodetud Marieke vaimuprotsessi poolt.

Samas on vaimuprotsessi esinemise üheks tingimuseks selle ajasuhete määratlematus, nimelt me ei suuda tuvastada vaimuprotsessi poolt toodetud pildi ajalisi suhteid ülejäänud esitatud maailmaga. Antud stseenid toimuvad seevastu diegeetilises maailmas ja seda fakti toetab ka ühele sellisele stseenile kronoloogiliselt eelnev tegevus, mis kinnitab olevikulisi ajasuheteid: Marieke keedab kasutatud tamponidest teed ja pärast pakub seda oma piinatavale. Kogu tegevus – tamponide kogumine ja tee keetmine – toimub siin ja praegu, filmis kujutatud reaalses maailmas. Nendes tingimustes esitatuna võiks stseeni, kus Marieke on koos oma meeletepetega, nimetada projektsioniks, kuid sellisel juhul ei tohiks diegeetilises maailmas esineda objekte, mida ei ole olemas. Branigan (1984: 82) sõnul on tegelase projektsioni representeerimisel oluline see, *kuidas esitatu osutab subjekti vaimsele seisundile või tajude häiritusele*, kuid ta ei näita subjekti fantaasiaid ja ei sisalda endas võimatuid (ehk mitte-diegeetilisi) elemente.

Niisiis, kuigi stseenides ei ole vihjeid määratlemata ajasuhetele, mis on subjektiivse vaimuprotsessi piiritlemise üheks tingimuseks, esineb seal reaalselt mitte olemasolevaid objekte, mis ei luba antud stseeni määratleda kui Marieke vaimse seisundi projektsioone.

Vaimuprotsessi representeerimise juures on oluline ka narratiivis esinevate elementide lõhestumine (Branigan 1984: 88). Analüüsitas filmis on lõhestuvaks objektiks märklaud, mis peategelase haiges teadvuses on muutunud pitsapoisiks.



Objekti muundumist kinnitab kaader, milles Marieke jäab äkki märklauda vaatama ja hüüatab endamisi: "*Fuck. It's pizzaman.*" Pärast seda avastust hakkab ta märklauaga suhtlema nõnda nagu tegemist oleks reaalse inimesega, kuigi vaatajana näeme jätkuvalt puidust märklauda. Alles hilisemates stseenides, kus Marieke pööningul tulistab ja räägib hallutsinatsiooniga, on puitplaat muutunud ka vaataja jaoks pitsapoisiks. Antud juhul asendatakse diegeetiline objekt peategelase tajus mitte-diegeetilise objektiga ja kuigi vaataja teab, et tegemist on vaid puust märklauaga (vähemalt alguses on vaataja sellisel teadmisel, hiljem võib ta selles kahtlema hakata), on Marieke jaoks seesama märklaud täiesti reaalne lihast ja luust pitsapoiss.

Branigan on viidanud ka sellele, et lõhestunud elemendid ei ole subjektiivse vaimuprotsessi korral identsed, vaid evivad erinevaid funktsioone (Branigan 1984: 88). Järelikult on meil objektiivse reaalsuse tasandil tegemist märklauaga, mis on psühhopatoloogilisel tasandil muutunud millekski muuks ja samal ajal omandanud ka uue funktsiooni: objekt ei ole enam vaid lihtne märklaud, mille suunas harjutada relvaga laskmist, vaid midagi sellist, mida peab piinama, ähvardama ja millele saab isegi kuuma teed joota.

Antud stseenides olevate kaadrite ülesehitus vastab ka ühele teisele vaimuprotsessi esitamise tingimusele, nimelt on näidatavad kaadrid peategelasega seotud nii ruumiliselt (näeme hallutsinatsiooni Mariekega samast punktist) kui ka metafooriliselt (Marieke on koos oma hallutsinatsiooniga samas kaadris) ja mölemad juhud on subjektiivse vaimuprotsessi esitamisel võimalikud.


Et Marieke häirunud vaimuprotsessist tulenev hallutsinatsioon esineb mitmel korral samas kaadris koos Marieke endaga ja stseenides toimuv on diegeetiline maailmaga "siin ja praegu" suhtes, on antud stseenid iseenesest huvitavad, kuna tekitavad küsimusi reaalsuse ja mittereaalsuse suhetest filmis endas. Psüühiliselt haige inimene peab oma hallutsinatsioone objektiivseks reaalsuseks, mille ehtsuses ta ei kahtle, ja samamoodi on see reaalsus esitatud vaatajale. Me teame, et pitsapoiss ei ole või ei saa olla reaalselt Marieke pööningul, kuid sellest hoolimata on ta seal ja Marieke tegeleb tema piinamisega. Marieke haiguslik subjektiivne reaalsus on Marieke jaoks objektiivne reaalsus ja sellepärast esitatakse pööningu-stseene kui objektiivset reaalsust kajastavad, mis tekitab vaatajas katlusi antud stseenide subjektiivsus - võib-olla ongi see tegelikkus?

Kokkuvõtteks

Võttes kokku eelneva arutelu filmis esinenud subjektiivsete vaatepunktide kohta, võib teha järgmisi tähelepanekuid:

(1) Kogu filmi jooksul on subjektiivsete psühhopatoloogiliste kogemuste esitamiseks kasutatud vaid subjektiivse vaimuprotsessi struktuuri.

(2) Projektsioonidega on rõhutatud esmajoones tegelase vaimse seisundi üldist häiritust või ebastiabiilsust, mis tingimata ei viita psüühika haiguslikele



hälbimustele. Selliste projektsioonide loomiseks on peaasjalikult kasutatud kaamera liikumist, kaadrite sagedast vahetumist ja heli (enamasti mitte-diegeetiline heli või tegelase sisemine heli). Lisaks sellele, et heli tõstab esile stseeni subjektiivsust, liidab ta kaadrid sidusaks stseeniks ning aitab fikseerida projektsiooni alguse ja lõpu.

(3) Subjektiivse pertseptsiooni struktuuri kasutamist filmis ma ei täheldanud, kuigi pakkusin ka seda üheks võimalikuks subjektiivseks vaatepunktiks, mis võiks üksiti anda edasi tegelase psühhopatoloogilist kogemust.


Filmis kasutatud erinevad subjektiivsuse vormid loovad suhteliselt autentse pildi psühhopatoloogilise seisundi arengust. Meile ei esitata mitte niivõrd tegelase objektiivset maailma, vaid peaaegu alati viibime mingis mõttes tema subjektiivsuses ja kogeme sama, mida kogeb tegelane ise. Vaataja hakkab reaalseks pidama isegi peategelase poolt kogetud nägemismeelepetteid ja kahtlema selles, kas tegemist on ikka hallutsinatsiooniga. Niiviisi oleme viidud psüühiliselt haige inimese subjektiivsesse realsusesse ja ei suuda enam eristada, kus lõpeb reaalsus ja algab fantaasia.

Kasutatud kirjandus

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SYNTAGMATIC AND PARADIGMATIC RELATIONS

in Grace Paley's *Wants*

Tom Boyle

University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics


Abstract. The article discusses the role of immanent structuralist analysis in relation to other, more contemporary approaches to literary study. Jurij Lotman's version of structuralism, in particular, is examined, and it is argued that his concept of the artistic text provides a model that is structural, yet flexible, allowing the analyst to abide by the text's structure without reducing all of the interpretation to that structure. We take Grace Paley's story *Wants* as an object through which to highlight these points. In addition, we provide a thorough analysis of the story, which may serve as a working interpretive framework to be carried forward into further studies of Paley's fiction.

Keywords: structure, text, syntagmatic, paradigmatic, Lotman, Grace Paley, Saussure

Süntagmaatilised ja paradigmaatilised suhted Grace Paley novellis "Wants"

Abstrakt. Artiklis uuritakse immanentse strukturalistliku analüüsī rolli teiste, kirjanduse uurimise nüüdisaegsemate lähenemiste kõrval. Konkreetsemalt uuritakse Juri Lotmani strukturalistlikku lähenemist, väites, et tema arusaam kunstilisest tekstist annab paindliku strukturalistliku analüüsimudeli, mis võimaldab uurijal järgida teksti struktuuri, redutseerimata kõiki tõlgendusi sellele struktuurile. Selle teema näitlikustamiseks uurime Grace Paley novelli "Wants". Selle tulemusena pakutakse antud novelli põhjalik analüüs, mis võiks toimida tõlgendusliku raamistikuna, mida kasutada autori loomingu edasisel uurimisel.


Märksõnad: struktuur, tekst, süntagmaatika, paradigmataatika, Juri Lotman, Grace Paley, Ferdinand de Saussure



Professional criticism of Grace Paley's fiction has focused on relations between the work and the author's identity as a Jewish American, a woman, a feminist, a socialist, an activist, a revolutionary, and a New Yorker. While such analyses have been fruitful in various ways — in helping to determine whether there exists a genre of Jewish American fiction (Baumgarten 1993), in making sociological comparisons between the situation of cultural minorities in urban space (Goffman 2000), in understanding the immigrant experience in America (Aarons 1987) — they have avoided a more fundamental question. They reach beyond the borders of the work itself to find meaning within it. This principle of *crossing the border* is common to many methods of contemporary literary analysis and has likewise been refuted by many schools. To list briefly a few most prominent members of the opposition — the American New Critics, structuralism, generally considered, and the Russian Formalists. Each of these traditions sought to preserve the integrity of the literary object and in its own way to study literature as literature. The situation in 1960-70s France is of particular interest because it is somewhat paradoxical. At the same time that Barthes and others were proclaiming the death of the author, the notion of intertextuality was being championed as a more perfect model for textual analysis. But intertextuality and reading for authorial intention are related in that both require the critic to bring extra-textual realisations to the reading in order to understand the meaning of a text.

The fieriness of these debates seems to have cooled in recent decades, and plurality as a general feature of meaning is mostly acknowledged. 'Interpretation' is increasingly used to describe the reading process, which places an emphasis on the reader and her subjective ability to make sense of a text. *What is your interpretation?* has become the question, not *What does the text mean?* While semiotics has certainly sided with the plurality camp, we must ask, are all meanings of a text equal? I would suggest they are not, or at least that some are more basic than others. Before bringing any new material to a text, be it another text, or an author, we can first understand the primary material on its own terms. The primary material is the one constant in each act of reading. While other meanings bend and float and disappear with the approach of each subjectivity to the text, the same material structure is perceived, I suggest, by each reader, if even only in an unconscious way.

Juri Lotman, whom we may identify with Tartu-Moscow semiotics, provides a model of text that allows us to examine the primary material in exclusion of all else. The approach of this essay will be to use Lotman's model to provide a reading of Grace Paley's story *Wants*. The goal of the analysis will be to provide scholars of American fiction with a structural framework with which to examine other Paley texts. In addition, as *Wants* contains several explicit intertextual references, our analysis will show how the text's structure provides meaning to these references on its own terms; the same holds true for implicit references to Paley's Jewishness, her gender, or age, etc. The goal is not to refute the plurality of the meaning of these references, but rather to reveal how structural meaning is also and already given.



Description of the model


The primary feature of Lotman's model is the external border, which indicates where the text begins and ends and marks its inside as different from its outside (Lotman 1977: 52). This boundary is of prime importance to cultural semioticians who use Lotman's model to textualise phenomena that is not inherently textual. For example, multiple works by a single author, multiple works within a given genre, a set of paintings, and even people may be framed as a text and studied as such; in these cases, the analyst must fix the external border herself. In our investigation we are dealing with a single text in which the boundary is already established. The external border plays another role. It defines the expression of the text; this means that the text is the material realisation of the system and not the system itself. This distinction is crucial to understanding Lotman's model, and I will use the terms 'text' and 'system' advisedly in this essay.

This distinction, however, also becomes blurry, as we will see later. The system of which the text is a realisation may be called, most broadly, 'the language of art,' though this term is deceptive in that it suggests only one system. In fact, for Lotman the language of verbal art is already a hierarchy of at least two systems — natural language and artistic language — and works of art usually entail the presence of many more languages (Lotman 1977: 13); their simultaneous expression in the text is what accounts for the plurality of possible interpretations, already at the level of immanent analysis.

This conception of 'language' is one of the advantages of Lotman's approach. Outside information is allowed to enter the text in the form of an invariant system; this allows the analyst to account for important external considerations, such as the tradition a writer is working within, without tying the interpretation to a number of intertextual references. Rather, the outside information comes into the text as a whole and should be considered in terms of its total effect on the literary object.

Demarcation of the text's material into units is another principal feature of Lotman's model (Lotman 1977: 52). Within the borders of the text, all material enters into well-defined structural units. In the case of verbal texts, which are composed in a natural language, we are given a hierarchy of at least some of these units: the phoneme, the morpheme, the word, the sentence, the paragraph, and so on. Longer works such as novels feature higher-level distinctions such as page breaks or chapters. The highest-level demarcation given in *Wants* is at the level of the paragraph.

A third principal characteristic of the text is its structure, which suggests that the text not only contains demarcated units, but that these units are strictly ordered (Lotman 1977: 53). The structural principles by which this order is attained — syntagmatics and paradigmatics — are of prime importance and deserve our brief attention. We will then arrive at the analysis of Paley's story.



The syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes

At least since the Russian Formalists, literary scholars have been interested in the difference between natural and artistic language (Eichenbaum 1926: 107-108). Roman Jakobson has characterised this difference by considering the function of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations between signs in an artistic text, considered as a product of communication in a natural language. Relying on the Saussurean⁶ model of language, he uses the latter's notions of the *syntagmatic* and *associative* relations in a sign system to build his understanding of what is specific to artistic language — though in Jakobson's terminology *syntagma* becomes *combination* and *association* becomes *selection*. He describes artistic language as follows: "The poetic function [of language] projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination" (Jakobson 1987: 71).


For Jakobson, the poetic message is characterised by the temporary ascension of one of language's internal threads over the others and therefore does not represent a real break with any other use of language; the poetic function is always present, albeit subordinated in non-poetic messages, and its dominance in a message is identifiable when the signs are sequentially structured according to principles of equivalence.

For Lotman, the situation is quite different. Verbal art, while appropriating the material of natural language, constitutes and is realised in a completely separate semiotic system: the language of art (Lotman 1977: 9). Nonetheless, Lotman adopts Jakobson's position regarding what we might call the *equivalence in contiguity* principle of artistic texts, though again there is a shift in terminology (Lotman 1977: 78): *selection* becomes *paradigm*, and Saussure's *syntagma* is resurrected in place of Jakobson's *combination*⁷.

What the *equivalence in contiguity* principle suggests, for Lotman, is that each element in an artistic text not only exists in some sequence but is also equivalent in some way to every other element in the sequence. A logical conclusion is that each unit of the artistic text may be seen as paradigmatic, not only of every other unit, but of the text as a whole. This indivisible meaning is the organising principle of the entire structure (Lotman 1987: 53). For Lotman, the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes constitute the "structural principles" through which this indivisible meaning can be determined, hence their prime importance. Indeed: "All the structural diversity of the text can be reduced to these principles" (Lotman 1977: 78). Each unit — from the

⁶ While Jakobson credits Saussure for making the initial distinction between these relations (Jakobson 1987: 98), Lotman traces the idea further back to Polish linguist Mikołaj Kruszewski. Lotman, however, credits Jakobson for having first noted the "vital role played by the mutual projection of these two axes in the structure of the poem" (Lotman 1977: 78).

⁷ These shifts in terminology indicate deeper theoretical distinctions, but a discussion of them would constitute another paper. We mention them here to show the evolution of Lotman's model and to demonstrate how it differs from Jakobson's.




phoneme, where according to Jakobson various articulations are selected and combined to create one sound⁸, to the word, in which various morphemes are selected and combined, even to the paragraph, which may be organised on the basis of similarity (each sentence is a repetition of a general idea) and contiguity (sentences are arranged according to a logical sequence) — is related to all other units according to a set of paradigms and also through its position in a certain temporal sequence. The analytical tool provided by the assertion that *all the structural diversity* can be reduced to these two types of relations is incredibly powerful. It becomes something like the zoom function of a camera lens, allowing us to investigate both types of relations on all hierarchical levels of the text.

We must make a distinction here between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations at the level of system and at the level of text. Saussure's initial description of these relations found them to be elements of *langue*, the system, but he was concerned with whether the syntagm shouldn't properly belong to *parole*, what we might think of analogically as the 'text' in Lotman's theory, because any combination of elements begins to seem like a realisation of the system and not the system itself (Saussure 1959: 124). He arrives at the conclusion that *parole* is characterised by freedom of combination, and that some combinations, though their constituent parts are identifiable as concrete entities in themselves, are not free but rather fixed by tradition ("bon marché," for example) and therefore are constituents of *langue*. He acknowledges, however, the difficulty in making an outright determination; elements of the system tend to become realisations of it, to varying degrees depending on the level of formalisation in culture.

Lotman makes the same discovery, but from the other direction. For Lotman, works of art — texts — are realisations of the language of art; but, they have a "constant tendency to be formalized" and become systems themselves (Lotman 1977: 17). In this view, system and text, rather than being total and mutually exclusive opposites, become the two endpoints of a gradated spectrum, along which sign combinations may be determined to exist. This blurring of the distinction between system and text when it comes to art becomes central to Lotman's larger project and explains why we may talk about the language of the Old Testament entering into *Wants* even though the Old Testament is ostensibly another text and therefore should be excluded from the analysis. Rather, certain invariant relations within the Old Testament have been formalised in culture, such that we may talk about these relations as rules of another system.

Another consequence of searching for syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations at the level of the text is that Saussure's dictum gets turned on its side: the syntagmatic relation is *in praesentia* and the paradigmatic relation is *in praesentia*

⁸ This claim represents an important break with Saussure. Jakobson: "Despite [Saussure's] own insight into the phoneme as a set of concurrent distinctive features, the scholar succumbed to the traditional belief in the linear character of language, 'which excludes the possibility of pronouncing two elements at the same time'" (Jakobson 1987: 99).



too, as all the elements of the 'system' in question are made present in the text. Structural textual analysis consists in determining these relations.

Grace Paley's *Wants*

In *Wants*, the narrator repeatedly encounters the burdensomeness of familial duty, which is contrasted strongly with her positive attitude toward another type of duty: that which she owes to the community. This dichotomy (community over family) comes to be the central indivisible meaning of the story. Family-as-burden is revealed through her negative attitude toward her sick father, her children, and her husbands, both ex- and present, all of which are contrasted with her positive attitude toward various sorts of communal figures or duty: her appraisal of the librarian, the affinity she feels with the neighbours during breakfast, her desire to be an effective citizen, and in the final triumphant sentences the recognition of the "little sycamores the city had dreamily planted" (Paley 1995: 191). We will illustrate this central dichotomy through a close analysis of the story.


The narrator's negative feelings toward her sick father are revealed through her enumeration of the obstacles she encountered during the marriage to her ex-husband. The series is as follows: "But really, if you remember: first, my father was sick that Friday, then the children were born, then I had those Tuesday night meetings, then the war began" (Paley 1995: 189).

What we have is a set of unlike elements that are brought into a syntagmatic relationship, which establishes a measure of equivalence between them. Each is equal to the rest in that they are all items on a list of obstacles leading to the dissolution of the marriage; they represent a paradigm. Thus, the sick father is a burden just as *war* is also a burden. He is not mentioned again. The children, who here are made equal to *sick father* and *war* are elaborated upon in other parts of the story.

The books, which the narrator has had for "eighteen years," are *The Children* and *The House of Mirth*. An intertextual analysis of the story would look into the content of the real books by Edith Wharton to draw conclusions about their meaning in this text, but the structure of *Wants* already provides the possibility for interpretation.

Furthermore, while the relevance of any intertextual interpretation could be debated, structural meaning is built into the material itself and would remain constant no matter what conclusions an analyst were to draw regarding the relevance of extra-textual references. As Lotman says, meanings "flicker" as different systems are brought to the interpretation (Lotman 1977: 67); continuing the metaphor, we can say that structural meanings are continual sources of light.

"Children" in the title of the book establishes a bond of equivalence with all other instances of "children" in the story, and thus the designatum of each enters into a relationship with the others due to this paradigmatic (lexical) relation. Thus, the




narrator's children, like the book, represent a burden for her, something she has been meaning to deal with for a very long time. That she has had the books for eighteen years (the legal age of adulthood in the United States, where the story takes place) strengthens the bond of equivalence between the children and the book *The Children*. Once eighteen years have passed she can be free of both. The title of the other book reveals again the burdensomeness of domestic life.

The House of Mirth must be read as ironical. 'Mirth' belongs to the highest register of English diction and stands out from the rest of the story, which is written in very common language. This is a case of what Lotman calls "internal recoding," which means that the code chosen by the reader for the text is suddenly shown to be insufficient. Along the syntagmatic axis, the new code activates new meanings for signs that have previously been interpreted; these signs now enter into the second system where they are valued again, though differently. Indeed as the story tells us, the household was not one of mirth, but its opposite.

One last point about the books: according to the narrator, they are "about how life in the United States changed in twenty-seven years fifty years ago" (Paley 1995: 189). The number "twenty-seven" appears in two other locations in the text, both times in reference to the number of years the narrator was married to her ex-husband (Paley 1995: 189, 190). Another paradigmatic relation is here established, between the length of time required for life in the United States to change and the length of time she was married. As before, the two elements, which are equivalent at the level of sign but not in what they refer to, enter into a relationship of equivalence and a symmetry is established between the non-equivalent parts. The meaning of the one is partly transferred to the other and vice versa. Thus, her life also changed in twenty-seven years; furthermore, this change is what *The Children* and *The House of Mirth*, which share a bond with the children themselves and the household, are "about." The condemning suggestion is that the primary role of children, what they are about, is to change the life of their mother.

The children are referenced again in the story's final scene: "The little sycamores the city had dreamily planted a couple of years before the kids were born had come that day to the prime of their lives" (Paley 1995: 190). The use of the diminutive *little* to describe the trees and the adverb *dreamily*, which is generally used to describe a lover, to describe the actions of the city are revealing of the mother's sympathies. "The kids" enter into a syntagmatic relationship with "the trees" and they are clearly valued lower. In the moment when the narrator glances out the window and notices the trees, which remind her of her children, it is not the kids, whom we must assume are also near the prime of their lives, who are remarked, but the city's *dreamily planted trees*.

The husbands also enter into the negative domain of domestic life and support our interpretation of the story's semantic structure. The first valuation of a husband begins in the third paragraph with the ex-husband's antagonising dialogue, where he is shown to be disagreeable and blameful. His appearance on stage ends with the



final accusation: "You'll always want nothing" (Paley 1995: 190). Following this, we get the narrator's judgment of him:


He had had a habit throughout the twenty-seven years of making a narrow remark which, like a plumber's snake, could work its way through the ear and down the throat, halfway to my heart. He would then disappear, leaving me choking with equipment (Paley 1995: 190).

The first sentence of the quotation represents a syntax that is far more complex than any other in the story, not to mention Paley's use of a rhetorical trope, which are infrequent in *Wants*, and for this reason the sentence acquires a prominent structural position. In addition, the sentence calls into the story an external code, the language of the Old Testament, to make sense of the snake. Yet, this code must be immediately supplemented by another as we move to the following sentence, in which Eve's snake becomes "equipment" that is woven into and about the head of the narrator.

This calls to mind a more modern register, perhaps that of science fiction, where metal interwoven into the thoracic cavity carries some meaning: the wife is made non-human by her husband. In any case, the quotation represents a textual segment where numerous features overlap and for this reason contains a great number of meanings (Lotman 1977: 72). This quotation is paired with another that comes a few paragraphs later: "You couldn't exhaust either man's [ex-husband or husband's] qualities or get under the rock of his reasons in one short life" (Paley 1995: 190). This sentence is deceptive in that it reads like a compliment. However, "exhaust" means to tire out, and what we actually find beneath rocks are worms, bugs, darkness, all of which carry negative connotations in the language of literature.

We have examined the bonds of equivalence between father, children, and husbands and have shown that the whole category acquires a negative value in the story, but we are left to show the other side of the opposition and discuss how the story values community and communal duty. Here's what the narrator has to say about the librarian: "Immediately she trusted me, put my past behind her, wiped the record clean" (Paley 1995: 189). The librarian also acquires a positive value through a differential relationship with the ex-husband in the earlier sentence, "He interrupted the librarian, who had more to tell" (Paley 1995: 189). Here, the ex-husband and the librarian are in a syntagmatic relationship, and the ex-husband, shown as the aggressor, is lowered and by default the status of the librarian is lifted into the realm of the positive.

The community is also embodied, and valued positively (again, in contrast to the ex-husband), through the narrator's neighbours, who always had "sugar-cured smoked bacon" for breakfast, while she and her husband only ever had coffee (Paley 1995: 190). Critics might be persuaded to read the bacon in light of the author's Jewishness. While we can't say whether such an interpretation is valid, we do know that nowhere in the text do we learn that the narrator is Jewish, or that she is herself Grace Paley. We can, however, show that the textual structure already gives meaning to the bacon, a meaning that would remain and exist simultaneously with any other




interpretation. The ex-husband says that he remembers their breakfasts together fondly; she can't remember why until she remembers the scent of the bacon, which gave a "very grand feeling about breakfast" (Paley 1995: 190). That is to say, in isolation domestic life is unimpressive and forgettable, while even just a hint of the wider community is transformative and can bring about something grand.

The strongest positive valuation of communal duty comes just after the emotional climax of the story. The narrator, having been "extremely accused" of wanting nothing, demurs, "I want, for instance, to be a different person. I want to be the woman who brings these books back in two weeks. I want to be the effective citizen who changes the school system and addresses the Board of Estimate on the troubles of this dear urban center" (Paley 1995: 190). Earlier we said the books were bonded with the children through their titles and that both represented a burden to her. What the mother does with the books, she also does with the children. Here, the same element (children/books) is seen in a new light, and the narrator is faced with a choice. Books from a library belong to the community and borrowing entails the obligation of returning, whereas children belong to a family where the parents are responsible for them until adulthood; we see the narrator clearly siding with the former interpretation, deciding to abide by the meaning of "children" that is given by the community rather than that which is given her family. She doesn't want to keep them for eighteen years (her obligation as a parent), she wants to return them in two weeks (her obligation as a citizen). We also notice again the adjective "dear" attributed to the city. In addition, she desires to "change the school system" and "address the Board of Estimates," both actions that would benefit the broader community. In the final action of the story, the narrator observes the dreamily planted trees previously discussed, which remind her of her children, whom she immediately forgets in favour of the trees, which "had come that day to the prime of their lives."

Conclusions


The importation of linguistic principles to the study of literature has proven to be an incredibly fruitful development. In particular, the structuralist practice of construing the text as a system of signs analogous to Saussure's model of language, and analysing it as such, began a line of thinking that led to many of the major developments within literary theory in the past century. While many of these developments have consisted in a critique of structuralism, it is our contention that structural analysis has a continued utility and ought not be forgotten. It is hoped we have demonstrated this in our analysis of *Wants*. Lotman's approach in particular, with its unique understanding of the concepts 'system' and 'text,' appears to be more flexible than that of other thinkers associated with the structuralist paradigm, and it allows critics to analyse a text structurally without falling prey to criticisms of rigidity or false jurisdiction over meaning.



According to Lotman, the structure of a single text may come to act as a system for interpreting other texts (Lotman 1977: 22). In light of this, we have provided a structural framework that may be carried forward to further studies of Paley's fiction. The opposition of community and family and the valuation of the former over the latter is an important structural element in, at least, *The Long-Distance Runner* as well. Further research into Paley's work may show that the presence and significance of this distinction is even more widespread.

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BEING ZIGGY STARDUST: A semiotic problem

Alina-Ruxandra Mircea


University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics

Abstract. At its onset, David Bowie's self-fashioning as the alien superstar Ziggy Stardust was meant as an ironical response to rock'n'roll rhetoric of authenticity. But legend has it that Bowie soon came to identify himself more and more with his character, so much so, in fact, that he would start to believe he was indeed Ziggy Stardust. Rumors about him becoming delusional at the height of his success were supported by Bowie's own press interviews and public appearances and further enhanced by the massive fan craze surrounding his persona. While Bowie's alleged schizophrenic-like psychosis remains, for many reasons, a matter of dispute, the way it was carried out on- as well as offstage nonetheless suggests the curious situation in which a theatrical construct – in other words, a conventional sign-system – can encroach upon, and eventually displace, reality (be it psychological reality). As the character takes over the interpreter and the boundaries between fiction and reality become more and more blurry, a double phenomenon ensues. On one hand, the split-identity delusion has an undermining effect on the performance, for it inevitably destabilizes its constitutive parameters (stage-space and stage-time). On the other hand, and owing to the same indetermination, every act, every gesture – regardless if it's carried out on- or offstage – can be inscribed in the performance's order. This paper proposes to take a look at the ways in which Bowie's performance as Ziggy Stardust challenges the notion of performance understood as a self-enclosed event having an autonomous semiotic status.

Keywords: semiotics of performance, Peircean semiotics, cultural semiotics, popular culture, history of rock'n'roll music

Olla Ziggy Stardust: semiootiline probleem

Abstrakt. Alguses oli David Bowie kehastumine tulnukast superstaariks Ziggy Stardust mõeldud iironilide vastusena rock'n'rolli autentsuse-retoorikale. Ent legend pajatab, et Bowie hakkas peagi üha enam oma tegelaskujuga samastuma, uskuma, et ta on tõepoolest Ziggy Stardust. Kuulduseid sellest, et ta oma karjääri tipul pettekujutelmade ohvriks sattus, toetasid Bowie enda intervjuud ja avalikud esinemised, samuti massiivne fännide hullustus, mis tema tegelaskuju ümbris.



Ehkki Bowie väidetav skisofreenialaadne psühhoos on mitmel põhjusel vaidlav, siis viis, kuidas see nii laval kui väljaspool lava teostus, osutab ometi huvitavale situatsioonile, kus teatraalne konstrukt, mis on loodud kokkuleppelises märgisüsteemis, võib tungida (psühholoogilisse) tegelikkusesse ja seda viimaks asendama hakata. Kui tegelaskuju võtab tõlgendaja üle ning piirid tegelikkuse ja fiktsiooni vahel üha enam häägustuvad, tekib kahetine nähtus. Ühelt poolt õonestab lõhenenud identiteedi luul etendust, kuna parataamatult destabiliseerib seda moodustavaid parameetreid (lavaruum ja lavataim). Teisalt on sellesama määramatuse tõttu võimalik iga žesti, sõltumata sellest, kas see viiakse ellu laval või väljaspool lava, võtta etenduse osana. Käesolev artikkel uurib viise, kuidas Bowie esinemine Ziggy Stardusti rollis esitab väljakutse etenduse kui autonoomset semiootilist staatust omava endassesuletud sündmuse mõistele.

Märksõnad: etenduslikkuse semiootika, Peirce'i semiootika, kultuurisemiootika, popkultuur, rock'n'rolli ajalugu

*'For he who lives more lives than one
More deaths than one must die'
Oscar Wilde, *The Ballad of Reading Gaol**


In the summer of 1971, young actor and musician David Bowie, still a struggling performer on the rock'n'roll scene, announced his plans for the near future:

I'm going to play a character called Ziggy Stardust. We're going to do it as a stage show. We may even do it in the West End. When I'm tired of playing Ziggy I can step out and someone else can take over for me. (quoted via Auslander 2006a: 111)

The success he subsequently encountered in the guise of Ziggy Stardust was nothing like the rather lukewarm reception he had had with his previous records. The story of 'the rise and fall'⁹ of a bisexual (or asexual) Martian Messiah who came to Earth as a rock'n'roll superstar in the attempt to save it from an impending catastrophe, only to fail and end up being killed by his fans elicited a strong fascination from young audiences world-wide. However, the three years of role-playing and intensive touring, all carried out against a background of ever-increasing substance abuse, seem to have taken a terrible toll on Bowie's mental state. In a 1976 interview he declared:

I fell for Ziggy too. It was quite easy to become obsessed night and day with the character. I became Ziggy Stardust. David Bowie went totally out the window.

⁹ *The Rise and Fall of Ziggy Stardust and the Spider from Mars* was released on the 6th of June 1972 and was produced by David Bowie and Ken Scott under the label of RCA Records. Besides Bowie, band members included Mick Ronson (guitar and vocals), Trevor Bolder (guitar), and Mick Woodmansey (drums). The songs outlining the story are: *Five Years, Soul Love, Moonage Daydream, Starman, It Ain't Easy, Lady Stardust, Star, Hang On to Yourself, Ziggy Stardust, Suffragette City, and Rock'n'roll Suicide*.



Everybody was convincing me that I was a Messiah, especially on that first American tour. I got hopelessly lost in the fantasy. (quoted via 5years.com)

Leaving aside, for now, the question of how credible such a strange turn of events actually is, the situation as described nevertheless suggests the possibility that what started as a performance of a character became a transformation into that character: or, in other words, what started as an ingeniously devised lie might have ended up not being a lie, after all. This is precisely why, as I will try to argue, before being a short-lived, possibly drug-induced, identity problem – a question which, no doubt on purpose, remains unanswered to this day – or a marketing strategy, which seems no less likely, ‘being Ziggy Stardust’ is a semiotic problem.


Thus, the sign system here under analysis is the one that builds up Bowie’s artistic persona, or, to put it more simply, *the impersonation* – not only because it constitutes the locus of the aforementioned dilemma, but also because it acts like a centripetal force for all the other sign systems that constitute the Ziggy Stardust act. The performance I will be looking at is the one which saw Bowie’s last impersonation of Ziggy Stardust in front of a live audience: the Hammersmith Odeon fare-well concert of July 3, 1973. This particular concert is not only the best documented one – it was filmed by D. A. Pennebaker and later released under the title *Ziggy Stardust: The Motion Picture*¹⁰ –, but, due to its special status as the tour’s final performance, can be considered the literal as well as the symbolic capstone of the entire act.¹¹

Constructing the perfect plastic rock’n’roll fantasy

The Rise and Fall of Ziggy Stardust and the Spiders from Mars is the outcome of Bowie’s long-standing wish to write and perform a musical – a wish that was never fully accomplished, not in the conventional way, at any rate. The material for the album was originally conceived as a musical theatre show to be staged at London’s West End, one not very much unlike the era’s regular musical shows (Auslander

¹⁰ The recording circulated as a bootleg until it was officially released in 1983, also under the label of RCA Records. Alongside the most important songs featured on the album, the fare-well concert included songs from Bowie’s other albums (*Width of a Circle*, *Wild Eyed Boy from Free Cloud*, *Changes*, *All the Young Dudes*, *Oh! You Pretty Things*, *Cracked Actor*, and *Time*) as well as covers after other artists’ songs (*My Death*, after Jacques Brel’s *La mort*, Mick Jagger’s *Let’s Spend the Night Together*, and Lou Reed’s *White Light / White Heat*). The show commenced with the first movement from Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony*.

¹¹ Toward the end of the show, just before singing *Rock’n’roll Suicide*, Bowie famously announced: “Of all the shows on this tour, this particular show will remain with us the longest because not only it is the last show of the tour, but because is the last show we will ever do”. As Philip Auslander observed, “[t]here can be no doubt that Bowie’s announcement was the tip of an iceberg built of personal difficulties and business maneuverings. But there is also a sense in which Bowie’s retirement announcement was integral to the concept of rock performance he developed during his engagement with the musical subgenre of glam rock, of which his performances as Ziggy Stardust were the apotheosis.” (Auslander 2006b: 70-71)



2006a: 107). A great part of the inspiration for Bowie's early projects came from vaudeville and variety show acts such as Anthony Newley, as well as from Lindsay Kemp's experimental theatre performances, in whose company Bowie participated in the late '60s, occasionally taking singing parts and also performing himself as a dancer and mime (*ibid*, 107–110).


By the time he started working on *Ziggy Stardust* he had identified himself with the theatrical culture to such an extent that he would declare that theater and mime were just as much a part of his artistic self as music was. At times he would even concede theatre the prominent part: 'I feel like an actor when I'm on stage, rather than a rock artist' (in a 1972 interview, quoted via Auslander 2006a: 109). Bowie took a marked actorly stance in his early performances (and after that, throughout his career, although in milder forms), a trait that set him apart from the mainstream rock culture of the '50s and '60s. As Philip Auslander noted:

If Marc Bolan brought an implicitly theatrical sensibility to bear on the performance of rock music, David Bowie sought explicitly to perform rock *as theatre*. [...] Bowie not only envisioned the rock concert as a staged, costumed, and choreographed theatrical performance, he understood his own performing and his relationship to his audience in actorly terms rather than the communitarian terms that defined performance for psychedelic rockers. (Auslander 2006a: 106 – italics in original)

Naturally, a lot of the skills he acquired in his years as an actor went into his impersonation of Ziggy Stardust. Everything about Ziggy involved performance: his identity, the story, the songs, his gender – are all role-playing; the fact that Ziggy was an alien, and that therefore there were virtually no limits as to what he can be or do, enabled Bowie to create his identity "in such a way that it was clearly revealed *as a performance* for which there was no underlying referent" (Auslander 2006b: 74). Likewise, the often ludicrous combining of pantomime with elements of Kabuki theatre, heavy make-up, outrageous costumes and affected body poses has the quality to emphasize the artifice of his act or, as Shelton Waldrep put it, to draw attention on "that he is in fact performing a performance: that, as in Japanese drama especially, what one is seeing is to be thought of not as real but as staged and artificial – that is, as a performance to be deconstructed" (Waldrep 2004: 111).

It could be argued that there is an implicit criticism (although an ironical-benevolent, rather than an incisive one) in this type of "deconstructable" music performance and some critics felt that "Bowie's conscious construction of an alien rock star was certainly meant to shed light on the artificiality of rock in general" (McLeod 2003: 341). He would later recall: "I packaged a totally credible plastic rock star – much better than any sort of Monkees fabrication. My plastic rocker was much more plastic than anybody's" (quoted via 5years.com).

Largely based on the 'rise and fall' stories of Vince Taylor, Syd Barrett and Iggy Pop, Ziggy is at once a synthetic (one could say 'archetypal') exponent and a caricature of the ultimate rock'n'roll star. In either case, the bold, strident features of the prefabricated rocker served to underline the conventionality of his status, to



expose and acknowledge the mask for what it is.¹² Moreover, if a performer's stage persona is nothing but that – a persona, a mask – why would one settle for one mask or one role only and not undertake a variety of roles?

Ziggy, rather than Bowie, became the actor who impersonated the characters delineated in the songs, yet Ziggy was also a fictional entity enacted by Bowie. Revealed on stage, the “real person” who portrayed the characters in the recordings turned out not to be a real person at all. Just to make matters more complex, Ziggy was himself a character from one of Bowie’s songs, meaning that Ziggy was sometimes singing about himself. (Auslander 2006a: 120)

It was this actorly versatility that ultimately built up and sustained the Ziggy Stardust performances’ special world of make-believe.


Downplaying the fantasy: alleged schizophrenia and “rock’n’roll suicide”

With Bowie’s alleged schizophrenic-like psychosis, it would look as if the ironical act he had so cleverly contrived had taken an ironical twist itself. Already towards the end of 1972, he would make declarations such as these: “I’m not what I’m supposed to be. What are people buying? I adopted Ziggy onstage and now I feel more and more like this monster and less and less like David Bowie.” (quoted via 5years.com). Taken at face value, these words testify to a gradual – and improper, with regard to the initial aims - overturn of ontological status. Provided that his self-fashioning as Ziggy had lost its intentional aspect, “I’m not what I’m supposed to be” here reads “I’m not acting anymore”. Obviously, this overturn describes a path opposite to the one outlined by Eco¹³: once the intentionality of acting is lost, the character - and with it, everything constituting the act - becomes referentially transparent again. In Peircean terms, this could be described as a case of Thirdness slipping back into Secondness: once the mediating factor of role-playing is suspended, the symbolic connection between the performer and the character falls back (literally recedes) to a relation of contiguity. As Bowie sinks into his character, he goes from *interpreting* Ziggy (Thirdness) to *being him* (Secondness)¹⁴.

¹² Auslander observed that “neither Bolan nor Bowie was content simply to perform the role of a rock star – both also pointed self-consciously to the conventionality of that role” (Auslander 2006a: 112)

¹³ Eco (1979: 115): “Because of the first performative act [of the actor saying “I am acting” – A.-R.M.], everything following it becomes referentially opaque. Through the decision of the performer (“I am another man”) we enter the possible world of performance, a world of lies in which we are entitled to celebrate the suspension of disbelief.”

¹⁴ See de Waal 2001: 17-19 and also Susan Petrilli’s entries on Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in *The Routledge Companion to Semiotics*, 2010: 217 – 218, 316 – 317, and 343 – 345, respectively.



In 1993, he would recall how an initial halving (two separate entities, the actor and the character, coupled through the third element of role-playing) became an eventual fusing:

It was so much easier for me to live within the character, along with the help of some of the chemical substances at the time. It became easier and easier for me to blur the lines between reality and the blessed creature that I'd created – my doppelgänger. I wasn't getting rid of him at all; in fact, I was joining forces with him. The doppelgänger and myself were starting to become one and the same person. Then you start on this trail of psychological destruction and you become what's called a drug casualty at the end of it.' (quoted via Jarnow 2008: 489)

Regardless of what caused it, the fusing of mask and actor has a hindering effect on the performance: with the loss of Thirdness there follows an implicit destabilisation of those parameters that define a performance, most importantly stage-space and stage-time (Pavis 2003: 153–154, 157–159). Because Ziggy is a rock star, albeit an alien one, there is no real 'stage-space', for where else would a rock star perform, if not on a stage? And if he exists 'for real' – in Bowie's and in some people's minds¹⁵ – appearing as such at interviews and even in every-day life, then there is no 'stage-time' either, for there can be no ontological ruptures in one and the same person's life continuum¹⁶. As the character takes over the performer, likewise, and in a direct proportion, the imaginary space-time takes over the concrete space-time¹⁷.


But then again, this story of self-mystification is not as clear and straightforward as Bowie's words might have made it look – and not only because his split-personality delusion seems to have disappeared as soon as he moved on to perform another act. In fact, rumors about him being delusional and even suicidal after the success of Ziggy Stardust were hardly ever taken at face value and generally hovered over those years more like an urban legend. While it is not impossible for Bowie to have been genuinely concerned about his mental health at the time – he has a family history of schizophrenia and many of the songs he composed between 1970 and 1973 deal with madness and loss or distortion of identity¹⁸ – there are, nevertheless, many indications suggesting that whatever happened cannot be entirely relegated to the realm of psychology.

¹⁵ The 5years.com "memorial" site has a compilation of such fan stories; one of them reads: "Ziggy was shrouded in mystery. He was definitely from the cosmos; androgynous, surreal and seductive, perfect porcelain skin, unearthly mismatched eyes with a foreign, piercing stare. It was impossible to discern if he was for real, or if this was an impeccable performance. We saw this on a black & white TV, yet it was still utterly compelling. We had found our ultimate icon, and there he was announcing his final performance. Our devastation mounted."

¹⁶ Bowie: "Nowadays there is really no difference between my personal life and anything I do on stage. I'm very rarely David Jones any more. I think I've forgotten who David Jones is." (in an 1972 interview – quoted via 5years.com).

¹⁷ For the conceptual discrimination between concrete and imaginary time-space, see Pavis 2003: 14. Pavis builds upon Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope.

¹⁸ Notable examples include *Bewlay Brothers*, *All the Madmen*, *Width of a Circle*, *The Man Who Sold the World*, and *Aladdin Sane*.



For one, the story of a rock star going mad at the height of his success is strangely consistent with the album's narrative; so is the Messianic craze surrounding his persona and the story's eventual denouement in – actual or symbolic – death. Seen from this perspective, what appears to be the downplaying of the performance-as-performance might prove to be its finishing touch, its, so to say, third act; or, to resort again to the Peircean scheme, a special case of Thirdness simulating Secondness.

It is true, on the other hand, that schizophrenia or schizophrenic-like psychosis is characterised precisely by some form of identity disorder, depression and paranoid manifestations. However, the most interesting fact is that none of these two alternatives (performed *vs.* genuine, conventional *vs.* natural) is either fully convincible, or completely unlikely. This, in a way, very Wildean dilemma of art imitating life *vs.* life imitating art managed to create an unrelenting ambivalence tingeing both realms of life and art, and it is just this ambivalence that has a distinctive semiotic "flavor".


It could be argued that, in a way, Ziggy-the-character dies – vicariously or otherwise – with each performance; to give a single example, each time the single *Ziggy Stardust* was sang during a performance, the lyrics would repeat "Making love with his ego/ Ziggy sucked up into his mind/ Like a leper Messiah/ When the kids had killed the man I had to break up the band". As some of Bowie's statements would make us believe, the character's grim destiny came to be internalised by the performer, or, at any rate, had an ominous bearing on his psyche:

I had a sort of a strange psychosomatic death wish thing because I was so lost in Ziggy and schizophrenia. It was his own personality being unable to cope with the circumstances he found himself in, which is being an almighty prophet-like superstar rocker. He found he didn't know what to do once he got it. It's an archetype really – the definitive rock'n'roll star. It often happens.' (Bowie 1974 – quoted via 5years.com)

Yet, already from the second sentence, he switches from the first to the third person, carrying on the play of shifting identities and pushing his persona even farther away from himself, back into the realm of archetypes, only to end, bluntly, in an impersonal and objective tone: "It often happens".¹⁹

It could be argued that this type of passage from the first to the third person in his statements faithfully mirrors the changing of masks in Bowie's songs and thus reveals an integral part of his manner of storytelling. As Philip Auslander observed with regard to the whimsical quality of Bowie's impersonations from his early '70s albums and videos, "[s]elf-expression and critical commentary both require a defined and stable position from which to speak: Bowie provides no such position" (Auslander 2006a: 111). Just like the studio material that serves, *mutatis mutandis*, as

¹⁹ It is worthy of notice that two of the people on whom Ziggy Stardust was based, Vince Taylor and Syd Barrett, were diagnosed with schizophrenia and lived the rest of their post-fame life in almost complete reclusion.



its textual basis, every Ziggy Stardust performance is a frame narrative containing the accounts of different characters (those of the narrator, of fans, of the band's members and that of Ziggy himself); at the same time, every performance is, at once, a narrating of the plot and a part of the actual unfolding of the plot – again, just like in a frame narrative.


The tour is a concatenated series of episodes forming the story of Ziggy Stardust, while each episode is a narrative complete in itself. It remains ambiguous if the individual performances-as-narratives are to be viewed as prophecies of what is going to happen or as 'here-and-now' happenings, and, if so, as a sort of small-scale consummations of the greater story or rehearsal for it. The looseness of the show's make-up, its open-endedness, as Bowie put it, which is nothing but the open-endedness of his leading character²⁰, served to maintain such ambivalences. The closest theatrical analogy I can think of is Heiner Müller's *Hamletmachine* (1977), a play in which actors step in and out of their characters in a series of loosely connected episodes (thus leaving the plot open to different and often playful cross-readings), amounting to what would essentially be a meditation on identity - on the identity of the actor, in particular. Still, for the analogy to be truly symmetrical it would mean that 'Hamlet' / the actor playing Hamlet should continue his split-identity dilemma also offstage long enough, say for two or three theatrical seasons, and maybe even give interviews to the press about his puzzling condition every now and then.

However, the 'space oddity' did eventually come to an end. The story is "told"/sang on stage and carried further offstage, in potentially endless series, but Ziggy actually "dies", as a character, in one last show at Hammersmith Odeon. Bowie singing *My Death* exclusively for the retirement concert is a sort of musical speech act²¹: the semantic content of the song, otherwise unrelated to the rest of the original musical material (it is an English cover of Jacques Brel's *La mort* of 1959) was in this way appropriated by the Ziggy Stardust act and readjusted as a part of the finale. Here again is another example of how the character, almost by itself, has the power to structure an entire performance and even to incorporate and semantically alter extraneous texts.

It is quite interesting – and relevant for the present talk about how a powerful and charismatic character can sometimes seem to take on a life of its own – that the sole viewing of the Hammersmith Odeon recording does not give the true measure of the Ziggy Stardust phenomenon, nor is it able to reveal the proportions that his

²⁰ Bowie: "I think that probably the best thing I did with Ziggy was to leave him open-ended. It wasn't a specific story, there were specific incidents within the story but it wasn't as roundly written as a usual narrative is. The only trouble with kind of copying somebody that's really well known is that you know all of the facts about them so you can't actually be that person but because Ziggy was kind of an empty vessel you could put an awful lot of yourself into being your own version of Ziggy." (in a 2000 interview – quoted via 5years.com).

²¹ London (1996: 49) argued that "as a result of our enculturated belief that music is a kind of language, we can and often do treat music as a linguistic phenomenon" and that therefore it is legitimate to speak of performing musical utterances as a special kind of speech acts.



legend took in the rock'n'roll imaginary. One spectator's testimony registered on the 5years.com "memorial" site reports that the desperation following Ziggy's "death" culminated into a full-blown orgy in the theatre house – an account which, to all appearances, is a matter of fiction. But the text that best captures the symbolic implications of the retirement concert is Todd Haynes' *Velvet Goldmine* (1998), the story of which is built upon the mystery surrounding the disappearance of glam rock star Brian Slade (played by Jonathan Rhys Meyers) after the tremendous success of his performances as the alien hero Maxwell Demon. Shrill and somewhat pretentious, *Velvet Goldmine* is, in many ways, the perfect fan fiction: Haynes was quick to pick up on the Wildean overtones of Ziggy's (Bowie's) story and even went so far as to compensate in the film's narrative for what Ziggy's performances and press interviews left understated ('open-ended') and, consequently, entirely up to fans' imagination. Perhaps the most pertinent example of such fictional compensation is the shooting hoax scene²², which, in all probability, was contrived as a more spectacular (i.e., proper) consummation of the rather anticlimactic statement that ended the Hammersmith Odeon show²³ and, with it, Ziggy's career.


Concluding remarks

Ziggy Stardust created a phenomenon that the music/star-system world has witnessed more and more since Bowie's pioneering act (most recently and arguably most blatantly in Lady Gaga's case) and that could be resumed as follows: *the performer is the performance*. This equation brings with it a number of very important consequences (e.g., the distortion of the performance stage-time and the blurring of the boundary between the stage-space and concrete space). Once started, a performance of this type cannot be downplayed, for every gesture, even – or all the more – if it's carried out offstage, will bear a semiotic ambivalence (natural vs. conventional) and can ultimately be inscribed in the performance's order. The actor and the character, the artist and the artwork, fuse so completely that there is virtually no end to the performance, unless the performer himself is in one way or another suppressed, which is the only logical end.

In Bowie's case, another consequence can be said to be the creating of a fully-fledged character that eventually took on a life of his own in the rock imaginary. It was, without a doubt, a conscious move on the part of Bowie and Mick Rock to title the thirty-year Ziggy Stardust anniversary book in the manner of a conventional biography: *Moonage Daydream: The Life and Times of Ziggy Stardust* (2002). Unlike Elvis or Michael Jackson impersonators, Ziggy impersonators are not impersonating

²² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ge7RKvi2Cp0>


²³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD1nzOeS6U0>



David Bowie, but Ziggy Stardust himself. It is not uncommon to find posts reading “RIP Ziggy Stardust” on YouTube, under Ziggy-era videos, and especially under scenes from the retirement concert. Ziggy’s status as a fictional all-round character is still unparalleled in rock’n’roll history and still somewhat exotic with regard to rock culture in general. Guitarist Trevor Bolder captured this aspect well when he observed that Ziggy was always “a bit like a cartoon character” (quoted via 5years.com); indeed, Ziggy belongs more to the world of Zorro and Spiderman than to that of, say, Lou Reed or John Lennon. He stands in that world freely on his own two fictional feet.

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THE HUMAN SYMBOLIC REVOLUTION: An Uexküllian perspective

Andrei Bleahu

University of Tartu, Department of semiotics


Abstract. The aim of this essay is to examine the potential application of Jakob von Uexküll's *umwelt* theory to enhance and complement the Darwinian understanding of the products of the symbolic revolution in humans. The symbolic revolution, characterised by the production of collective phantasies that can be symbolically labelled, signifies an explosion of human practices, represented by various forms of art and rituals that took part nearly 50000 years ago. The connection between these Uexküllian and Darwinian concepts will be facilitated via the proposed construct of the 'illusory world'. Two illusory worlds are defined: 'Illusory world 1' (IW1) and 'Illusory world 2' (IW2). These are constructs based on a Darwinian understanding of human evolution, and they signify, respectively, the perceptual human world (IW1) and the symbolic human world (IW2). These 'worlds' will be used to analyse the usefulness of the integration of two closely related Uexküllian concepts: the *umwelt* and the functional cycle. An attempt at producing a useful synthesis between the two seemingly opposed perspectives, Darwinian and Uexküllian, while outlining potential directions for future research will be proposed at the end of this essay.

Keywords: *umwelt*, illusory world, symbolic reality, physical world, perceptual world

Inimese sümbolilise revolutsioon: uexküllilik perspektiiv

Abstrakt. Artikli eesmärk on uurida Uexkülli omaailma teoria potentsiaalset rakendamist suurendamaks ja täiendamaks darvinlikku arusaama inimeste sümbolilise revolutsiooni tulemitest. Sümbolilise revolutsioon, mille tunnuseks on kollektiivsete kujutelmade loome, iseloomustab inimpraktikate plahvatust, mida esinavad mitmed kunstivormid ja rituaalid, mis toimusid juba peaegu 50000 aastat tagasi. Ühisosa uexküllilike ja darvinlike möistete vahel aitab luua 'illusoorse maailma' möiste. Artiklis määratletakse kaks illusorset maailma, mis pöhinevad darvinlikult arusaamal inimese evolutsionist ja viitavad vastavalt inimese tajumaailmale ('I illusoorne maailm') ja inimese sümbolimaailmale ('II illusoorne maailm'). Neid 'maailmu' rakendatakse analüüsimaks Uexkülli kahe seotud möiste – omailm ja funktsioneeriring – kasulikkust, kui proovida sünteesida uexkülliliku ja darvinlikku ehk kaht näiliselt vastandlikku perspektiivi. Essee lõpus visandatakse ka potentsiaalsed uurimissuunad tulevikus.

Märksõnad: omailm, illusoorne maailm, sümboliline reaalsus, füüsiline maailm, tajuilm



1. The human symbolic reality: one type of ‘illusory world’


An individual's life consisted of certain classified things: "real things" which were unfrequent and priceless, simply "things" which formed the routine stuff of life; and "ghost things," also called "fogs," such as fever, toothache, dreadful disappointments, and death.

Vladimir Nabokov, Ada or Ardor: A family chronicle

The human brain receives signals through the senses, which include the five primary ones: sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. To these five primary senses one can add, for example, proprioception, which is the sense of being aware of one's own body and thus having the ability to locate various body parts (Tuthill, Anzim 2018: 194). Moreover, one can consider that the human body is sensitive to temperature variations and, consequently, a sense of ‘thermoception’, referring to the human body’s ability to regulate its temperature can be conceptualised and added to the five primary senses (Kanosue et al. 2010). Following this line of thought, other senses could be added.

However, the essential point about all these senses is that they owe their existence to the human physical body, that is, a centre of perceptions that the human brain uses to construct its own version of the world. The version of the world that the brain constructs cannot be fully accurate, since human perceptions do not constitute a perfect guide to the physical world (Smeets, Brenner 2000: 215). Hence, the organism lies at the centre of its own ‘illusory’ world, which is a sort of internal map that plays an active role in the organism’s survival and reproduction. The reason why this world, based on perception, is here denoted illusory is due to the role of the senses in transforming and filtering reality: the senses retrieve a limited collection of elements to be mapped accordingly in a sort of internal space that belongs to the organism. The implication is that vast parts of the physical reality are left out.


This means that not all objects that belong to the physical world are directly accessible to the human mind – there are things invisible to the senses. The fact that reality does not reveal itself to humans in its totality can be demonstrated by using two premises. First, consider that elements of the physical world are mapped into mental images by sight. The term sight signifies here the capacity for having a mental event, which is multisensory in nature, that is responsible for all the elements that humans can perceive and transform into imagery; through ‘multisensory’ it is understood that all senses participate in the creation of the mental event, that enables the mapping of an element that exists in the physical world in an ‘internal space’, the perceiving mind. Second, some objects that exist in the physical world



cannot be perceived directly by humans. One example is the polarisation of light. Humans cannot perceive the polarisation of light directly through the senses, and therefore there is nothing in human sight that accounts for polarisation. As there is nothing that enables humans to look at light and map the direction of the electric field that approaches the retina, polarisation cannot be known through the senses. Despite this, light waves are clearly polarised as demonstrated by various optical technologies that rely on this property. These optical technologies can be connected to the emergent field of quantum optics, where the role of light polarisation is crucial (Heiss 2002: 149-197). Hence, polarisation belongs to the physical world, which is a world that exists outside of human perception (Monteiro et al. 2017). Interestingly, although the polarisation of light is not perceived by humans, there is evidence that it can be perceived by bees. Karl von Frisch, in his Nobel Lecture, explain how bees encode in their waggle dances the direction and distance of a point of a desirable location to communicate it to other bees: the bees can orientate themselves by encoding the angle the sun makes with the position of the hive (Frisch 1973: 79-80). This means that the polarisation of the incoming beam of light plays a crucial role in their perceptual world, seeming to be real to the bees in question.

In sum, the human perceptual world is not the real world, but an illusory world. In the following I will refer to the perceptual map that humans construct as 'illusory world 1' (IW1). To better understand the concept of IW1, consider further a human subject contemplating a landscape. A traditional plastic description of a landscape must consider the effect of depth, as a property of a portion of physical space. The effect of depth can be understood as a physical phenomenon. This effect is produced by gradual degrees of desaturation (saturated colours seem to advance while desaturated colours seem to recede), the weakening of visual contrasts, and the type of colours that are part of the landscape. For example, cold colours seem to recede from the viewer, while warm colours seem to approach the viewer, contributing to the illusion of depth. In addition, the further the observing subject directs their gaze into the distance, the chromatic dominants of the shapes that constitute a sort of 'outer boundary' to an imaginary bubble in which the subject takes position play an important role: when looking at the sky, blue shades seem to dominate. It is therefore not enough to specify that this real description is subject to a point view to explain how a portion of natural space — that exists in the physical world of the perceiving subject — becomes a 'landscape' mapped into an internal space.

But it is not enough only to observe this general weakening of visual contrasts attributed to perceptual stimuli such as colours, shapes, borders, textures, either: because this weakening is not a fixed datum, it is a process that can be observed in all its stages in the visual object itself. The simple description of the depth effect only indicates the decrease in contrasts, or the presence of certain colours. The decrease in contrasts cannot be used to identify the underlying process: the gradual degradation of the transparency of the atmosphere along the axis of the viewer. The gradual degradation of the atmosphere is due to the decrease of the thickness of the atmosphere. Once again, the explanation for this is related to physics: because




humans live on planet Earth, a massive body that exerts a gravitational attraction to everything that surrounds it, it is expected that the densest layers of the atmosphere are to be found closer to the ground (where gravity is stronger) thus resulting in a thicker and more transparent atmosphere closer to an observer situated on the surface of the Earth. As humans look towards distance points in the sky, the layers of the atmosphere become less and less dense, and this decrease in atmosphere density affects their perceptions. The atmosphere regulates the perception only to lead to an imaginary landscape that informs the subject of the real distance between the subject and the objects in the physical world. Nonetheless, the role of the atmosphere, a real physical object, regulates the production of an illusory world, which is IW1, that helps the subject orientate themselves in the ‘real world’.

Notice that the role of the real world remains essential: should one perform a thought experiment, where one could modify the thickness of the atmospheric layers between a perceiving subject and an object, the depth effect could be controlled. This means that atmosphere takes the role of a filter and a controller of perception. But this filter is already set, already revealing a necessary illusion to which the human species is adapted; the meaning of the weakening of visual contrasts, or by the illusions created by warm and cold colours can be explained by the imperfect transparency of the atmosphere – something that cannot be perceived directly and mapped in the same way that colours are. Without the atmosphere, transparency would be perfect, there would be no more depth effect, and therefore no more imaginary landscape, but only a two-dimensional image, crushed on a single plane. It becomes clear that a two-dimensional picture is not a useful picture, unlike the necessary illusion mediated by the atmosphere. Therefore, the world of human perception is necessarily mediated by the real elemental world, although it remains a distorted version of the real elements that control it.

IW1 can be used to understand the limits of the human perceptual world, as well as the illusions necessary to act on the elemental world that humans inhabit. Now, consider that to successfully survive, and eventually thrive, humanity needed more than one ‘necessary illusion’. Humans can also build internal models that allow them to be part of a symbolic community. This means that a different illusory world from the one that the brain creates through the senses exists.

This second illusory world will be referred to as Illusory world 2 (IW2), and it represents a sort of symbolic reality. IW2 contains objects that have no equivalent in the physical world. In other words, IW2 is not a map containing elements from the physical environment, but it is connected to the realm of inter-human relationships, and it works to integrate humans into communities. To understand the basis of IW2, consider the production of symbols.


One theory that has been proposed to deal with the production of symbols within human communities is symbolic interaction theory. According to this theory, meanings arise from the reciprocal interactions of individuals. The symbolic school was heavily influence by George Herbert Mead, a pragmatist, and an anti-dualist philosopher (Fink 2015: 1). Mead detailed the way children become socialised through



means of playing games. In socialising games, the individual, seemingly endowed with empathy and being able to take different perspectives, takes the role of a generalised other (Fink 2015: 6). The notion of the generalised other, as described by Mead, becomes central to any participant in a game, and it is the attitude of the community from which the participant takes place. Recalling the example of a baseball game, a baseball player's actions are controlled by his assumptions of every other participant in the game (Mead 1972: 153-154). This example is illustrative of the importance of perspective taking. Perspective taking is important for understanding symbols, as symbols must mean the same thing to the individual that uses them as well as to the individuals to whom the symbols are communicated.

Herbert Blumer, a student of Mead, who is considered the founder of symbolic interactionism, considered that “[...] meaning arises from the act of interpretation between the parties involved in the process” (Fink 2015: 8). Blumer is responsible for developing Mead's thoughts on symbolic human interactions. According to Blumer, symbolic interaction has three noteworthy characteristics. First, symbolic interaction is a positive shaping process, which means that participants in this form of interaction must constantly reinterpret each other's actions. Second, established patterns of group life can only exist due to certain schemes of interpretation being set in place. Third, symbolic interaction can cover the full range of human associative patterns: domination, exploitation, consensus, etc (Blumer 1986: 66-67). It follows that the production of symbols is an associative activity that can exist due to different relationships of members in a community. Moreover, the simple fact that there is an association is a sufficient condition for symbols to arise, and, without symbols, complex communities would not be able to exist. Thus, the nature of meaning is that it is shared between the members of a community.

The premise of the shared meaning is important for constructing IW2, and IW2 cannot be completely separated from IW1, although it remains distinct from it. This means that shared meanings are the foundation of IW2, but IW2 must remain grounded in perception as objects belonging to IW1 can be meaningfully shared between individuals. Gossiping about demons, witches, and unicorns, as well as about constructs such as promises, or marriage, is not necessarily tied to the existence of colour, shape, sound, or any other elements that belongs to IW1, although the former entities can take shape due to perceptual elements, that is, elements that belong to IW1. For example, it can be argued that the existence of mythological animals is based on the image of horses. A unicorn exists as an imaginative construct made up of the body of a horse and a horn, however, it has a different meaning. This meaning, that can be shared between the members of a community, is not tied to the perceptual image of the horse or of that of the horn. The total unicorn is thus a complex object, having both real and imaginary parts, and this IW2 object is greater than the sum of its perceptual parts. The usefulness of IW2 becomes apparent when linked to the practice of rituals and with art in general. Therefore, IW2 is a world of intangibles, which although linked to IW1, the world of tangibles, it remains complementary to it.




Chris Knight, Camilla Power and Ian Watts give an extensive overview of the ‘human symbolic revolution’ in their paper “The Human Symbolic Revolution: A Darwinian Account” (Knights et al. 1995). According to them, membership to a symbolic community is possible due to the human capacity for building a “personalised copy of a communal map”, which is made of intangibles, things that have no existence in the real, things that have no perceptual counterparts (*ibid*, 75). This means that spiritual entities, mythical creatures, promises, as well as gods would belong to this communal map that constitutes IW2.

Hence, the intangible objects that belong to this non-perceptual world, named IW2, could be represented and reproduced by various forms of art, or they can belong to the realm of religion, and they could also be produced by myths. For the purposes of this analysis, myths are defined as narratives that refer to gods, demigods or humans endowed with supernatural capacities (ADEF 2003 *sub: myths*). The objects of IW2 can be produced, in the sense of being given some sort of material existence via sounds produced by the vocal apparatus, by human speech. Before the invention of writing, human speech must have been responsible for generating religion, narratives, and myths. This means that human speech is one of the main mechanisms of production for IW2, that is, of the symbolic reality, other being forms of visual representation or even collective ‘conspiracies’ in the form of rituals.

The status of the construct of IW2 as a human-specific world, can be further understood by examining the differences in behaviour between humans and non-human primates in collective and individual deception. It has been found that certain species of primates, such as Vervet monkeys, have specific alarm calls for different species of predators. A vervet monkey emitting such a call triggers the behaviour of other primates: they act as if the predator has been seen and thus, they can make their escape (Seyfarth et al. 1980; Ignas 2019).

In contrast with the Vervet monkeys, only humans, through speech, writing or visual representations, can trigger imaginative acts of supernatural entities. Some of these IW2 entities are of authoritative type, and they include concepts such as God and the Devil, while others are mediators between the world of humans and the worlds of spirit such as unicorns; these supernatural entities only exist in IW2, and they can be represented within a community. The label God refers to a collective fantasy that exists within a community of humans, while the Devil is the antagonist. For these two characters to exist, the humans to which they are communicated must necessarily inhabit the same imaginary world, IW2. In IW2, God exists as a narrative, a collective fiction that can be used to trigger a stereotyped response from the part of the community that shares this God, the seat of Good, in opposition to the Devil, which represents the narrative corresponding to the seat of Evil. The role of speech in summoning such entities remain interesting to explore.

According to the Darwinian perspective, speech and ritual were produced by hunter-gatherers as both co-operative and exploitative signals. Following the point made by Knight, Power and Watts, speech evolved due to counter dominant




behaviour in hunter gatherer groups. Counter-dominant behaviour refers to a strategy of resisting dominance in hunter-gatherer groups, which are generally thought of as egalitarian communities. The idea of counter-dominance is resisting dominance without fighting to attain it. The counter-dominance strategy has been linked to the idea of using vocal-auditory signals, which were less costly (energy-wise) than manual grooming or using gestures to communicate to others (Knight et al. 1995: 83-84). Since counter-dominance theories were related to co-operative behaviour between individuals “resisting” a “dominant figure” within the group, the essence of speech is that of relying on a symbolic communal map of communication, which is IW2. Knight, Power and Watts proposed that the essence of ritual is that of representations of relations of power within a group as well as in between groups. The importance of the concept of ritual remains crucial in understanding IW2. This is because ‘ritual’ can be considered central to the notion of ‘shared meaning’, which can eventually ‘materialize’ through representation, taking a cultural form. The ‘symbols’ that describe the cultural form can be of the supernatural type, or they can stand for animals assumed by the interactants to be endowed with magical properties.

In essence, a communal map of intangibles would require an almost ritualistic behaviour from the members involved in the creation of ‘shared meaning’. For example, according to Hodgson and Helveston Australian Bushmen can imagine themselves to be animals during the ritual activities (Hodgson, Helveston 2007: 4). However, this notion of representation must be tied to the existence of shared concepts for the animals that the Australian indigenous tribes identify with. Therefore, rituals do require the presence of a collective shared inner world, their purpose being to externalise this inner world, an inner world that can be, in some cases, IW2, to the “initiates” that are taking part in said ritual. This means that rituals can act as a mechanism of expanding the physical domain of IW2: the new initiates take elements of the shared IW2 into their minds, and thus, IW2 contaminates yet another mind.

The ‘illusory worlds’ described in this section are constructs which were formed by considering Darwinian theory. The focus of the next section is the integration of Umwelt together with the functional cycle, to complement the understanding of ‘speech’ and ‘ritual’ as taken from hunter gatherer communities, and to bridge the gap between ‘Illusory world 1’ and ‘Illusory world 2’.

2. The reality of the Umwelt

Umwelt is a concept introduced by the biologist, Jakob von Uexküll. In his paper “A stroll through the world of animals and man. A picture of invisible worlds”. Uexküll defines the umwelt as a “[...] *phenomenal world or self-world of the animal*” (Uexküll 1934: 319 – italics in original). In an Uexküllian understanding, the umwelt is formed



by two different ‘worlds’, which are the ‘perceptual world’ and the ‘effector world, of the animal in question. Hence, perception and action form a closed unit for every animal (including humans) endowed with an *umwelt*. Consequently, it can be argued that the organism in question is not a simple machine, that it is not forced to mould itself according to external natural forces, be they real or ‘illusory’. A living being is a subject that can interact with objects that are being identified by its perceptual world, and act on them in multiple ways, depending on its inner subjective world. A living being has a choice.

IW1 is the world of human perception. Now, considering the notion of *umwelt*, IW1 is, in the Uexküllian sense, the perceptual world of humans to which it is added the subject’s active role in constructing it. The sky is blue because humans interpret it as such. Without the action of the human, the blueness of the sky would remain an indefinite palette of shades of blue shades. This means that IW1 is one of the building blocks of the human *umwelt*. The actions that humans take, shapes their *umwelt*. An intuitive way of describing the *umwelt*, which would not contradict the Darwinian perspective, is a sphere of signs which surrounds an organism. Hence the human subject is at the centre of this sphere. The organizing centre of this sphere, say the human subject, participates in a process of co-selection with its *umwelt*: to satisfy its needs it takes actions in the world, and the *umwelt* selects and integrates the actions that facilitate the organism’s well-being.

While IW1 and IW2 bear striking similarities to the concept of life-world, developed by Alfred Schutz (1945: 534), they remain different from it. According to Vargas, who analyses Schutz’s concept of life-world, the life-world integrates spatial and time dimensions and constitutes the human social world (Vargas 2020: 420). In this regard, IW1 and IW2, taken together as a unit, seem to form a concept that is closely connected to life-world, the latter containing meanings and symbols which are similar to the intangibles that are contained by IW2. However, this is not true. For Schutz the concept of intersubjectivity forms the basis of the life-world and this concept aims at explaining the reciprocity of human relationships (*ibid*, 420). Conversely, in this analysis, the notions of *umwelt* and functional cycle are relevant for tying IW1 and IW2 and, therefore, the complex unit formed by the IW1 and IW2 cannot be the same as the life-world since the principle behind connecting them is taken from *umwelt* theory and not based on intersubjectivity.

The functional cycle, which is key to the understanding of *umwelt*, is the associated non-linear model for producing signs. Uexküll used this to illustrate how organisms interact with an object. Below, there is a diagram of the functional cycle as proposed by Uexküll.






Fig. 1. Jakob von Uexküll's functional cycle diagram (Uexküll 1934)

The functional cycle represents a subject, in this case a human individual, which has an inner world, integrating an object into its *umwelt*. In the figure shown above, the functional cycle is depicted as the closed loop of interactions between stimuli coming from the object and inner world of the subject. The terms labelled central receptor and central effector are two features of the organism's nervous system. The motor field represents the innervating impulse that causes the organism to respond to the stimulus received through the perceptual field. This enables the organism to act on the object. Hence, through action, a functional cue bearer is placed on the object. The production of an effector cue erases the initial perceptual cue that started the process. As the cycle is renewed, new signs can be produced.

Now, the usefulness of the functional cycle and the *umwelt* to the creation of fictional constructs that belong to IW2 can be illustrated by examining the process of constructing IW2 from IW1. The question is: how does one go from the perception of a thing existing in the physical world to constructing an imaginary construct that exists in the 'shared communal map' of symbolic entities, entities that have physical analogues? This question may not have a simple answer, however, valuable insight that might pave the way towards a clearer understanding of the problem was provided by Thomas Sebeok's application of the functional cycle to the development of language in humans. In *Signs: An introduction to Semiotics* (1991), Sebeok dedicated the chapter "In What Sense is Language a Primary Modelling System" to the problem of the origin of speech in humans. Sebeok's use of Uexküll's functional cycle is linked to the concepts of verbal and non-verbal signs. Sebeok believed that only *homo sapiens* have "[...] two mutually sustaining repertoires of non-verbal signs": 'the zoosemiotic non-verbal' and the 'anthroposemiotic verbal' (Sebeok 1991: 332-334). The anthroposemiotic verbal can be modelled on the non-verbal




repertoire: the latter serves as a primary modelling system to the former. By considering the notion of the ‘primary modelling system’, one can see that a link between IW1 and IW2 can be constructed.

Without taking a reductionist approach, the emergence of IW2 and of all its associated ‘fantastic beasts’ would require two components: (i) a shared, IW1 which is part of the human *umwelt* and (ii) a system of inter-human relationships that are cooperative, as seen in the evolutionary theory based on counter-dominance. The idea is that of a primary modelling system which is based on shared perceptual objects within a community that are actualised through human practices such as song, ritual, or forms of art. For example, how can the concept of God emerge as a symbol within a community? The simple existence of the perceptual elements that are part of IW1 would not be sufficient for such a spiritual entity to emerge, and simple action of the human upon objects in its reality could lead only to an individual fiction, and not a shared one. Therefore, the application of the functional cycle would have to be modified, based on three premises:

- (1) A shared illusory world 1; between multiple human subjects can be constructed. This shared ‘illusory world 1’ is no longer individual, but collective and it can be based on things such as colour, shape, smell etc. Note that this is consistent with the notion of *umwelt*, which was designed to account for species specific behaviour. It is sufficient that the perceptual elements exist as being similar enough in the individual IW1 of different human subject (no two humans perceive the exact same shade of red or green, but they can still agree that it is the same thing) to exist in the ‘shared illusory world 1’.
- (2) The actions taken by humans are responsible for creating meaning between themselves. Hence, the functional cycle is no longer of the type of subject-object but of the type involving two subjects and an object that is exchanged between them illustrated by the following dynamic: subject 1 receives object from subject 2, it acts and modifies while integrating it into its *Umwelt*, delivers it to subject 2, who does the same and delivers it to subject 1”. Hence the tonality is that of an exchange of objects of values; the process is envisaged as auto emergent, and it is tied to the existence of a collective.
- (3) The ‘shared actions’ between individuals lead to the creation of an object belonging to ‘Illusory world 2’ that can be actualised through art as God, Unicorn, Dragon; etc. Speech, or various forms of art, would be used to endow this fictional object with a sort of materiality.

The proposed application of *umwelt* and the functional cycle would be useful and in agreement with the Darwinian understanding of the development of symbols in hunter-gatherer communities. Indeed, the functional cycle is designed to understand the production of signs by considering the interaction between subject and an object perceived by the subject in question, however the necessary extension to understand the formation of a ‘symbolic communal map’ is based on shared meaning that is actualised and hence the actions that the humans perform in a community would be



underlined by the tonality of the exchange; of objects of value, in a co-operative approach, that leads to the construction of shared meaning through these exchange processes. The shared meaning can eventually materialize through speech into symbols. These symbols can represent elements of the supernatural type or stand for objects assumed by the interactants to be endowed with magical properties. As such, through such acts, ‘Illusory world 2’, a shared map, can be created. This map can require an almost ritualistic behaviour from the members involved in the creation of shared meaning.


Conclusion

The illusory worlds are, indeed, constructs which are independent of the concept of *umwelt*, and they attempt to facilitate the Darwinian understanding of adaptation and communal survival in humans. The *umwelt* notion, although closely related to IW1, differs from it in one essential aspect: it takes away the action of the perceiving subject. In other words, the ‘red’ element exists in IW1, however, to be part of the subject’s *umwelt* it must be interpreted as such: a rose is red because the concept of red has been introduced in the inner world of the perceiving subject because of action from the subject (the act of interpretation).

The main thread covered in this paper is the application of the functional cycle to the creation of symbolic collective phantasies, which are objects classed under the umbrella term IW2. The hypothesis is that collective phantasies can arise from the objects of IW1 and the mechanism can be that of the functional cycle. The analysis reveals two interesting directions.

First, it seems that the way in which IW2 objects can arise from the world of perceptions is through acting on objects in a collective. Hence, the existence of an economic system that underlines the exchange between conspecifics together with the existence of the *umwelt* that permits the circulation, and the integration of these valuable objects can lead to the existence of collective phantasies, that have symbolic value. The idea is that any perceptible object can be exchanged and during that exchange the object would gradually become integrated in the *umwelt* of the human species. For this act of integration to be marked within a community, certain symbols may arise; God, for example, can be a symbol for the code of laws within a community, based on successful and advantageous exchanges within a group.

Second, the objects of IW2 are necessarily distinct from the objects of IW1 but are rooted in the objects of IW1. In other words, the image of a unicorn must be based on a real animal, a horse for example, to which one can add a horn. However, the shared meaning that the unicorn represents is not the image itself and therefore it represents an object which is distinct from the perceptual elements that add up together to draw it in the minds of a community. Modern representations of unicorns, although originating from medieval bestiaries, are subjected to new interpretations




and as such the unicorn can acquire specific meanings: for example, consider the paper unicorns signifying unbound freedom in Ridley Scott's film *Blade Runner* (Babić, Vekić 2018: 173). The association between an object such as 'unbound freedom, which exists in IW2 and the fantastic image of the unicorn, that exists in IW1, can be forged such that it gains the same meaning in the mind of community, but the objects belonging to the two worlds remain separate. Therefore, the unicorn, has shared symbolic value and it can stand for various concepts that regulate the behaviour of a community.


In conclusion, the proposed direction is left open. Questions such as "Could all constructs pertaining to 'Illusory world 2' be constructed by the proposed use of subject-object-subject exchange?", and "To what extent can these constructs be based on exchanging elements belonging to the inter-shared perceptual world of humans?" are left unanswered here, the focus of this paper is more modest: to outline the potential adaptation of the functional cycle to explain the production of intangibles from tangibles.

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AN INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDR FADEEV

on being a PhD student and his experiences in researching the semiotic side of Vygotsky's framework: A summary.

Aleksandr Fadeev, Andrew Mark Creighton





Illustration by Kaustubh Khare, 2021



Introduction

In the following interview, with Aleksandr Fadeev, a Ph.D. student in semiotics and culture studies at the department of semiotics at the University of Tartu, a number of questions were posed to him that inquired about his experiences as a Ph.D student, his Ph.D project, the importance of Lev Vygotsky, and some intricacies of working with Vygotsky's texts. Fadeev replied to these questions in the audio file that accompanies this summary. Moreover, you will also be able to find a reference list containing the works Fadeev discussed, at the end of this summary. I have structured this text to first present the question posed to Fadeev, and have his answers follow directly afterwards. I have done this as I believe it allows the text to simulate Fadeev speaking style, while also allowing for easy recognition of the sections of this text and their corresponding sections within the audio file, consequently allowing for easier comparison and reference.

Questions:


1)

The first question posed to Fadeev: "What attracted you to the semiotics department at the University of Tartu, especially regarding the Ph.D. program?" Fadeev discusses at length about this, first discussing his past visits to Tartu, and his love for the city, its status as a university centre, and its having a "[...] special atmosphere and academic life [...]", which the scholar describes as inspiring.

The semiotics department at the University of Tartu was also a major draw for Fadeev, which he viewed as an opportunity to further expand his master's research on the works of Vygotsky to the Ph.D. level. Fadeev also mentions the opportunity to work with prominent semiotic scholars, such as Peeter Torop, Kalevi Kull, and Mihhail Lotman as another 'important factor' in his decision to further his studies in Tartu.

2)

The following question: "How have your experiences at the department been regarding studying, opportunities for grants, supervision, and more general aspects about your time here?" Is again answered thoroughly. Fadeev mentions his positive surprise with the organisation of studies at the department. This largely relates to the University of Tartu allowing students in Ph.D. studies to focus their curriculum on the



needs of the PhD research. The university not only supplies a set of core classes, but allows students to conduct studies in a way that supports their own needs as a developing researcher. As Fadeev states, “[...] you can also study and take different courses, which actually relate to your specific research focus, your specific scientific interests, so that you do not just follow some abstract educational curricular [...]”, which the semiotician mentions is important for effective Ph.D. research.

The facilitation of interdisciplinary studies and research is also mentioned here by Fadeev as a positive experience within his studies as a Ph.D. student. He states that “[...] you sometimes need to incorporate the knowledge of different departments [...]” and continues to state that the good communication between the university’s departments allows for easy contact with peers and scholars within these departments, which helps to develop interdisciplinary research. Focusing on the semiotics department, Fadeev states he was ‘positively surprised’ with the support they offered him, that he was able to turn to them with questions, and needs for information, and they were ‘[...] always welcoming to help.’


Fadeev then turns his discussion to the supervision he received as a Ph.D. student, and considers his supervisor as supportive. Moreover, the semiotician mentions that the organisation of supervision within the department, means supervision not only acts as a mentorship, but “[...] promotes the partner relationships between the Ph.D. student and the supervisor [...]” which is valuable at PhD levels of study.

Turning to grant opportunities, Fadeev says he did not become knowledgeable about the grant system quickly, that it took time for him, as his master studies were in a different country and that the differences between these systems took some time to adapt to. However, he does mention that over his study period in Tartu, he has noticed that the grant system has been ‘actively developing’. That workshops and meetings promoting and assisting in grant opportunities have become prevalent for doctoral students. The relevance of this, Fadeev states, is important for international students from different education systems.

Fadeev also quickly mentions another positive of studying at the university, the ability for Ph.D. students to teach a course, of which they have the option to structure it to their specialties. The scholar states this was valuable, as it allowed for him to teach a regular course on Vygotsky and a short course about inner speech, gain students’ feedback, and allowed for the further development of his academic competence for future positions.

3)

When answering the third question: “What projects are you currently working on?”, Fadeev mentions a number of projects. Firstly, he discusses a project ‘Education on Screen’, which he is working on in a Transmedia research group from the semiotics department. The research implicates semiotics of culture to the empirical research of contemporary media environment, digital reading, cultural autocommunication,



teaching and learning. In other words it focuses on “[...] how various aspects of contemporary culture, such as for instance, the development of media, can be used to enhance learning practices [...].” In the practical side, the project is focused on creating digital education platforms on the basis of key Estonian cultural texts (e.g. “Truth and Justice”, “Spring”, etc.), which are aimed towards secondary schools and can be used for enhancing learners’ competences in various subjects, including culture, history, social studies, environment, digital media, etc. The methodology of the project is based on the affordances of semiotics of culture and the interdisciplinary dialogue with other disciplines, such as psychology, media and education studies. Through this project, Fadeev and his colleagues are able to gain practical results and publish articles, while also engaging with cultural and educational institutions.²⁴²⁵

Fadeev offered some further information about his project after the interview: “For the recent years we have been developing a collaborative project with the Estonian National Museum. The result of this collaboration is the course on Estonian culture, which is based on the platform “Education on Screen”, but which at the same time includes visits to the museums, workshops and various interactive activities. The course is meant for newcomers, international students, and everyone interested in Estonian culture, history and identity. Beginning from this semester we even offer it as a university course. So students can also get credits for it (you can find it on SIS). We welcome everyone and especially students from our department!”


A second project the scholar is a part of has to do with inner speech research, which is a project being developed between the semiotics and psychology departments. As Fadeev states, the project tries “[...] to understand how inner speech is involved in the meaning-making of various artistic texts [...]” which includes texts in digital form. After the interview Fadeev clarified that, specifically, this project is interested in how internalised verbal speech is involved in the interpretation, creation/generation of non-verbal artistic texts. This collaboration between the semiotics and psychology departments, allows for a multi-view perspective on inner speech, which Fadeev calls a ‘multifaceted phenomenon’, and as such this collaboration may allow for a more holistic view of inner speech and meaning making.

Fadeev, outside of the audio, mentioned a further project he is working, a podcast called “Alex Speaking Science” As he states:

“I am currently working on a popular science project, which is currently a podcast, but I am also considering a Youtube channel. The idea of the podcast is to

²⁴ Through this research project, a digital educational platform, called ‘Education on Screen’ (“Haridus Ekraanil”, est.), was developed that utilises cultural semiotics to create study materials for students and teachers (Ojamaa et al. 2019: 152-153). The platform mediates texts, with the intentions of helping students develop cultural skills needed for contemporary learners.

²⁵ The Education on Screen digital platform can be found in the following link: <https://haridusekraanil.ee/>



discuss (in a popular and understandable way) how we learn and what influences our learning abilities. So, you can see that it is related to what I am researching within my PhD thesis. And of course there I am discussing the basics of our learning process, as well as some actual questions, such as digital learning (and its effectiveness) or the role of the new media environment in learning processes. I am also considering discussing inner speech there and its role in our everyday life.”²⁶


4)

As a fourth question, I asked Fadeev: “Your PhD thesis, “The Role of the Semiotic Approach in L. S. Vygotsky’s Pedagogy” takes interest, as the title states, in the more semiotic aspect of Vygotsky’s work. Briefly, may you give a general overview of your thesis and what you are attempting to accomplish with it?” Fadeev replied stating that his PhD dissertation is intended to “[...] develop the understanding of how recent cultural changes, including digitalization, new forms of cultural communication, and so on, influence learning, and more precisely the acquisition and development of sign operation in learning.” His project also aims to identify the actuality, value and the possibility of a practical use of Vygotsky’s cultural historical theory in the context of contemporary culture regarding acquisition and the development of sign using activity, verbal and artistic languages, meaning-making, inner speech, semiotic mediation, etc. The PhD research argues for the necessity of addressing learning within contemporary culture through Vygotsky’s framework and analyses the affordances it provides for the contemporary understanding of learning processes and the development of sign operation. Fadeev is attempting to study these phenomena in a multidisciplinary manner, which also follows Vygotsky’s work, through using psychology, semiotics and other disciplines to create a more encompassing view of the objects of study.

5)

Fadeev answers the fifth question: “Why is Vygotsky important for contemporary semiotics” by first pointing out that Vygotsky was not a semiotician, and has never been seen as such, but that “[...] his contribution to semiotic science can never be overestimated and outcomes of his research continue to uncover new perspectives [...]” within semiotics and other areas. Fadeev mentions that Vygotsky is often referred to as the Mozart of psychology, as their lives share a number of similarities. Both men had short but productive lives; that though Vygotsky only died at age 37, he had by then made a large “[...] contribution to science in general [...]” which included psychology, educational science and semiotics, and which continues to be

²⁶ The link for Fadeev’s podcast, is here (<https://anchor.fm/aleks-fadeev>) and on Google too (<https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9hbmNob3luZm0vcy82NTExYjhhOC9wb2RjYXNOL3Jzcw==>).



important for these disciplines and relevant to new research. On another note, regarding Mozart and Vygotsky, one of Vygotsky's most anticipated works, *Thinking and Speech*, was not completely finished when he died, and as such has left many to wonder what may have developed from this. Because of this, today even his unpublished notes and lectures become of interest in the scientific community.


Focusing more specifically on Vygotsky and his influence on semiotics in general, Fadeev states that Vygotsky's cultural historical theory, which studies the role of 'science and science systems' in the development of higher psychological functions is especially important for current semiotics. According to Fadeev, 'culturally elaborated sign systems' are significantly important in the human learning and development processes, which includes the acquisition and use of verbal language. Vygotsky also focuses on thinking and speech process relationships, as well as the concept of meaning and its importance for human beings, symbolic mediation, inner speech etc. These, among other concepts and works, have been important for semiotics regarding research on learning, memory, development, and meaning. Moreover, Lotman, Bakhtin, Ivanov, and Valsiner all drew from Vygotsky's work.

Vygotsky's work has also been increasingly a point of interest in academia, this in part stems from English language academia, where English language publications and translations of Vygotsky's texts are becoming more prevalent. Additionally, technological changes in education and learning have allowed for new applications of Vygotsky's work as well. Fadeev states that the incorporation of digital technology, media, etc., have focused interest on how we learn and acquire knowledge in these environments. Moreover, Vygotsky's interest in inner speech and its importance for 'inner cognitive functions' has become easier to study due to the development of new research methodologies, renewing interests in these phenomena and Vygotsky's work.

According to Fadeev, Vygotsky's cultural historical theory is important for the semiotics of culture, especially in regard to researching artistic texts, but also artistic languages and learning. Moreover, the semiotician states that Vygotsky's importance to the semiotics of culture has grown with the increased use of the "[...] artistic languages of digital media in learning" and with the growing role of the new media environment in learning.

6)

Regarding the sixth question: "You have published and worked on a variety of topics including music, pedagogy, learning, literature, and psychology, perhaps you can discuss the important insights Vygotsky's scholarship has on these topics? Is there a common theme among these subjects that can be linked to, or by, Vygotsky's work?". Fadeev, in response states that the commonality between these subjects "[...] is actually Vygotsky himself [...] as Vygotsky was a 'multifaceted scientist'. Vygotsky was interested not only in medicine, art, and psychology, but also their relationships



as well as their relevance to education and learning. Fadeev states that “[...] high psychological functions, including consciousness, for example, and also the fact, that always even when he was discussing such complex high psychological functions as learning and memory, he links them to some examples with Literature.” As such Vygotsky’s multiple interests allowed him to take a multifaceted view, which Fadeev also states influences his own scientific approach.

Fadeev states that due to globalisation, it is necessary to approach scientific issues in a multidisciplinary way. This need for multifaceted views is, according to Fadeev, important for research on inner speech for instance. The semiotician discusses when he first began studying inner speech, stating that he understood the process needed to be studied as a complex phenomenon, and this was enforced by Fadeev’s previous experiences with fields like semiotics, psychology, music, education, neuroscience, etc.

7)

Fadeev responded to the seventh question: “What drew you to studying Vygotsky?” by referring to his experiences as a master level student, and his research on how students “[...] acquire the language of music in the context of contemporary learning environments.” Vygotsky’s multifaceted approach and its applicability for contemporary research on education and learning acted as a useful and helpful aid for Fadeev in developing his understanding on learning in current times.


8)

When questioned “Do you have any recommended literature to read for students new to Vygotsky?” Fadeev stated that the multidisciplinarity of Vygotsky’s work makes it hard to offer just a general recommendation. However, regarding semiotics, Vygotsky’s original works are recommended, and specifically, Ivanov’s article ‘Cultural-historical theory and semiotics’, published in 2014 in ‘The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology’ serves well as an introduction to Vygotsky’s “[...] contribution to semiotics and his theory”. Fadeev also recommends reading some of the leading researchers developing upon Vygotsky’s work, as well as those working within Vygotsky’s framework; classic works by scholars like Rene van der Veer, Jaan Valsiner (1991) or James Wertsch (1985).

9)

“What are some guides, commentaries or critiques that you believe are particularly important or useful for students and scholars interested in gaining more insight into Vygotsky?”

According to Fadeev, there is a “[...] growing interest in Vygotsky’s scholarship, especially in the English speaking scientific community. There have been a lot of new works published, which analyze, or somehow conceptualise Vygotsky’s works in relation to contemporary situations.” However, many of these texts sometimes




simplify Vygotsky's concepts (maybe to make them an easy solution for complex scientific issues), and as such Fadeev recommends sticking with texts authored by the scholar or key scholars of his works (mentioned above). Fadeev also argues that if a scholar is working with other authors engaged in Vygotsky's scholarship, that said scholar should do their own research on works that are being analysed as well. This is important as Vygotsky requires careful readings, as he tends to write in a condensed manner, and as such it can be easy to misunderstand, or not fully understand aspects of his work, as Fadeev states: "[...] one sentence can actually contain the whole world inside it."

10)

In reply to the final question: "Are there any challenges in studying Vygotsky that are particular to certain language translations or translators, for instance, other insights, uh, that Estonian or English translations may miss when compared to Russian texts?" Fadeev states that this is a common issue within translations, and Vygotsky's work is no exception. As Fadeev mentioned earlier, Vygotsky's works are often quite dense and complex, and as such translations may reduce some meanings. This sometimes leads to simplifications of Vygotsky's concepts or misunderstandings. However new editions attempt to overcome such problems. Another problem is that relatively little of his work has been translated, and some of Vygotsky's terms have been translated in different ways, making further work with them difficult. One example is his most famous work "Мышление и речь" (Rus.), which was translated as "Thought and Language" and later editions were translated as "Thinking and Speech". If you read the work, you will understand that these two names actually carry different connotations in relation to the ideas the author developed. This also happens with more specific things like with Vygotsky's concepts. Fadeev raises a further point about translation and Vygotsky regarding the text, '*Tool and symbol in child development*' (*Vygotsky and Luria 1994*), which was published posthumously by Alexander Lauria in the English language; the article was forbidden from publication in the Soviet Union. Later the article appeared in the Russian language, but was eventually retranslated into Russian as the source text does not seem to exist, and now there is some debate regarding the validity of Lauria's work.

As the final point on translating Vygotsky, according to Fadeev, is the scholar's style of writing. Vygotsky often links and references art and literature within his work. Here, he not only uses empirical studies to exemplify and explain concepts, but also arts. However this also leads to a further issue with his work, as according to Fadeev, Vygotsky's experiments are often not referenced within his texts, which makes it difficult to further investigate his scholarship. However, again the recent editions (e.g. by van der Veer and Wertsch) attempt to overcome this problem by publishing Vygotsky's works with such references.



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EDITED BY: Letícia Vitral, Andrew Mark Creighton

EDITORIAL TEAM: Andrew Mark Creighton
Eleni Alexandri
Karl Kivastik
Katre Pärn
Keily Tammaru
Nelly Mäekivi

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